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SUMMARY 
 
This research highlights the issues of kampung settlement in Jakarta, the capital city of 
Indonesia. Globalization has resulted big cities being caught in the wave of modern 
development, including Jakarta. The attempt to eradicate slum or kampung settlements in 
Jakarta has become one of the city’s development priorities, which suits the spirit of modern 
progress. Kampung settlement, where the poor lives in unplanned settlements amongst 
degraded physical conditions - is considered the scapegoat of various environmental hazards. 
Furthermore, it stains the beautification image of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. 
Slum or kampung settlements have been understood as a transitory condition which will fade 
away with economic development. However, economic development leads to uncontrollable 
urbanization and has created enormous economic disparities. This condition provides housing 
deficits, infrastructure deficiencies, and rapid growth of kampung settlements. In the case of 
Jakarta (Indonesia), staggering economic development cannot automatically eradicate the slum 
or kampung settlements.  
There have been many eviction programs since independence to diminish kampung settlements 
in Jakarta, yet they still remain. Evidence has shown that 13.52% (88.80 km2) of the total size 
of Jakarta is still identified as kampung settlements. An incapacitated government that is unable 
to provide affordable housing for kampung residents and flooding migrants have been 
attributed as the sources of this failure. Although the government has enacted the concept of 
Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Area to distribute the flow of migrants and develop housing in 
surrounding Jakarta, the kampung settlements still persist and remain in the city. As an 
alternative, various improvement programs have been also delivered to increase the living 
quality of kampung settlements such as the Kampung Improvement Program in the 1970s-
1980s, also Thematic and Row Houses Program in 2010s. However, such programs still cannot 
eradicate the kampung settlement from Jakarta. Experiences from these programs demonstrate 
that the kampung settlements will continue to co-exist in the city despite persistent economic 
development. Additionally, the limited outcomes of various kampung improvement programs 
indicates the necessity to understand kampung settlements beyond their physical features.  
It is understandable that the focus of various kampung improvements has been on the physical 
features, as kampung has been considered synonymous with slum. The definition of slum 
emphasizes the lack of legal status and poor physical features. Whereas the term ‘kampung’ 
the well-known synonym for slum in Indonesia, is solidly cemented in its spatial and social 
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characteristics, rather than the physical and legal condition. Kampung might appear chaotic 
and unorganized from a modern planning point of view, but living in a kampung has to be seen 
as an organic process in which planning is done bottom-up within the neighborhood. Therefore, 
the physical intervention approach of kampung improvement programs cannot be delivered 
successfully without a comprehensive understanding of the social characteristic of kampung 
residents. These characteristics have enabled the residents to produce their own code for land 
tenure security, the function of the house as production (economy) and reproduction (domestic) 
space, and building regulations, which is different from the modern approach.  
This research aims to understand the housing code of kampung settlement, which covers the 
land tenure security, the mixed-function of houses, and building regulations. The questions 
addressed are why the housing code is produced, and what kinds of the housing code are 
evident in the kampung settlement of Jakarta. The result will contribute to finding a suitable 
approach for house improvement in kampung settlements in the future. 
In order to achieve the aims, a case study research method has been selected. Selecting a single 
case study provides the opportunity to attain a comprehensive understanding of the spatial and 
social characteristics of a specific kampung settlement. Although Jakarta, especially Central 
Jakarta, experiences modern development, some kampung settlements still remain. Pegangsaan 
is the one of the high-density sub-districts (27,335 persons /km2) in Central Jakarta. Kampung 
Cikini is identified as a high-density kampung settlement, where 942 households (+ 3,800 
persons) live in 4.01 hectares (+ 95,000 persons/ km2). 
This research covers 4 (four) different topics in the single case of kampung settlement in 
Jakarta. These topics are: 1) the history of kampung settlement in Jakarta and Cikini, as the 
research location; 2) the code of land tenure security; 3) the code of the function of the house; 
and 4) the code of building regulation. Overall, the research is reported in 6 (six) chapters. 
Chapter I illustrates the false conception of kampung as a transitory settlement that diminishes 
with economic development. Through descriptive statistical investigation, this research 
demonstrates that economic development has failed to eradicate kampung settlement from 
Jakarta. Various improvement programs also failed to attain a complete eradication of kampung 
settlement. This chapter also introduces the research aims, questions and methodology. 
Chapter II consists of the historical investigation of kampung in Jakarta and Cikini. The 
investigation used an archival research method and semi-structured interviews with the local 
administrative leaders and senior citizens. From the archival investigation, it emerged that 
kampung grew as segregated autonomous settlements and benefits the planned settlements for 
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providing cheap labors. The autonomy was granted by Dutch Colonials, allowing residents to 
manage their own issues and arrange the settlements. This autonomy was sustained in the 
Independence Era during the Old Order Regime (1945-1965), New Order Regime (1966-1998), 
and until the present Reform Era. Several policies were enacted, solidifying the resident’s 
autonomy in managing their own issues and settlements arrangement. This was done through 
self-help land management that was in keeping with the spirit of mutual assistance, a value of 
the nation. Furthermore, the acknowledgment of their identities, which enables them to exercise 
political rights, utilize city infrastructure and facilities, and obtain intervention programs, was 
legalized in several policies. The establishment of the sub-district board by city government 
has reinforced this acknowledgment, as the kampung residents have representation to voice 
their aspirations and advocate for their role in policy decision making. It also provides access 
and power for kampung residents to obtain job opportunities, donations, and facilities to 
improve their settlement, in exchange for security and administrative assistance. As the result, 
Kampung Cikini has been developed from a segregated to an institutionalized autonomous 
settlement. 
However, several policies were developed and enacted to challenge the granted autonomy. The 
development of housing, spatial order and building laws have resulted in a city spatial plan that 
changes Kampung Cikini to a high-density commercial area and social facilities with a green 
open space along the edge of Ciliwung River. Consequently, Kampung Cikini has been 
experiencing eviction threats, challenging their autonomy. Despite these tenacious challenges, 
the kampung residents still produce and practice their own codes, which encompass land tenure 
security, the function of the house and building regulation. 
Chapter III explains what kinds of the code exist for land tenure security in Kampung Cikini. 
This study was conducted with group and individual interviews with 79 of 942 households in 
Kampung Cikini. There are two types of tenure security: objective and subjective. The first 
refers to the acknowledgment of land ownership by the government. The second corresponds 
to the acknowledgment of land ownership by oral community recognition. The first relies on 
government regulation, while the second relies on the customary and religious law or 
consensual agreement among residents. 
In the Dutch Colonial Era, objective tenure security was obtained with the Right to Build and 
Girik Letter. In the Independence Era, the previous landowners maintained the objective tenure 
security with the existing document, while the migrants relied on the oral community 
recognition as the evidence of land ownership status. In 1960, the Government of Indonesia 
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enacted Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) to arrange the land ownership formally. It orders all 
landowners to register their lands with the National Land Agency (NLA) for receiving 
Objective Tenure Security, such as right of ownership. BAL provides the procedure of land 
registration, which is obligatory. 
The findings show that only a small number of respondents registered their lands under Basic 
Agrarian Law to receive Right of Ownership, thus holding Objective Tenure Security. While 
most of respondents hold Subjective Tenure Security. They claimed their land tenure security 
by possessing various documents, which are not acknowledged by government. 
There are several obstacles to comply with BAL: 1) inadequate knowledge about land 
registration because it is very complicated and confuses the residents; 2) financial 
unaffordability, because the cost of land registration is very expensive, especially due to the 
location being in the center of the capital; and 3) fragmented policy, as the land registration 
must conform with the recent city plan. 
Furthermore, according to the respondents their Subjective Tenure Security is strengthened by 
the following additional factors: 1) The strategic location propels the land price which requires 
the government to provide a huge amount of compensation for eviction; 2) Various 
interventions to improve kampung are regarded as recognition of their existence; and 3) 
Political parties and the other organizations/groups support, which enable them to survive from 
fear of eviction over the years. 
These findings highlight that subjective tenure security emerges due to the incompatibility of 
the government regulated system with the condition of kampung residents to obtain objective 
tenure security. The type of subjective tenure security also expands from oral community 
recognition to the making of land ownership documents and other external factors. 
Chapter IV highlights the function of the house for kampung residents and its implication for 
self-help house improvement. The house for kampung residents has dual function: reproduction 
(domestic) and production (economy) activity. It is essential to combine production and 
reproduction activities in the house to ensure the household’s livelihood is sustainable, and thus 
empower residents in performing self-help house improvement, regardless of the land tenure 
security status. This phenomenon is well-known as Home-Based Enterprises (HBE). 
From 942 households, around 30% (approximately 300 households) perform HBE. However, 
according to interviews and observations, only 133 households have established permanent 
HBE, while others are temporary. From 133 households, 54 respondents volunteered to share 
information by interview and observation.  
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The findings demonstrate that most HBE owners tend to mobilize their own resources as 
financial capital, in order to preserve harmony among residents and to avoid the possibility of 
generating conflict regarding production activities. The accumulated financial capital and 
existing house size are the primary resources to start HBE. These two factors also help 
determine the types of commodity. However, the surrounding neighbors and existing HBE 
owners also play a pivotal role in determining the type of commodity. This relates to a desire 
to maintain a competitive market and social agreement among residents.  
The Head of Community and Neighborhood Association are the authority to issue permission 
when the type of commodity generates a large numbers of consumers, which may compromise 
the security of the neighborhood. It becomes the recognized code of the HBE in Kampung 
Cikini. Therefore, HBE cannot be considered only as an individual production activity but also 
one with community involvement, as the surrounding neighbors, existing HBE owners and 
Head of NA all have a decisive role in determining commodity types and permit issuance for 
HBE operation. 
The assumption that HBE will generate self-help house improvement, was built on the 
increasing income of the owners. It is proven that just under half of the respondents manage to 
improve their houses, and do so to increase the sales, preserve privacy and/or elevate their 
social status. However, most of respondents are reluctant to improve their houses because the 
HBE owner’s lack of priority, knowledge and space. 
The first impediment corresponds to how households prioritize their finances, and it is evident 
that self-help house improvement is not a priority. The second relates to the inability to deliver 
self-help house improvement within the available, limited budget. The third highlights that 
self-help house improvement will compromise their well-established production activity. 
While the last is specific to renters, as the lack of ownership impedes their ability to improve 
their rental dwellings. 
Although the HBE does not depend on the land ownership, self-help house improvement does 
correlate to land ownership. Therefore, HBE does not automatically ignite self-help house 
improvement, because it also depends on the land ownership.  
Furthermore, the preservation of a well-developed production activity indicates that self-help 
house improvement is the least priority, because of the economic opportunity in the city center. 
It illustrates that the production activity is indispensable from the house in kampung settlement. 
The mixture of individual production and reproduction activity with community involvement 
is the code of house in kampung settlement.  
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Chapter V focuses on the code of building regulation in Kampung Cikini, as the government 
regulation is unsuitable due to its high production and maintenance costs. The kampung 
residents produces the Unwritten Building Shared Rules (UBSR), which are affordable 
guidelines for building and improving houses in order to prevent hazards and maintain the 
social harmony.  
This study was located in Neighborhood Association 7, the only area in Kampung Cikini that 
still practices UBSR. There are 50 from a possible 96 household heads participated as 
respondents. The main objectives are hazard prevention and the preservation of social 
harmony. 
According to the 50 respondents, there are 3 (three) ways to encourage the awareness of UBSR, 
which are: internship, community meetings and neighbors discussion. The internship is 
affirmed by most respondents as the most efficient way. The engagement of community 
members in housing improvement and community facility provision, enables the local leaders 
and builders to transfer technical knowledge and UBSR to the rest of community. 
Although aware of UBSR, most of the respondents attempt to negotiate UBSR by achieving its 
main objective via other feasible methods that are appropriate to their financial capacity and 
spatial needs. The negotiation and collaboration with neighbors has become a popular method 
to negotiate UBSR. It illustrated that the UBSR is not a fixed and rigid building activities 
regulation, but rather an open-ended mechanism that has evolved with the built form of the 
kampung settlement.  
The chaotic appearance is not the result of the absence of UBSR but the evolution of the multi-
level mechanism of the UBSR. It also illustrates that the codes of building regulation are hazard 
prevention and maintenance of social harmony, which adapt with the financial capacity and 
spatial needs of the residents. 
Chapter VI concludes with the existence and practice of the code in Kampung Cikini. First, the 
code of Land Tenure Security emerges as the kampung residents cannot meet the State’s land 
registration but need to provide their own tenure security for living in the settlement. The code 
has expanded from oral community recognition to provision of written evidence, and 
strengthening external factors, ranging from benefit of increasing land price, various 
intervention programs from multi-parties and support from political parties.  
Second, the code for the function of the house in Kampung Cikini relates to the mixed-
functions of production and reproduction activities. It is essential to provide additional income 
to survive in the city center. This code is different to the program of mono-functional houses, 
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which are prescribed by modern planning and regulated by the government. However, the 
predicted self-help housing improvement cannot be delivered automatically, as the land 
ownership becomes a pivotal factor, along with other factors such as: lack of priority, 
knowledge and space. The last three factors indicate that sustaining production activity is 
considered higher priority than self-help house improvement, which also strengthens the 
importance of this activity in the house for kampung residents. However, the mixture of activity 
must be coordinated with the surrounding neighbors to ensure the preservation of social 
harmony.  
The third topic relates to building regulation, as kampung residents cannot comply with the 
building regulation by government. However, they must meet their spatial needs and hazard 
prevention requirements within the constraints of their financial capacity, preserve social order.  
UBSR is the embodiment of housing code in kampung settlement that is created by the 
residents, and aims to build and improve houses and facilities. It was consensually enacted, but 
gradually allows modification to meet the needs of space and financial capacity of the residents. 
Modification is accepted as long as the result still respects hazard prevention objectives and 
aims to preserve social harmony by gaining approval from the surrounding neighbors. 
These three topics emphasize that the emergence of the housing code results from government 
regulations, relating to land tenure security, house function and building regulation, which are 
fragmented and not compatible for kampung residents to meet their spatial needs and financial 
capacity.  
The housing code has its roots in the Dutch colonial era, as kampung settlements were excluded 
from city development and they were endowed with autonomy. Their autonomy remains 
unacknowledged by the government as their existence in kampung settlements is continually 
challenged with continuous eviction threats. It is anonymous, as the existence of kampung 
settlements remain unacknowledged by the government, despite residents having obtained 
legitimate identity cards to allow access to city infrastructure, receive intervention programs 
and exercise their political rights.  
However, the fragmented policies allow the kampung residents to exist in the city center, as 
they are needed by the modern development. In order to preserve their existence in the city 
center, it is essential to acknowledge the autonomy and respect to the existing housing codes 
in kampung settlement, to help find a suitable approach for house improvement in kampung 
settlement in the future.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 SLUM SETTLEMENT AS THE INSEPARABLE URBAN ENTITY 
I.1.1 Challenging the Slum Settlement as the Transitionary Phenomenon 
According to the Global Report on Human Settlements (UN-Habitat, 2011), only 8.2% of the 
world’s urban population lived in megacities larger than 10 million people in 2000. This 
number will continue to grow to 10.4% by 2020. In 2000, the average size of the world’s largest 
cities was around 6.3 million inhabitants; an increase from 2.1 million in 1950 and 5.1 million 
in 1990 (Wisner et al., 2004; Satterthwaite, 2005).  
 
Figure I-1: Growth of urban population in 1950-2010, and projections for 2010-2050. 
Source: UN-Habitat (2011) 
 
According to the Figure I-1 and Evers & Korff (2003), the fastest rate of urbanization in the 
world occurs on the Asian continent, with urban populations projected to reach 3.4 billion in 
2050, with increasing housing demand amounting to approximately 20,000 housing units/ day 
(UN-Habitat, 2011) in cities such as Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta (UN-Habitat, 2008). 
Economic growth due to globalization and industrialization has triggered the migration of 
villagers to the city. This shift has contributed to the expansion of urban areas and the creation 
of slum settlements. These slum settlements are the sole option for the influx of migrants, and 
have become one of the notorious urban challenges for developing countries. Slum settlements 
started to emerge as shelter for urban inhabitants, as most of them are excluded from formal 
housing sectors. 
Urbanization is believed to be a trigger of economic development, but unfortunately its benefits 
have never been equally distributed to all urban inhabitants. Drakakis-Smith (1996) asserted 
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that massive urbanization has led cities to enormous housing and infrastructure deficits. In 
many cities, personal annual income cannot cope with the increasing living costs and 
consequently, the number of urban poor increases and their ability to obtain decent housing in 
the formal market is limited. Therefore, it is not the urbanization that causes slum settlement, 
but economic disparity. This condition, according to UNCHS (1999), occurs because of the 
insufficient capacity of the government. 
Most governments in developing countries regarded the proliferation of slum settlements as a 
transitionary phenomenon that would gradually fade away with economic development 
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989; Takahashi, 2009). In his perspective, Todaro (1969) perceived 
that migrants move to the city due to the rural-urban income differential. Slum settlements 
develop because migrants initially gain a foothold in the 'urban traditional sector' before they 
are able to move on to the 'modern sector'. In this view, slums might only be considered a 
temporary phenomenon, since the urban traditional sector is preparing the urban poor for the 
advancement into the modern sector. The argument of Todaro became a prominent modern 
development theory in the 1960s.  
According to this argument, the slum settlement will slowly diminish as the urban population 
gains the modern employment with the growth of GRDP and income/capita. The following 
sub-chapter will explain the Indonesian experience relating to this argument. 
 
I.2 DEFINITIONS OF SLUM AND KAMPUNG 
I.2.1 Definition of Slum 
According to Benevelo (1980), the word slum was first coined in 1812 and was derived from 
slumber, which refers to a sleepy unknown black alley.  However, d’ Cruz and Satterthwaite 
(2005) identified the word slum which was originated from an old English or German word 
meaning “a poorly drained place, was originally applied to describe the cheap rental housing 
of the working class”. Later, the term was used in one of Engels’ writings in 1835, Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific, to describe the housing condition of the exploited and oppressed 
working class in industrial-era Europe. Since the 19th century, the word ‘slum’ relates to “low 
quality in sporadic parts of town” (UN-Habitat, 2003). 
The term slum generally refers to two aspects. On the one hand, it is linked to a settlement 
pattern characterized by sub-standard housing and a lack of infrastructure. On the other hand, 
the slum settlement is commonly perceived as the living place of people engaged in alternative 
economic activities. Stokes (1962) argued that the function of the slum settlement at any stage 
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of city development is to house those classes which do not participate directly in the economic 
and social life of the city.  
Since then it has been associated with disparate meanings. Gilbert (2007) noted the concept of 
slum is underpinned by a correlation between health issues and the built settlement. This note 
explains why many definitions of slum relate to health criteria.  Cities Alliance (1999) and UN-
Habitat (2002) characterized slums as a group of individuals living under the same roof in an 
urban area with at least one of four key deprivations: 1) lack of access to improved water 
supply; 2) lack of access to improved sanitation; 3) overcrowding (more than three persons per 
room); and 4) dwellings made of non-durable materials. UNSECO (in Bala & Kumar, 2013) 
has defined slum as a building, a group of buildings or an area characterized by overcrowding, 
deterioration, unsanitary conditions, or absence of facilities or amenities. While UNCHS 
(2002) defined a slum as a low-income settlement and/or poor human living conditions.  
Bose (1995) defines a slum as a deprived and vulnerable human settlement because of extreme 
overcrowding, poverty, and the lack of access to basic services. Most definitions refer to an 
area with inadequate housing, deficient amenities, facilities, overcrowding and congestion 
(Clinard, 1970 in Bala & Kumar, 2013). In the UNFPA document (2007) and UN-Habitat 
(2003), slum is frequently termed as ghetto1, informal2 or shantytown3 settlement that is 
occupied by squatters4.  
                                                             
1  The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) stated the word ‘ghetto’ derives from the the German gitter or the 
Talmudic Hebrew get, Italian getto, meaning foundry, based on the original Jewish quarter in Venice. While 
according to Wirth (1928), the word ‘ghetto’ relates to the Jewish quarter of a city. In medieval Europe, Jews 
were commonly allotted quarters wherein they resided, administered their own affairs, and followed their 
customs (Sennett, 1994). Social life in the Jewish ghetto was turned inward and verged ‘on over-organization’ 
(Drake & Cayton, 1993; Gay, 1992; Wirth, 1928), so that it reinforced both integration within and isolation 
from without. It refers to urban enclaves that were composed primarily of one racial or ethnic group, which 
was enforced by restricted zoning and covenants (Massey & Denton, 1993; DeVos & Wagatsuma, 1966; 
Hane, 1982). However Forman (1971) identified difference between ghetto and slum, where ghetto is the 
result of racial or cultural characteristics, and slum is determined by economic factors. Wirth (1928) affirmed 
the ghetto as a natural result of human migration, which was challenged by Wacquant (2004) as the ghetto as 
spatial confinement was a product of political action of the dominate class. In medieval Europe, Jews were 
commonly allotted quarters wherein they resided, administered their own affairs, and followed their customs 
(Sennett, 1994). Social life in the Jewish ghetto was turned inward and verged ‘on over-organization’ (Wirth, 
1928), so that it reinforced both integration within and isolation from without. 
2   According to Pieterse (2014 in Thieme & Kovacs, 2015), the term of informal settlement refers to their 
illegality or lack of compliance with planning and tenure regulations. 
3   Shanties implies the crudely built shacks‘ frequently made out of cardboard, ‘hastily thrown up‘ on the 
‘outskirts‘ of towns, unable to withstand the elements. See Pieterse (2014 in Thieme & Kovacs, 2015). 
4   The term of ‘squat’ relates to illegal land occupation with temporary housing without legal title (UN-Habitat, 
2003) to experience better condition than rural condition (UN-Habitat, 2011). In his book Planet of Slums, 
Davis (2006) introduced ‘pirate urbanism’ to describe this kind of land occupation, where the squatters make 
land ownership claim which does not belong to them legally according to the government. It shares similar 
interpretation with Singh (2003), who define ‘squatting’ as the appropriation of another person’s land for 
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Bala and Kumar (2013) explained three scenarios of the growth of slums, such as: 1) squatting 
of poor migrants; 2) the deterioration of a group of buildings in the older part of the city; and 
3) the imposition of urban land use on agricultural land, as a consequence of city expansion 
whereby the existing residential areas of peasant villages remain with insufficient 
infrastructure. As the rent and land-price are low due to the lack of infrastructure, it becomes a 
suitable place for the settlement of poor migrants (Rao & Rao, 1984). Based on the scenarios, 
slum is a consequence of poverty (Ali & Singh, 1998; Thakur & Dandave, 1987 in Bala & 
Kumar, 2013). 
According to the aforementioned definitions, the term ‘slum’ relates to a settlement in poor 
condition as a result of poverty. Therefore, slum is not acknowledged by the government as an 
integral part of the city, but as a city problem which needs to be solved (Caldeira, 1996 quoted 
in UN-Habitat, 2003). This definition becomes the reference for government in developing 
countries to eradicate slum settlements with economic development and physical improvement 
approaches5.  
 
I.2.2 Definition of Kampung 
The kampung has been known as a space for nomads. Kampung is a process of space 
occupation, a living organism in the form of a place, rather than merely a form of place. In the 
Malay region, etymologically ‘kampung’ refers directly to rural villages. This differs in 
Indonesia, where the concept relates to urban neighborhoods (Thompson, 2006). The Malay 
word ‘Kampung’ first entered the Portuguese and Dutch languages in the 1600s and 
experienced several variations in spelling such as Campon/ Campong and Campond/ 
Kampund. The word Campong officially stood for urban wards or neighborhoods in official 
town maps and plans drawn by European colonial authorities. The original form, “Kampung”, 
finally entered official English usage nearly 200 years later in 1836-1845. Englishmen later 
began to use the word to indicate the enclosed quarters in India and then afterward in Africa 
(Shiino in Funo et. al., 2002). It is usually understood as ‘village’, which obscures its other 
meanings. 
In Cham and Ede, which are languages of Malayo-Polynesians in Central Vietnam, Kompong 
/Kpong means “settlement at a Boat Harbour”. It gives a clue to the initial arrival of Malayo-
                                                             
one’s own use without title or rights. This kind of claim is essential in order to survive due to the 
incompatibility with the government regulation (Benjamin, 2008).  
5    These approaches will be explained in Section I.3 according to the experience of Indonesia. 
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speakers through maritime trade up the mainland Southeast Asian coasts and rivers. In Malay, 
the verb “berkampung” (to form a kampung) means to gather, to come together. It also can be 
used to denote coming together for major festivities, and to form a settlement unit. 
While in English, the term ‘Compound’ refers to the spatial entity applied to a two-storey house 
type, is derived from the Malay term ‘Kampung’. It originally indicated the quarter occupied 
by the same ethnic group in Batavia (now Jakarta) and Malacca. These are ethnic and 
occupational neighborhood units that helped to characterize pre-colonial cities in the islands of 
Southeast Asia. The same word exists in several native languages in Indonesia, such as 
Acehnese (gampong) with the same meaning. While in Javanese, it corresponds to urban 
entities, to parts of towns and cities. Reid (1979) argued, the word ‘kampung’ denotes 
'compound', which is most typically the walled yards, gardens, and residences of well-to-do 
families. 
Van Grunsven (1983) used the term ‘urban kampungs’ and defined them as ‘autonomous 
settlements’, as they were acknowledged by the landlords. The residents were paying rent for 
a piece of land and constructed houses with semi-permanent materials without planning 
approval. Furthermore, Lee (1996) believes kampung settlements are not always ‘sinks of 
degradation’, because quite a few accommodate middle-income Indonesians. Therefore, the 
comprehension of kampung must be solidly cemented in its spatial and social characteristics. 
Therefore, the working definition of kampong in this research is ‘urban neighborhood which 
is once based on demographic preferences, within the spirit of commonalities.  
However, this image of the kampung is close to the several general aspects of the definition of 
‘slum’, including: 1) lack of basic infrastructure; 2) substandard housing conditions; 3) high 
density of people and buildings; 4) situated in a hazardous location; and 5) insecure tenure and 
low-income inhabitants (UN-Habitat, 2003). As they were living without planning approval, 
kampung residents were associated with criminals. Nonetheless, the existing definitions of 
slum do not reflect the complexity in the specific local case (Korff, 1986).   
 
I.2.3 ‘Kampung as Slum’: Stigmatization for Eviction 
Depaule (2006 in Valladares, 2009), Gilbert (2007) also Mukhija and Monkkonen (2007) have 
warned to use this word with caution because of its negative connotations and generalization6. 
They argued that the negative connotations have been stigmatizing the neighborhoods, thus 
                                                             
6   The term slum is frequently depicted images of disorder, crime, immorality (Davis, 2004, 2006) and a 
cancerous growth that must be cured (Stokes, 1962). 
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impeding innovative solutions to improve the living condition of the residents (UN Habitat, 
2003, 2008). The negative connotations help to justify the structural violence towards the 
residents through massive dispossession7 (Escobar, 2004; Springer, 2011). This concept 
underlines the dependency of accumulation of capital in the city on the social and economy 
disparities of the surrounding areas (Amin, 1976; Levien, 2013), in order to obtain cheap labor 
(Whitehead in Eckers, 2013) and commoditization of nature (Ayelazuno, 2011). Therefore, if 
the social and economy disparity becomes an indispensable source for accumulation of the 
capital in the city, the slum settlements are the inevitable consequence, as they hold pivotal role 
in the accumulation of a pool of affordable labor and resources. This condition should be 
comprehended as the reality of postcolonial cities, where informality and illegality become the 
inevitable characters (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006) and somehow ‘institutionalized’ 
(Nordstrom, 2004). Schrader (2004) argues that a slum (in this case, ‘kampung as slum’) cannot 
only be seen as a large size of people is living in inappropriate conditions, but also a highly 
complex space with socioeconomic connections to formal and informal economies. 
Therefore, according to Perlman (1976), the slum residents are not socially and culturally 
marginal, but unacknowledged by the government code because of this stigmatization. This 
stigmatization encourages prejudice towards them (Sennett, 1994) and makes them segregate 
spatially from the modernized part of the city (Caldeira, 2003; Massey & Denton, 1992). 
Appadurai (2000) concluded that the relationship of spatial segregation and economic 
integration is ironic, where high-income citizens need to be close to the stigmatized lower-
income citizens. 
Kampung can be regarded as ‘slums’ due to similarities in physical characteristics. However, 
the aforementioned arguments claimed the definition of ‘kampung’ is more than the apparent 
physical conditions, but lies also in the social cohesiveness. Based on similarities, city 
governments and planners regarded kampung as ‘slums’ and the nemesis of city development 
(Leaf, 1992; Jellinek, 1991). This limited comprehension of kampung has diminished the 
essence of kampung settlements and leads to inevitable failures in the improvement projects. 
 
                                                             
7  The origin concept of ‘dispossession’ was introduced by Marx (1976), which refers to the separation of the 
land with the peasant and transform them into industrial workers. This concept latter was developed by 
Harvey (2003, 2014) with the concept ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ (ABD), which highlighted the 
accumulation of the capital by separating the land with the owners in order to increase the growth of 
industrialization. Many studies have underlined the abdicable result of uneven development in developing 
countries (Levien, 2013), such as slum proliferation (Ayelazuno, 2011; Bond, 2006; Chatterjee, 2008; 
Gillespie, 2013; Hall, 2012; Kozul-Wright & Rayment, 2007; Kuriakose, 2014; Smith, 1996; Tyner, 2013). 
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I.3 ‘KAMPUNG AS SLUM’ AS INTEGRAL PART OF THE CITY 
I.3.1 Perseverance ‘Kampung as Slum’ in Indonesia’s Economy Growth 
Since the New Regime era (1966-1998) and continuing in the Reformation Era from 1998 
onwards, economic development has been widespread in order to reduce poverty and the 
unemployment rate. Although the number of poor and unemployed persons in the nation kept 
growing from 1990-2000, the slum population has been successfully reduced with the public 
housing program provision. This best practice was implemented between 2000-2007, achieving 
a decline in the slum population and poor population, despite significant unemployment 
figures. However, the condition somewhat inverted in 2007-2014, as the slum population 
continued to grow despite a decline in populations of the poor and unemployed.  
 
Figure I.2: Number of Slum, Poor and Unemployed Population since 1990-2014 
Source: Central Statistic Bureau (2011-2014) and Graphic by Author 
 
In 1990-2000, the slum settlement population decreased as the population of unemployed and 
poor grew despite the increase of monthly income/ capita. This condition depicts the non-
correlation between the number of slum population with the poor population and 
unemployment. During the monetary crisis of 1997-1998, the number of poor population 
increased, although they did not live in slum settlement. At the same time and due to the same 
reasons, the number of unemployed increased.  
Despite the monetary crises, the monthly income/ capita in the same period still managed to 
grow from US$ 521 to US$ 603.46. In this period of time, the increases of monthly 
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income/capita managed to reduce the slum population, but not the poor and unemployment 
population. Therefore, the growth of slum population did not necessarily correspond to the 
poor and unemployed population. In 2000-2007, the number of slum population continued to 
decrease along with the number of poor population. This was accompanied by an increase of 
income/capita. However, the number of unemployed kept rising, indicating that the increase of 
income/capita was supported by informal employment as the formal employment opportunities 
failed to absorb the total population of the workforce. Nonetheless, in this period of time the 
increase of monthly income/capita succeeded to reduce the number of slum population, which 
still did not necessarily correspond to the settlement of the poor and unemployed.  
 
Figure I.3: Slum, Poor and Unemployment Population Growth since 1990-2014 
Source: Central Statistic Bureau (2011-2014) and Graphic by Author 
 
Although the income/capita persistently grew from 2007-2014, which enabled the State to 
reduce the number of poor and unemployed population, the slum population started to increase. 
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the decline of the poor and unemployed population and increasing income/capita. 
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was slower in 2009-2014 as the growth of the poor and unemployed population started to rise. 
These dynamic interactions occurred in the midst of an increasing income/capita since 1990-
2014. Therefore, the slum settlement will persistently co-exist in the city despite the tenacious 
economic development, and may not be solved only with the economic development approach. 
According to Indonesia’s experience, economic growth does not automatically eradicate the 
slum settlement from the urban and rural landscape.  
This experience is similar with the findings of a longitudinal study by Arimah (2010), who 
identified the prevalence of slums in a country was significantly correlated with a variety of 
aggregate economic indicators, including GDP per capita, the debt stock and debt service. It 
indicates urbanization and economy growth in developing countries are not significantly 
associated with welfare improvement (Marx, et al., 2013). Therefore, this experience 
demonstrated that slums do not illustrate a transitionary phenomenon of migration to cities, as 
they remain and co-exist in the city, as stated by Armstong and McGee (1985).  
 
I.3.2 Perseverance ‘Kampung as Slum’ in Jakarta’s Physical Improvement Programs 
Although the slum settlement cannot be considered as a temporary phenomenon and solved by 
modern employment provision, this paradigm has been haunting the city government’s 
mindset. The city government of DKI Jakarta tends to reduce the rampant onset of urbanization 
since 1970s, in order to create better living conditions for the city.  
Simultaneously, it demonstrates the willingness of the city government to improve the living 
quality of the DKI Jakarta province by reducing the density and numbers of migrants, which 
has been stigmatized as the scapegoat of slum proliferation in the capital. Within this logic, the 
growth of the poor significantly contributes to the growth of slum settlement proliferation, 
which must be eliminated in order to attain the development objectives of the capital city. 
The pace of population growth in the DKI Jakarta Province has slowed since 2011-2014, as 
shown in Figure I.5, indicating a promising outcome of the dispersal strategy. The dispersal of 
the population also reduced the number of poor population in all municipalities. This condition 
allowed the city government to stimulate economic development, and the result is promising. 
The average of GRDP growth reached around 60.00% in 2011-2014 and Central Jakarta 
municipality was recording the highest rate (65.88%). Figure I.5 illustrates a massive 
development of the commercial area in Central Jakarta, as the highest GRDP growth was 
accompanied with the massive decline in population.  
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Figure I.4: Population Growth in Jakarta Metropolitan Area 2011-2014 
Source: Central Statistic Bureau (2011-2014) and Graphic by Author 
 
Figure I.5: Poor Population and GDRP Growth of DKI Jakarta Province in 2011-2014 
Source: Central Statistic Bureau (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
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This phenomenon also occurred in Thousand Island and East Jakarta, where the immense 
commercial areas flourished. However, a different phenomenon occurred in South, West and 
North Jakarta, where the rapid GRDP growth has impacted the poor population but not the 
overall population. It indicates the increasing number of non-poor population residing in these 
municipalities, along the massive housing developments by the private sector. 
 
Table I.1: ‘Kampung as Slum’ Improvement Programs in Jakarta Province from 2011-2013 
Source: Central Statistic Bureau (2011, 2012, 2013) 
 
Municipality 
Number of 
Slums in 
2011 
The Improvement 
2011-2012 
Number of 
Slums in 
2012 
The Improvement 
2012-2013 
Number of 
Slums in 
2013 (n) (%) (n) (%) 
Thousand Island 9 3 33.33% 6 - 0.00% 6 
South Jakarta 80 20 25.00% 60 25 41.67% 35 
East Jakarta 113 38 33.63% 75 31 41.33% 44 
Central Jakarta 76 13 17.11% 63 17 26.98% 46 
West Jakarta 143 51 35.66% 92 26 28.26% 66 
North Jakarta 145 49 33.79% 96 29 30.21% 67 
DKI Jakarta 566 174 30.74% 392 128 32.65% 264 
 
In pursuing the dream of the modern city, the city government continues to improve the slum 
settlement, as forced evictions cannot be imposed due to human rights concerns and staggering 
land prices, which would significant impact the city budget due to required compensation to 
the victims (City Government of Jakarta Report, 2012). Gradually, since 2011-2013, the 
attempts demonstrated a promising result with the decline in the number of slum settlements. 
Nonetheless, the pace of slum improvement programs is still disappointing, especially in 
Central Jakarta and Thousand Island Municipality.  
The statistical investigation indicates that economic development measures – such as 
increasing the monthly income/capita and formal job opportunities – cannot automatically 
eradicate the slum settlements from Jakarta.  
In Central Jakarta, which is designated as the center of city development in pursuing the dream 
of a livable modern city, the staggering economic development cannot eradicate naturally the 
slum settlement significantly, which challenges the argument of modern urban development 
scholars. Therefore, the eradication of slum settlement cannot be comprehended only from the 
economic development perspective.  
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I.3.3 The Neglected Realities and Failure of Slum Alleviation Programs 
Hobson (1999) explained that new town planning, which emerged as a reaction to problems of 
the nineteenth-century industrial city, is the ultimate form of modernist planning. After the 
Second World War, it gained mass popularity. Modernist city planning was implemented as a 
solution to the previous failure of architecture and design to meet basic social needs 
(Greenhalgh, 1990). During the 1930s, 15% of the urban populations were living in poverty, 
and slum clearance was one of the many social problems of this decade. The desire to improve 
the quality of the physical environment of urban areas and accessibility within towns dominated 
physical planning practice of the 1950s and 1960s. 
In dealing with the myriad problems of urban environments, city planners perceived the city as 
a machine. In this view, the city was considered as an industrial object by breaking it down 
into its essential functions such as: housing, work, recreation, and traffic; manufacturing, 
standardizing and reassembling in Master Plans (Sandercock, 1998). This view also argued that 
the urban crisis would be resolved in the improvement of “standard” numeric leads to identify 
factors external to the discipline. However, it brings the social breakdown in the city, as the 
determined the zoning function fails to equalize the social and economic development (Savarro, 
2014).  
The aims of modernism were arguably noble in pursuit of individual liberty and human welfare, 
which can be achieved with the linear progress, positivist approach, technocratic solutions, 
rational planning of social and geographic space (Irving, 1993). The standardized knowledge 
and production are implemented in the rational ordering of urban space to achieve individual 
liberty and human welfare.  
These ideas, according to which planning’s central aim was the most technologically friendly 
and efficient urban form, came to dominate the profession of city planners and architects in 
building the efficient city in the post-World War years (Loukaitou-Sideris & Banerjee, 1998). 
The core of the idea is “good city planning is not primarily a matter of aesthetics, but of 
economics. Its basic principle is to increase the working efficiency of the city” (Ley in Agnew 
& Duncan, 1989). 
Ebenezer Howard became the pioneer of this segregation of zones. In 1898, he advocated for 
a complete social and functional structure, with sufficient jobs to make it self-supporting. The 
proposal was spaciously laid out to give light, air and gracious living, and surrounded by a 
green belt that would provide both farm produce for the population and opportunity for 
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recreation and relaxation. Although each function was divided by definite urban structure 
(Keeble, 1969), they are linked by a rapid transport system (Self, 1972).  
Following a 1926 US Supreme Court decision to safeguard property values from noxious land 
uses and neighbors, zoning became accepted as the principal planning tool (Hall, 1988). The 
result was the strict separation of work, home, marketplace and social life (Ley in Agnew & 
Duncan, 1989). This move, to create areas dedicated to specific purposes and to remove uses 
that conflicted, produced single-use central business districts, uniform housing tracts, and 
dispersed shopping centers and recreational facilities (Moe & Wilkie, 1997).  
The function based segregation led to the enactment of regulation for land tenure, mono-
functional land use zoning and building regulations. The first refers to defining the land 
ownership, the second corresponds to the land usage, while the third relates to the conformity 
of the building form, construction materials, requirement for setbacks and other defined 
prerequisite measurements of a building. 
This is the rationale for the evolution and/or enactment of various land use control laws and 
regulations designed to safeguard, conserve, disburse and regulate the use of land in the pursuit 
of respecting overall public interest (Agbola, 1997). These laws include zoning regulations, 
building by-laws, density controls, land acquisition laws, effluent discharge laws, etc. As a way 
of categorizing types of regional growth strategies, Nelson (2000) introduced a category of 
land use regulation, which he coined ‘urban containment’, to make development more compact 
and to preserve agriculturally and environmentally rich sources of open space beyond exurban 
areas.  
Historically, urban containment was also intended to prevent inferior public health conditions 
from migrating toward the suburbs (Simmie, et.al., 1992). A healthy, conducive and satisfying 
environment may not evolve from human settlements unless there is adequate provision for the 
monitoring and control of housing units.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that five million deaths and another two to 
three million cases of permanent disability could be prevented annually if housing conditions 
could meet a safe standard level. In most countries of the world, building regulations represent 
a collection of current and past wisdom on what constitutes a building that is both safe and will 
not impair the health of the occupants.  
The early building codes that attempted to improve environmental conditions include those that 
prescribed access to sunlight and ventilation, the structural integrity of buildings, protection 
from diseases spread by insects and rodents, minimal level of sanitation, and reduced housing 
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densities. As new problems in the level of the habitability of homes arose, and as these 
problems impaired the satisfaction of occupants with their housing and their safety, new 
building regulations evolved (Murta & Williams, 1987).  
As is to be expected, these standards vary from country to country and also over time within a 
given country according to the level of social, economic and cultural development of that 
nation. Since house building constitutes the most important land use element in most planning 
schemes, it is therefore mandatory that planning standards should be firmly entrenched in the 
building regulations of most countries. 
Significantly, city planning practice has drastically shifted from a skill based on personal 
knowledge of rudimentary concepts about the city, into a sophisticated scientific activity in 
which vast amounts of precise information are garnered and processed (Hall, 1988). At the 
most basic level, city planning regulations became a science of codes8, plot ratios, setbacks, 
percentages of open space, standardized road patterns (Newman & Kenworthy, 1999).  
As a code, city planning regulations have top-down and exclusive legal positivism characters, 
according to Durand and Vergne (2013). Because of these characters, city planning regulations 
must be complied by the whole population. However, these characters also exclude citizens, 
such as the kampung residents, who cannot afford to comply with the city regulations due to 
poverty. Durand and Vergne (2013) in their book, Pirate Organization, introduced the ‘Pirate 
Code’, which refers to the self-made regulations by the ‘excluded citizens’ in order to survive. 
The ‘Pirate Code’ has contradictory characteristics, which are bottom-up and inclusive legal 
positivism in order to adapt with their ever-changing socio-economic conditions.  
The distinction between the code of government and ‘the pirate’ (in this case, kampung 
residents) relates to the dichotomy between the formal and informal concepts. According to 
Boecke (1943), the first refers to activities that comes under the jurisdiction of government’s 
code, while the second to activities which occur outside the ambit of government codes. In 
terms of the physical conditions of settlements, Hernández and Kellet (2010) and Kamel (2014) 
defined that the term ´formal´ represents the ordered city, while the term ´informal´ connotes 
the disordered settlements.  
This dichotomy does not occur and practice dependently, but has a causal relationship. Several 
scholars (Agamben, 2005; Altrock, 2012; Gaffikin & Perry, 2012; Roy, 2005) argued that the 
                                                             
8  The term code is derived from Latin word, caudex, which means ‘book of law’. It evolved and adopted to 
English language which means ‘the set of rules or principle’. In their book, The Pirate Organization, Durand 
and Vergne (2013) defined the term code as the normative apparatus to arrange the way of conduct.  
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informal (‘pirate’ code and activities) co-exists as it is produced by the formal (government 
code and activities). The government code excludes some of those, who cannot comply with 
the enacted code, which indicates the government code has become the source of the ‘pirate’ 
code itself.  
However, the spatial segregation, since the colonial times, still allows a symbiotic economic 
relationship. According to his study in Mumbai (India), Falzon (2008) identified the upper-
class citizens depend on the lower-class citizens for maintaining their lifestyle.  
Although it is considered as disorder settlement, several studies (Brillembourg & Klumpner, 
2010; Luiz Lara, 2010; Marx, et al., 2013; Milbert, 2006; Ostrom, 1990) established the fact 
the ‘kampung as slum’ settlement has crafted creative solutions with different rules and 
procedures compared to the regulated architecture in the enacted laws and norms. These 
solutions occur in everyday urban life through persistent incremental efforts and practices of 
self-government9, by referring to Lefebvre (1996).  
In Kellett and Napier’s (1995) study of Santa Marta (Colombia) and Santos (1977) study of 
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), the regular grid plan of land subdivision by the residents was identified. 
‘Kampung as slum’ settlement has distinctive ‘codes’ that operate based on self-governance 
and a strong sense of individual and collective practice in the community10 (Beardsley, 2008; 
Gouverneur & Grauer, 2008; Schröder & Waibel, 2012).  
Schrader (2004), Magnusson (2011) and UN-Habitat (2014) added that the practice of self-
government of slum residents enables them to provide their own houses and infrastructure in 
                                                             
9   Ismael (2010) in his article, Self-Organization and Self-Governance, has demonstrated the difference between 
self-organization and self-governance. The main difference indicated was in the regularity and predictability, 
which belongs to the former, as it depends on the occurrence of stimulus. While the latter, self-governance 
was defined as the complex and open systems that are able to formulate goals, regulate the responses, decide 
the dynamic changes and immediate adaptations, which do not own by the self-organization. He emphasized 
once self-governing systems have appeared in the natural landscape, they can band together into self-
governing units regulated by rules of their own design. Concepts such as civil society, modernization, and 
human rights are discontinuous with the everyday reality of popular politics in post-colonial societies. In 
other words, there is a constitutive disjuncture between the intentions of enlightened elites to create rights-
bearing citizens and the political realities of the post-colony. The point to be stressed, however, is that popular 
politics, being contemporaneous with governmental politics, is not less modern than citizenship politics. It 
differs only in being a politics of the poor (Koster & de Vries, 2012). 
10  The term community, which has been in the English language since the 14th century (Williams 1976), has 
undergone metamorphosis over time. It revolves around ‘identity’, which relates to imagined commonalities 
among people who may not be personally acquainted, than with face-to-face interactions among people living 
in physical contiguity. Religious communities, caste communities, linguistic communities, migrant/diasporic 
communities, are some of examples of the community. The concept of community, as used in the urban 
context, refers to a spatio-temporal entity in which face-to-face interaction is by definition important (Maciver 
& Page 1962). It relates to argument of Lefebvre (1996), who affirmed the city dwellers are atomized 
individuals with segmented personalities as the result of urban life only recognises the universal human by 
erasing differences.  
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the absence of the intervention of the government. Graham and Marvin (2011) and Myers 
(2005) argued that it is impossible for the government programs to cope with the myriad of 
changes in population and its conditions. The practice, as Mingers (2004: 409) affirmed, 
consists of a code which is invariably made up of rules and resources.  
Despite adversity, the slum residents make significant contributions to the economic activity 
of the city, by participating as cheap labor in the formal sector. It is the site of economic 
autonomy as explained by Gibson-Graham (2008), which is flexible and pragmatic due to 
negotiation among residents (Bayat, 2007). This type of economy enables residents to create 
their own job opportunities (Crerar in Roy, 2011; (Enwezor, in Patteeuw 2003) amidst a well-
fabricated form of community self-government (Gandy, 2005; Godlewski, 2010). Therefore, 
Nijman (2010 in Roy, 2011) asserted the slum is more than a settlement of cheap laborers but 
a place of economic activity, which supports the formal economic sector. Even Peattie (1994) 
emphasized the need for cities to preserve and increase housing that the poor can afford. If such 
housing is referred to as slums, then the cities needs slums (Coates, 2003; Pieterse, 2005). It 
provides the affordable shelters for the migrants and allows them to obtain job opportunities in 
the city (Huchzermeyer, 2011), which is considered better than living in rural poverty 
(Chowdhury et al., 2009; Glaeser, 2011; Saunders, 2011). 
Therefore, self-government should be appreciated as an assistant to providing decent housing 
solutions (McFarlane, 2012). This self-government relates to the concept of autonomy, as the 
right for self-government, as the government cannot deal with the increasing numbers of 
affordable housing and infrastructure. 
However, due to its definition, ‘kampung as slum’ settlement is categorized as urban pathology, 
which needs to be integrated into modern development for achieving the expected progress 
(Fischer, 2014). The worldwide governance of developing countries disregards the practiced 
‘Pirate Code’ by ‘kampung as slum’ residents and enforces the enacted city planning 
regulations with various programs, such as: evictions, site and service, and slum upgrading 
programs.  
 
I.3.3.1 Eviction Program 
The general attitude of city governments in developing countries towards slum settlements 
varies from blind intolerance to blatant hostility (Westgate, 1981), as it considers slums as a 
cancerous growth on the city (Laquian, 2005). Starting in the 1950s, programs focused on the 
evictions of slums.  
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In their studies of the housing problems in the Third World, Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1993) 
summarized the government justifications for these evictions in three categories: (1) city 
beautification programs; (2) slums as centers of crime and health problems; and (3) 
redevelopment for public projects. Many governments took the position as the only shelter 
provider for poor and low-income groups (Balbo, 2001) and comprehended slum residents as 
an infliction (Akrofi, 1991). Governments in developing countries have proved neither 
effective nor efficient as housing providers. Although the government subsidizes land and 
construction costs, the land price and adherence to inappropriate building regulations results in 
the house price still being unaffordable for the poor (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989). 
 
I.3.3.2 Site and Service Program 
The background behind the sites and services program in the developing countries is different 
compared with its origin. According to Harris (1999), the sites-and-services concept came from 
European countries in the 1930s, to fulfill housing for refugees and soldiers who returned after 
World War I. 
Despite early optimism, some positive evaluations of upgrading, and compliments towards 
sites and services approaches, upon reflection it has become clear that many shortfalls existed 
early on during the in situ upgrading, and sites and services projects. At beginning of the 
program, Werlin (1999) highlighted the sites-and-services projects that may show promising 
results. However, the improvements had become negligible due to several reasons, such as: 1) 
locations were far from work opportunities (Payne & Majale, 2004); 2) weak institutional 
capability (Beall, 2000); and 3) the piecemeal nature of projects did not contribute to city-wide 
housing reform (Pugh, 2000). Furthermore, Dowall (1991) argued the high cost of land and 
housing became a significant issue in housing for the poor in the city.  
 
I.3.3.3 Slum Upgrading Program 
Slum upgrading is one of the major housing policy instruments in developing countries 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Along with sites-and-service schemes, slum 
upgrading is considered a far more effective solution to improving the lives of slum residents 
than resettlement (UN-Habitat, 2003). It was based on the concept that the urban poor have the 
capabilities to effectively deal with their own housing problems, and given such assurances 
such as security of land tenure, low-interest loans, appropriate building materials, and some 
technical assistance, they could help upgrade their own living conditions (Laquian, 2005). 
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These projects and policies focus on three main areas of concern: (1) provision of basic urban 
services; (2) provision of secure tenure for slum residents and the implementation of innovative 
practices regarding access to land; and (3) innovative access to credit (UN-Habitat, 2003). 
In many Asian countries the central actors are the slum residents themselves who have 
demonstrated a capacity to articulate their dwelling needs and priorities, by developing upgrade 
proposals and plans, and managing and implementing upgrade work (UN-Habitat, 2003). 
However, by the mid-1980s, both slum upgrading and sites-and-services came under severe 
criticism because of the limited reach and impact of slum upgrading projects (Habitat Agenda, 
1996). The governments did not follow through with services, communities did not maintain 
the facilities, and governance structures disappeared once the international experts were gone 
(UN-Habitat, 2003). The planning standards for upgrading are often unrealistically high, which 
increase the unaffordable living costs for the poor (Hasan, 1992). Land registration procedures 
are also unnecessarily costly, and unaffordable standards are demanded in land development 
(Rogerson, 1998).  
These severe obstacles forced the Bank to shift its policy during the period 1976-1979, towards 
squatter and slum upgrading, but the cost recovery reached below the expectation (Keare & 
Parris, 1982; Ward, 1982; Rodell & Skinner, 1983; Payne, 1984). In 1980-1983, the slum 
upgrading program was retained, as it focused on the financial effectiveness rather than on 
beneficiary capacity and empowerment (Paul, 1986). Although it is only recently that the 
evaluation of slum upgrading program has been considered important to improving the policy 
(Field & Kremer, 2006; Galiani et al. (2013), the upgrading program in Jakarta has not been 
evaluated properly in clear criteria and the evidence does not seem to suggest improvement int 
the condition of slum residents in meaningful way (Werlin 1999).  
 
I.3.3.4 Self-Help Housing as the Ideal Provision for ‘Kampung as Slum’ Residents 
Housing provision projects in which the government is the sole design actor have been proven 
to fail (Jacobsen et al., 2002; Turner, 1976). In the late 1960s the ‘self-help’ housing paradigm 
emerged in reaction to the apparent failures of direct government housing provision and the 
perceived benefit of ‘helping the poor to help themselves’. It allows and represents the principle 
of self-government in housing, which was coined by Turner (1976), to provide self-help 
housing that satisfies the needs of them as individuals and as members of a community.  
Self-help housing came from the people themselves (Pugh, 2001), and not from governments 
or international experts (Harris, 1998; 2003), and had been practiced for centuries (Harms, 
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1992; Ward, 1982; Parnell & Hart, 1999), long before the rise of the ideas of Turner in the 
1960s and 1970s (Harris, 1998, 1999). Abrams (1969) distinguishes three types of owner-built 
housing: self-help housing, aided self-help and organized self-help housing. Self-help housing 
is described as the earliest form of construction by communities. Aided self-help housing refers 
to official self-help programs implemented by governments in developing countries. Organized 
self-help housing are mutual aid projects implemented by the third sector or charities, in which 
self-builders are taught building skills and work in all houses of a project without knowing 
which one will belong to them. 
This principle arose in developed countries with regards to the growing appreciation of the 
importance of social capital (Boyle, et. al., 2006) and to meet the needs of people who are 
becoming increasingly competent service users (Boviard, 2007). It is increasingly used in 
developing countries to deliver necessary social and physical infrastructure (Mitlin, 2008), as 
a direct response to state’s inabilities to provide satisfactory services (Joshi & Moore, 2004). 
Turner (1967, 1976, 1978) used concepts like ‘dweller satisfaction’, ‘use value’, ‘housing as a 
process’ and ‘housing as a verb’ in his writings, where the value of a house lies in what it does 
for people rather than how it looks from the outside. The function of a house cannot be equated 
with the material standard of the structure and the physical appearance should be the last aspect 
to consider in defining a house. He argued that access to employment, services, and social 
amenities were more important considerations. 
Turner's arguments can be summarized into three laws: 1) Without control being in the hands 
of the residents, dwellings can become an economic burden and a barrier to personal 
fulfillment; 2) The value of a house is not what it is but what it does; and 3) Residents are more 
likely to take responsibility for their own work. Overall, as discussed by Bazant (1979 in 
Walker, 2001) and Holston (1991), the quality of self-help housing is the reflection of the socio-
economic situation. The aforementioned explanation confirmed the autonomy11 of ‘kampung 
as slum’ residents to build their houses according to their socio-economic situation. The 
process of occupying the land and constructing the house according to the socio-economic 
situation is inseparable in forming the occupant’s identity12. Therefore, if one of them (the land, 
                                                             
11  The word ‘autonomy’ was absorbed into English in 1620s from Greek autonomia, and means “living by one’s 
own laws”, for the states or community. This word was later in 18th century was used for individual.  In 
Oxford English Dictionary, the word autonomy is translated to ‘Self Rule or self-determination, the right of 
self-governing community.’ It relates to the right for self-governing according to the community’s/ one’s 
needs, which becomes my working definition for this concept. 
12   According to Heidegger (1971), the personal connection between occupant and the land formulates his/her 
identity, as it represents his/her identity and existence in the world.  
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house and socio-economic condition) is not acknowledged by government due to an 
incompatibility with the enacted regulations, the ‘kampung as slum’ residents’ identities 
become anonymous13.  
 
I.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND AIM 
Urbanization14 becomes the specter of development, especially in developing countries like 
Indonesia. The massive acceleration of urbanization tends to be associated with the degradation 
of living quality and ‘kampung as slum’ settlement proliferation, although it promises the 
expected outcome of development at the same time. 
According to Thorbecke (in Tarp, 2000), the dominant paradigm of development in the 1950s 
and 1960s focused on economic growth. The focus enabled developing countries to attain a 
similar level achievement to that of developed countries (Burgess et al., 1997). Since the 1980s, 
international policies such as Structural Adjustment Programmes have resulted in uncontrolled 
proliferation of slum settlements, increase of social inequalities, and poverty in developing 
countries (Balogun, 1995; Bhan, 2009; Jacobsen et al., 2002; Portes & Hoffman, 2003; 
Ramanthan, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2003; Davis, 2004; Shatkin, 2004).  
However, in the case of Indonesia, the growth of ‘kampung as slum’ population does not 
correspond to the growth of poor and unemployed population, although the number of 
income/capita steadily increases since 1990. This experience asserts that the slum settlements 
must be regarded as the challenging issue, and it cannot only be solved by economic growth.  
Several worldwide slum improvement schemes have been attempted but still cultivated 
significant criticism, as they failed to demonstrate meaningful success. Some experts have 
concluded that the generators of slum settlement proliferation are not only the uncontrolled 
urbanization and poverty rate but also the imbalanced control of land ownership, which makes 
the land and house price unaffordable for some of the population. Despite the fact that many 
slum improvement schemes have been delivered, Downs (1991) and Fernandez (in 
                                                             
13  The word ‘anonymous’ was derived from Greek anonymous, which has meaning “without identity, 
undistinguished’. It was absorbed to English in 15th century to Modern English (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2013) and means ‘lacking of unique character or distinction, insignificant’. Therefore, I conclude the lack of 
acknowledgment of something by someone is the cause of anonymous. 
14  Mitchell (1956) referred the term ‘urbanization’ to the growth of cities compared to people living in rural 
areas. According to Lefebvre (1972, 1976, 1991), urbanization is triggered by industrialization and implicates 
the social relations among the people. The argument explains the transformation of socio-cultural of the 
migrants, as they become ‘urbanized’ (Singh, 2003). Urbanization demands ‘process of stabilisation’ which 
consists of the issues of security, transfers of rights and duties, conceptions of strategies, and preconditions 
for economic action. Land tenure security and housing provision are among other operational manifestations 
of the process of stabilization. 
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Huchzermeyer & Mayekiso, 2003) note that there are three main obstacles to achieving 
promising results: 1) land tenure security; 2) the use value of housing, especially for the poor; 
and 3) unaffordable house construction.  
However, despite the absence of land titles, the residents manage to survive in the city and 
obtain jobs for their livelihoods in kampung15 settlements. Through massive efforts of asset 
mobilization, kampung residents manage to provide their own land tenure security and mixed-
function of houses, by practicing home-based enterprises (HBE) via the formulated unwritten 
building shared rules (UBSR).  
Although these issues have been extensively studied in the existing body of literature on this 
topic, there is still a lack of comprehensive study on reason behind the kampung’s autonomy 
to attain the land tenure security and its implication to HBE and practice of UBSR. 
Furthermore, each housing code are discussed separately, whereas land tenure security, use 
value of the house relating to HBE and UBSR are inseparable. Therefore, this research attempts 
to deliver a comprehensive study on the housing code. 
Based on the aforementioned literatures, kampung still has autonomy to produce its own 
housing code in order to survive in the center of Jakarta. These codes are: 1) code of land tenure 
security; 2) code of use value of the house, relating to HBE; and 3) code of building regulation, 
relating to UBSR. As the result, the main research questions are:  
1. What kinds of practiced autonomy exist in kampung settlement in Jakarta and why? 
2. What kinds of housing code in kampung settlement produced and practiced and 
implicated, relating to land tenure security, HBE and UBSR, and why? 
Therefore, this research aims to understand the practiced autonomy and the ‘code’ of kampung 
settlement relating to the land tenure security, HBE and UBSR.  
The first question will be answered with the investigation of history of kampung settlement, 
particularly looking at Jakarta and Cikini. The second question will be answered with the 3 
(three) topics, which are:  
1. Investigation of the Land Tenure Security in kampung settlement; 
2. Investigation of the HBE in kampung settlement; and 
3. Investigation of the formulated and practiced of UBSR in kampung settlement. 
The research framework established is shown in the following Figure I.6. 
                                                             
15  In this part and Chapter 2-5, ‘kampung as slum’ will be translated into kampung settlement, because generally 
kampung settlement in Indonesia has been producing and practicing its own housing code. The term of 
‘kampung as slum’ only uses the data of government relating to the population, as the government defines 
kampung as slum settlement. 
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Figure I.6: The Research Framework 
 
The result of this research will contribute to find the suitable approach for house improvement 
in kampung settlement in the future.  
 
I.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
I.5.1 Selecting Case-Study as Research Method 
Studies by Jellinek (1991) and Murray (1991) in several kampung settlements in Jakarta 
illustrate how the social system in kampung has been evolving as an adaptation to the dynamic 
changes in urban life and serving the diverse interests of the residents. They warned about the 
entrapment of perceiving kampung settlement as the ideal homogenous community. Although 
the built-environment of kampung settlement has been studied, the social and cultural factors 
were regarded as general underlying factors. Rapoport (1969) stated the most effective 
approach to studying vernacular architecture, which includes kampung settlement (Glassie, 
2000; Lawson, 1997; Oliver, 1997; Vellinga, 2005), is to examine the relationship between the 
socio-economic context with the built environment. This approach explores more explanations 
to understanding kampung settlement as vernacular architecture, rather than the chronological 
documentation of its physical buildings.  
The case-study method usually mixes quantitative data with qualitative analysis (Ragin & 
Byrne, 2009; Byrne, 2009). It is one of the suitable qualitative research methods that can draw 
causal conclusions from a properly done single case (Cartwright, 1989). According to Hamel, 
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et al. (1993), Yin (2003), Sayer (2000) and Walsham (1995), this method allows this research 
to go beyond the quantitative statistical results to describe the reality and understand the 
conditions, as the focus of the study is to answer “what kinds” and “why” questions.  
As part of the proposed methodology, this research involved a combination of oral data, 
historical records, architectural and illustrative drawings, archival sources and visual 
photographic documentations (Jabeen, 2012). The method of each topic will be explained 
directly in each part of this research, which are contextual with the problems on the field. 
In order to gain trust from the community, this research was conducted after and concurrently 
with several other community projects such as: 1) Renovation of Communal Bathroom (2011) 
in NA 7; 2) Informal Pre-School Building (2012) in NA 2); 3) Community Center Building in 
NA 7 (2013); 4) Renovations of Communal Bathroom (2014) in NA 11; and 5) Renovations 
of Communal Bathroom (2015) in NA 14. The community projects were a collaboration 
between University Indonesia, Chiba University and residents of Kampung Cikini. 
In this research, semi-structured interviews were selected to obtain the most in-depth 
information. This technique also provides a sense of security to the respondents by decreasing 
the feeling of being interrogated and allows them to share their most private information. The 
main problem was the participant’s consent to each issue, due to several reasons such as: the 
fear of potential danger when revealing private information regarding the legality of their lands 
and economic activity status. Therefore, this research employed a small number of respondents, 
which suits with the prescribed qualitative research method. Results are also stated 
anonymously to protect the identity of the consented respondents. 
 
I.5.2 Selecting Kampung Cikini as Research Location 
In selecting the ‘kampung as slum’ as the research location, it is important to understand the 
history of kampung in occupying the land. According to Taschner (in Fernandez, 2011), the 
land occupation takes place in a spontaneous or planned manner. In the “spontaneous” 
occupation, it should be noted that the first inhabitants of the land acquire a kind of “power” 
over it and the newcomers must ask permission to occupy a piece of land to build their house. 
In the case of organized or planned occupation, it is a form of invasion carefully prepared in 
advance. It is roughly planned with a proposed subdivision of streets bearing similarities to that 
of a formal subdivision, albeit of a smaller size. Restrepo-Tarquino et al. (1998) found that it 
is precisely this distance that reaffirms the cohesion and solidarity networks between the slum 
Chapter I: Introduction 
Autonomy Anonymous and the Code of Kampung Settlement: The Case of Cikini, Jakarta 
 
 
 
I-24 
 
residents. In order to reaffirm the cohesion and solidarity networks between the slum residents, 
the organized planned occupation type should be selected as the case study of this research.  
 
Table I.2: Comparison of Area Size, General and Poor Population, Density of Each District in 
Central Jakarta Municipality 
Source: Central Bureau Statistic (2014) 
 
District 
Area Size 
(km2) 
Population 
(n) 
Poor Population Density  
(n/ km2) (n) (%) 
Tanah Abang 9.30 145,345 17,726 12.20% 15,628.49 
Menteng 6.53 85,546 11,719 13.70% 13,100.43 
Senen 4.20 95,502 16,931 17.73% 22,738.57 
Johar Baru 2.38 117,440 25,011 21.30% 49,344.54 
Cempaka Putih 4.69 84,864 6,329 7.46% 18,094.67 
Kemayoran 7.25 220,538 28,236 12.80% 30,419.03 
Sawah Besar 6.16 100,461 13,266 13.21% 16,308.60 
Gambir 7.59 78,152 11,020 14.10% 10,296.71 
Central Jakarta 48.10 910,381 130,238 14.31% 18,926.84 
 
Table I.3: Comparison of Area Size, General and Poor Population, Density of Each Sub-
District in Menteng District 
Source: Central Bureau Statistic (2014) 
 
Sub District 
Area Size 
(km2) 
Population 
(n) 
Density  
(n/ km2) 
Number of Poor Population 
(n) (%) 
Menteng 2.44 29,063 11,911.00 3,482 11.98% 
Pegangsaan 0.98 26,788 27,335.00 5,270 19.67% 
Cikini 0.82 9,626 11,739.00 684 7.11% 
Gondangdia 1.46 4,671 3,199.00 97 2.08% 
Kebon Sirih 0.83 15,398 18,552.00 2,186 14.20% 
Menteng District 6.53 85,546  11,719 13.70% 
 
Jakarta consists of six municipalities with size 661.52 km2 and 88.80 km2 (13.52%) was 
identified as ‘kampung as slum’ settlements (Central Bureau Statistic, 2014). As a consequence 
of the significant modern development in the city center, the lowest growth of general and poor 
population is located in Central Jakarta. Although Jakarta Province (especially Central Jakarta) 
experiences modern development, some kampung settlements still remain. According to this 
fact, it is intriguing to understand the housing code of kampung settlement in this municipality. 
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Figure I.7: The Location of Slum Settlements in Jakarta and Kampung Cikini (red circle) 
Source: Central Bureau Statistic (2014) 
 
 
    
Figure I.8: Map of Kampung Cikini and Its Surrounding Neighborhood 
1) Cikini Station; 2) Mall & Apartment; 3) Rental Office; 4) Areal View to Kampung Cikini 
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This municipality consists of eight districts, which are Tanah Abang, Menteng, Senen, Johar 
Baru, Cempaka Putih, Kemayoran, Sawah Besar and Gambir districts. Johar Baru is the highest 
density district, followed by Senen, Kemayoran, Sawah Besar, Tanah Abang, Menteng and 
Gambir districts. 
The low population density in Menteng and Gambir district was caused by the high land price, 
and the transformation of housing to commercial areas. The land price in these districts has 
surpassed US$ 1,500/m2, according to National Land Agency (2014), which is higher than the 
other districts.  
However, the ratio of poor population in Gambir and Menteng district is still in the top-four 
ranking in this municipality (17.21%), below Johar Baru (21.30%) and Senen district (17.73%). 
However, the Central Bureau District (2012) did not identify any slum settlements in Gambir 
district, but several in Menteng district. Therefore, it is intriguing to understand the 
perseverance of the poor population in Menteng district despite the expensive land price.  
Pegangsaan is the one of the high-density sub-districts (27,335 persons /km2) in Central Jakarta. 
This sub-district consists of 12 Community Associations (CA) and according to the Central 
Bureau Statistic (2012, 2013, 2014), there are three identified kampung settlements in this sub-
district with one of them located in Community Association (CA) 1.  
This location is well-known as Kampung Cikini and is selected as the research location. 
Kampung Cikini is identified as a high-density kampung settlement, where 942 households (+ 
3,800 persons) live in 4.01 hectares or approximately 95,000 persons/ km2 (Central Bureau 
Statistic, 2014).  
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CHAPTER II 
THE AUTONOMY OF KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT IN JAKARTA AND 
CIKINI 
 
II.1 THE AUTONOMY OF KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT IN JAKARTA 
II.1.1 Kampung as Autonomous Settlement in the Dutch Colonial Period 
Before the Dutch Colonial Era, the area where Jakarta is located today was attracting regional 
and international trade. Based on archaeological findings, in the 12th century the West Javanese 
Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran maintained a harbor town called Sunda Kelapa at the mouth of 
the Ciliwung river. The harbor town, with approximately 10,000 inhabitants, developed into 
an important regional trading port (Abeyasekere, 1989).  
High profits from the international spice trade attracted several European countries to explore 
Southeast Asia in the 16th century (Evers & Korff, 2003; Ricklefs, 2001). Attracted by the 
strategic location, the Portuguese started cooperating with the kingdom in 1522, aiming to use 
Sunda Kelapa as a trading post for the international pepper trade (Nas & Grijns, 2000; 
Abeyasekere, 1989). Before the Portuguese could establish a trading base, Fatahillah from 
Bantenese Kingdom had conquered the city in 1527 (Silver, 2008; Somantri, 2007; Grijns, 
2000) and named the city to 'Jayakarta', which translates to 'perfect victory' (Heuken, 1982). 
Accordingly, Dutch ships continuously came to the port of Jayakarta in the period from 1596 
to 1610 (Taylor, 2009) and established the headquarters of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC) in Jayakarta (Abeyasekere, 1989). In the 19th century, VOC had managed 
to conquer Jayakarta (Winet, 2010), renamed the city to Batavia (Blussé, 2008) and 
transformed it into the center of territorial administration (Evers & Korff, 2003). Since then, 
Batavia became the starting point for the development of the new city (Somantri, 2007; Brug, 
2000; Grijns, 2000; Bowo, 1999; Abeyasekere, 1989; Heniger, 1986). 
The city residents originated from different places, such as Eastern Indonesia, China, Europe, 
as well as other VOC bases, such as Malacca or India (Nas & Grijns, 2000; Blussé, 2008; 
Lohanda, 1996). VOC maintained the plurality of ethnic and religious groups in Batavia 
(Blussé, 2008; Nas & Grijns, 2000), with the principle to 'divide and rule' (Winet, 2010) in 
order to establish security and to prevent conspiracies (Lohanda, 1996; Abeyasekere, 1989). In 
this context, only Europeans, the Chinese community, Mardijkers (foreign slaves) and 
domestic slaves were allowed to live within the walled part of the city (Abeyasekere, 1989). 
VOC sent the Sundanese and Javanese to live outside of the city walls because of conflicts with 
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the Sultanate of Banten and the Kingdom of Mataram (Grijns & Nas, 2000) in the cultivation 
area surrounding the wall (Blussé, 2008). 
In the second half of the 17th century, soldiers in the service of the VOC (who mainly originated 
from other parts of the archipelago) were granted land in the cultivation area (Blussé, 2008). 
The colonial administration planned to assign a specific location to each ethnic group (Nas & 
Grijns, 2000). These settlements were called kampung. The settlements were placed under the 
jurisdiction of an officer who received the military rank of a captain. Their directive was to 
control these settlements in order to guarantee public safety and also to recruit soldiers 
(Niemeijer, 2000: 77). The social organization in each kampung was based on self-help 
governance by each group (Abeyasekere 1989), but the VOC could establish indirect rule 
because the headman was recruited from the ethnic group he represented (Milone, 1966).  
Nonetheless, because of its self-help management and self-sufficiency, the Dutch Colonial 
government control did not fully extend throughout the kampung (Raben, 2000). Furthermore, 
ethnic segregation could not be reinforced because the social structure was not based on ethnic 
classification but rather on personal relations and religious identities (Niemeijer, 2000). 
Consequently, kampungs became a very mixed ethnic settlement (Raben, 2000). 
Batavia had its golden age in the first half of the 18th century, but experienced downturn in the 
second half (Beaglehole, 1968). One of the reasons was the extremely unhealthy living 
conditions in the city (Stockdale, 2003) due to the polluted river – an implication of the 
escalation of population in kampung settlements (Abeyasekere, 1989). This condition caused 
an increase in the mortality rate of foreign residents (Brug, 2000).  
In order to prevent further downturn, the Dutch Colonial administration expanded the city to 
the south and evicted the kampung residents within the development area to Weltevreden (in 
present times, around the Gambir and Senen districts). A tram system was built to connect 
residential and commercial areas around the harbor (Abeyasekere, 1989). Nonetheless, the 
expansion developments excluded the kampung and did not accommodate the kampung 
residents to live in the new developed area, because of discriminatory policy mechanisms and 
limited economic resources (Milone, 1966).  
From 1900-1942, a first wave of internal migration brought many people from rural areas in 
Java to Batavia, due to the variety of job opportunities (Krausse, 1975; Setiawan, 1998). Most 
of these migrants resided in kampung settlements and they started to lose their rural appearance 
(Silver, 2008; Jellinek, 1991; Leaf, 1992). 
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The epidemics of plague and cholera that continued to break out until the second decade of the 
twentieth century were often a direct result of the exceedingly unhygienic conditions in these 
neighborhoods. Acute housing shortages, inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure and 
an obvious lack of administrative experience, combined with limited financial, technical and 
legal resources, represented major obstacles (Woesthoff, 1915 in Coté, 2015).  
In addition to this already complicated situation, there were two more factors that severely 
handicapped the municipal councils in the execution of their work, which were: land ownership 
and the lack of jurisdiction over the autonomous kampung within their municipal boundaries 
(Van Roosmalen, 2008 in Coté, 2015). 
Although it took the municipalities more than a decade, the government in 1918 revised the 
Governmental Code of the Netherlands Indies. This functioned as the Constitution of the 
colony, and was implemented in order to empower municipal authorities to carry out public 
works projects throughout their municipal territory, including the autonomous kampung.  
Thus kampung improvement became a policy characterized by a strong top-down approach 
that was typical of colonial reform policies of the time. It aimed to overcome the disease 
epidemics, reduce criminal activities, and facilitate colonial authorities to increasingly 
penetrate the lives of the kampung people (Versnel & Colombijn in Coté, 2015) in order to 
prevent the urban poor from falling into the hands of the nationalists (Van Roosmalen, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the abolition of the autonomous kampungs was not only prevented by juridical 
constraints, but also by financial limits (Versnel & Colombijn in Coté, 2015). Neither colonial 
nor Indonesian governments ever succeeded in exercising effective control over kampungs and 
therefore could not develop, standardize, and regulate these settlements to conform to their 
policies (Reerink in Coté, 2015).  
During the colonial period, this lack of state control was a consequence of village or kampung 
autonomy, and after Independence, kampung settlements actually retained their autonomy, 
despite efforts to decolonize (Reerink in Coté, 2015). The kampung settlements were allowed 
a high degree of autonomy, which meant that the population could apply its own customary 
law, administration, and justice (Reerink in Coté, 2015). The lack of state control resulted in 
kampungs developing into the kind of settlement the government itself qualifies as informal. 
In the Dutch Colonial Era, kampung was established to divide the power of native people 
according to ethnicities. The residents were given autonomy to organize and build their own 
settlement, because of the colonial government’s limited budget and the absence of political 
will to improve the living condition of the kampung residents. Although the deterioration of 
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kampung settlement worsened the living conditions in Batavia, the rapid escalation of kampung 
population presented formidability in kampung improvement. As the result, kampung was 
neglected from the city development and granted autonomy.  
 
II.1.2 Massive Land Usurpation in Japanese Occupation Era (1942-1945)  
At the beginning of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the kampung population fled back 
to the rural areas. The rural-urban migration slowed down as travel was restricted (Milone, 
1966). Jellinek (1991) claims that unlike in the villages, the situation in the urban kampungs of 
Jakarta remained relatively calm. Yet, kampung residents experienced a time of absolute 
poverty as basic goods (including food) were not available and rural populations returned to 
the cities.  
After the Japanese occupied Indonesia in 1942, the Japanese administration allowed people to 
squat on private land (Colombijn, 2010 in Coté, 2015). They also introduced the neighborhood 
associations system (tonarigumi), which was designed to control and mobilize the Indonesian 
population (Somantri 2007). It showed the integration of kampung self-organization into the 
formal administration system (Abeyasekere, 1989; Ricklefs, 2001). Unfortunately, the 
autonomy of the kampungs hampered the municipal government’s effectiveness in exercising 
control and gradually became untenable. 
In this short occupation phase, kampung became the site of control to prevent rebellions and 
mobilize war resources, with an evident lack of attention for the improvement of living 
conditions. Consequently, the kampung residents continued to exercise their self-organization 
in order to survive in the calamity of war. 
 
II.1.3 Proliferation of Kampung Settlements in Old Order Era (1945-1965) 
During the Old Order Era (1945-1966), Jakarta had been developed as a modern city that 
stressed the importance of a national identity in an international circle (Silver, 2008). Sukarno, 
the first president, built a National Monument, the largest modern shaped mosque in South East 
Asia at the time, Hotel Indonesia, a highway interchange in Semanggi, and the Kebayoran Baru 
new settlement.  
As a consequence, these massive developments opened up significant job opportunities that 
drove considerable in-migration (Somantri, 2007). Previous studies highlight that rural-urban 
migrants commonly follow friends or families to the city and are thus initially supported with 
housing and employment (Lloyd, 1979).  
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The population grew rapidly, from less than 1 million inhabitants in 1948 to 3.8 million 
inhabitants in 1965 (Leisch, 2000). The insufficient quantity of housing and infrastructure 
became pivotal factors of the kampung proliferation across the city (Abeyasekere, 1989; 
Krausse, 1975). Nonetheless, the relocations and forced evictions from kampung settlements 
must be conducted to deliver large scale developments (Silver, 2008). 
In the 1950s, there were increasingly strong calls to abolish kampung autonomy, but because 
this measure had not been bolstered by a consistent set of policies affecting kampungs, it was 
not completely effectual. The enactment of two pieces of agrarian legislation exerted possibly 
more effect on the legal position of kampung residents.  
In order to prevent further land administration problems, the government produced the Basic 
Agrarian Law (BAL) in 1960 to regulate land rights (Daryono, 2010) and created the National 
Land Administration (NLA) to manage all grants, extensions, renewals of certified titles, as 
well as running the land registration system. Land rights based on customary law, which were 
still widely applied in the kampungs, would now have to be integrated into a unified system of 
land titles. Integration of kampung land held under customary law into the unified system 
required the surveying and certification of all plots of land by the administration. However, the 
state was incapable to provide adequate land records and the land administration system due to 
political turbulence (Harsono, 2008). These conditions created ambiguity of land ownership 
and rights. As a result of the extravagant development of these monuments and the BAL 
implementation some kampung settlements were evicted, yet the rest were simply left in their 
deprived condition. 
 
II.1.4 Dualism of Kampung Autonomy in New Order Era (1966-1998) 
In the early part of New Order Era, the city government of Jakarta realized that kampung 
residents constituted a major part of the urban population. Prominent Jakarta Governor Ali 
Sadikin introduced development programs to improve the situation in kampungs (Silver, 2008). 
In 1969, the first Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) was introduced in Jakarta, as the 
world’s first urban kampung upgrading project.  
The KIP provided basic urban services, such as roads and footpaths, water, drainage and 
sanitation (Laquian, 2005), as well as health and education facilities in the kampung settlements 
within the city (UN-Habitat, 2006). The program was delivered via a “top-down” approach, 
which reflected the financial stability of the country at the time (Njamwea, 2003). Until 1982, 
the program had benefited almost 5 million people of the urban poor (UN-Habitat, 2006). 
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However, the KIP faced several challenges and eventually failed to protect kampungs from 
demolition. It is argued that KIP funds were primarily allocated for lighthouse projects which 
were easily visible. Kampung settlements that were easily accessible for external visitors to 
Jakarta were prioritized. Moreover, the KIP was criticized for not suitably responding to the 
immediate needs of kampung residents. Abeyasekere (1989) provided examples including: 
instead of providing access to water, KIP improved roads in order to facilitate cars.  
Legal issues became the one of the main considerations of the program. Consequently, 
kampung settlements along the rivers or other areas which were considered illegal, had been 
ignored (Abeyasekere, 1989). Furthermore, the KIP did not prevent the city government from 
explicitly mentioning kampung clearance and demolition in the master plan (Silver, 2008). 
Most importantly, the KIP did not solve the problem of insecure tenure (Baharoglu, 2002). In 
the early 1980s, the KIP was still continuing despite the quality of implementations and number 
of programs having decreased significantly following the retirement of Sadikin as Governor 
(Silver, 2008). Eventually, this prominent program was terminated in the 1990s (Silver, 2008). 
Despite efforts to upgrade kampung settlements, they were not considered compatible with the 
dream of Jakarta, as the capital city of Indonesia (Jellinek, 1991). Rapid modern development 
and urbanization led to a conflict of interest between economic growth and maintaining the 
kampung settlements within the city (Leaf, 1992). In this era, immense real estate development 
by private developers had grown since the 1980s (Evers & Korff, 2003: 37). This development 
increased in first half of the 1990s and reached its peak in 1995-1997 (Somantri, 2007). 
Consequently, it increased the number of evictions in order to provide land for contemporary, 
large-scale development (Evers & Korff, 2003). The national and city governments legitimized 
the eviction or demolishment of their quarters, which mainly consisted of usurped property of 
the state, an institution, a legal body, a foundation or individuals, occupation without any 
permission from the land owners, and irregular and unsafe buildings (Komarudin,1997).  
Conflict occurred in Jakarta that resulted in many evictions of the kampungs. McCarthy (2003) 
estimated that around 20% of total kampung settlements in Jakarta were evicted during the 
1980s. According to Silver (2008) and Somantri (2007), the numbers of forced kampung 
evictions reached its peak in 1980s-1990s and were conducted to provide land for high-rise 
buildings and large scale road infrastructure (Dorléans, 2000). This number increased to 60-
80% in the first half of the 2000s (Budiarto, 2005; Steinberg, 2007). Besides the legal issue, 
kampung residents were evicted from their properties because of the accelerated land price in 
the city, which they also cannot afford (McCarthy, 2003). Since the low-income households 
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did not often hold a stake in the negotiation processes, they became the easiest prey to inflict 
forced moving to another place with or without compensation (Silver, 2008).  
Housing provision for the poor in Indonesia has already been conducted through a national 
public housing company, which is financially supported by the central and local government. 
This corporation evolved into National Housing Company (NHC) based on Government Act 
29/1974 (Yudohusodo, 1991: 151). They have delivered landed housing and Low-Cost 
Apartment (LCA) provision programs in several big cities since 1979 (Hutagalung, 1998). 
LCA provisions were supported by various policies such as Apartment Act 16/1985 and 
President Instruction 5/1990 and applied to rejuvenated kampung settlements which were built 
on state land.  
However, the land availability and limited government budget have restricted the pace of the 
program. Furthermore, this type of housing is not suitable with the social and cultural condition 
of the most of Indonesian people, because it cannot be extended to accommodate more family 
members (Mufida, 1998). Consequently, this type of housing is often bought as an investment 
by middle- or high-income people who already have their own houses. In this era, the 
considerable modern development has neglected the kampung as an essential entity of the city. 
The immense role of the private sector in urban development has led to enormous kampung 
evictions, despite these areas serving as a pool of cheap labor for the massive modern 
developments. 
 
II.1.5 Housing Policy in Indonesia and Jakarta in Reformation Era (post-1998) 
The housing policy in Indonesia after independence began in 1964 with the enactment of 
Housing Law 1/1964, which encouraged all citizens to deliver self-help housing due to 
government being unable to assist in housing provision. This law was revised with the 
enactment of Housing Law 4/1992, which emphasized the house as the generator of social, 
economic and environmental improvement. The revised law indicated the possibility for multi-
functional housing, for social and economic improvement.  
However, since the enactment of Building Law 28/2002, which defined the house as the place 
for definitive domestic activities, economic activities lost its place. This separation was 
designated to ensure the health of the house users. Additionally, conformity with the specified 
land use as stipulated by the city spatial order became one of the mandatory requirements to 
obtain a building permit.  
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This law also requires that building provision, including houses, to be designed and built by 
registered professionals to ensure the building is safe. It indicates a paradigm shift in housing 
provision, from self-help housing to the government and private sector as providers. 
Furthermore, Spatial Order Law 26/2007 was enacted to create harmonious interrelationships 
between functions in the city, and sterilization housing zone from economy activities. It also 
mandated that the city government established a city spatial order that acts as the juridical base 
for the building permit process, which relates to Building Law 28/2002. In the case of Jakarta, 
the city government has also enacted City Government 1/2014 on Detail City Spatial Order of 
Jakarta Province. Figure III-1 depicts the land use in Kampung Cikini, which are high-density 
commercial and social facility without housing for the existing kampung residents.  
These two laws became the juridical base for the revised Housing and Settlement Law 1/2001, 
which inscribed the separation of domestic and economic activities. Although it still contains 
consideration for self-help housing, most of the articles encourage the transformation of 
kampung settlements in the city center to Low-Cost Apartments (LCA), which the government 
and/or private developers are the providers. 
The enactment of Housing and Settlement Law 1/2011 was followed by Apartment Law 
20/2011. This law mandated that the Government of Indonesia (GoI) assures housing 
availability for all citizens. As the representation of GoI, the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing (MPWH) has enacted a massive housing provision program as part of the National 
Strategic Plan Development 2014-2019. LCA has become the main priority, as it incurs more 
than 70% of the State budget in the housing provision program, a lack of land availability in 
the major cities exists, and there is the ever growing housing backlog to overcome.  
Housing development was rejuvenated in 2005 after the monetary crises of 1997-1998, as it 
became a priority in the National Long-Term Development Program 2005-2025. It was pledged 
by President Decree 7/2005 to build 60,000 units of Rental LCA and 25,000 units of Owned 
LCA for low-income people through government-private sector partnership (Alif, 2009: 14). 
Based on Public Housing Ministry Decree 7/2007 the program was designated for those who 
earn a monthly income less than US$ 450. This figure was reduced to less than US$ 250, 
according to the Public Housing Ministry Decree 14/2010. 
Due to severe impediments, the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government announced several 
programs in its Jakarta Middle Range Development Plan 2013-2017 (JMRDP 2013-2017) such 
as housing improvement, especially in kampung settlement across the province (Bappeda DKI 
Jakarta, 2012).  
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According to the JMRDP 2013-2017, the provision of low-cost apartments was targeted to 
reach 4,000 units in 5 years, which is tremendously low, compared to the rate of urbanization 
in Jakarta. In order to overcome the housing shortage, the provincial government plans to 
provide 700 units in 2014, 534 units in 2015, 400 units and 800 units in 2016. In order to 
accelerate the numbers, it also introduced a new program of integrating low-cost apartments 
with traditional markets as mixed-use buildings. This program will be executed in 4 locations 
which are: Rawa Buaya and Susukan (West Jakarta) and Semper and Tegal Alur (North 
Jakarta). It is hoped that this will contribute 1,920 additional housing units. If both programs 
run according to plan, their combinations will provide 16,155 new units, which will surpass 
the expected result. The central government, through Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 
will also contribute to 2,600 units in 2015-2016 to assist the provincial government in achieving 
the target. Despite the promising progress, both programs are still in the planning stage until 
the end of 2015, because they have encountered land provision and bureaucracy problems.  
Meanwhile, the creative integrated kampung improvement along Ciliwung River will be 
implemented in 100 locations in 2013-2017. In 2013, DKI Jakarta Provincial Government 
introduced the “Thematic Kampung Program” as one of the novel concepts to alleviate 
kampungs in the city (Bappeda DKI Jakarta, 2012). The objective of this program was to 
rebuild and rebrand each kampung according to its own identity, such as Fishermen Kampung 
in Muara Angke (North Jakarta), Backpacker Kampung in Jaksa Street (Central Jakarta) among 
others. The program was initiated by the provincial government purchasing the land and 
building new houses without local resident’s participation in design and construction stages. 
As the government’s land has slowly diminished, purchasing land from residents was declared 
necessary because the expenditure of government budget for social; housing must be located 
on government’s land, according to Government Regulation Number 38/ 2008. Despite the 
program being championed as a promising kampung improvement program through its 
preservation and strengthening of the local kampung identity, this program encountered 
massive resistance from the designated kampung residents due to loss of land ownership and 
its top-down approach.  
Learning from the previous failure, in 2014 the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government introduced 
a new program which was widely known as the “Row-Kampung Program”. This initiative 
aimed to accelerate the kampung improvement programs. This program included the widening 
of the narrow kampung alley and neighborhood drainage, along with the improvement of the 
houses’ facades. This program was delivered in 26 kampung locations throughout the province, 
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including 10 locations (2,434 houses) in Central Jakarta, 6 locations (230 houses) in North 
Jakarta, 3 locations (367 houses) in West Jakarta, 3 locations (602 houses) in South Jakarta and 
4 locations (834 houses) in East Jakarta (Bappeda DKI Jakarta, 2014). Despite its acclaimed 
success in improving the physical condition of kampung settlements, the sustainability of the 
result is questionable. In her post-occupancy evaluation of the Row-Kampung Program in 
Tanah Tinggi (Central Jakarta), Ainy (2014) unveiled the physical improvement cannot be 
maintained comprehensively by the benefactors because of the limitation of their financial 
capacity and lack of sensitivity with their everyday life. This fact suggests the program needs 
to encourage community participation to achieve an appropriate physical improvement that 
corresponds to their social activities and economic capacity.  
Meanwhile, the city government identified the lack of accurate data on benefactors and updated 
settlement map in every sub-district as the major challenges in this program (Bappeda DKI 
Jakarta, 2015). The city government database demonstrated major discrepancies with the 
initiated program, due to the rapid and clandestine incremental development by kampung 
residents. As a consequence, the program was annulled in 26 locations by the Jakarta House of 
Representative based on an official report from the Jakarta Audit Board of DKI Jakarta 
Province, who identified incompatibilities of requirements for intended benefactors. Therefore, 
in 2016 a preliminary demographic and topographic survey will be the priority in order to create 
a basis for the upcoming program (Bappeda DKI Jakarta, 2015).  
The rapid self-help development of kampung settlements has been causing problems for the 
city government when they come to compose precise kampung improvement interventions, 
primarily due to data incompatibility. Frequent changes in the number and status of the 
population, physical structure of settlements, and land ownership, play major roles in the 
shortfall of government programs to improve the deprived settlement. Therefore, it is obvious 
that the incapability of the government to resolve land ownership and affordable housing 
problems for kampung residents has become the dominant factors of the survival of kampung 
settlements.  
The fact is that the residents of Kampung Cikini are still practicing self-help housing until now. 
This illustrates their autonomy to build their own houses and settlements still exists in the 
present times. However, according to Figure II. 1, their existence in their location will be 
diminished, which indicates the autonomy is challenged by vague land ownership. Therefore, 
the research questions are: 1) Does the autonomy of kampung settlement in the case Cikini still 
exist? 2) What kinds of practical examples are there of the practiced autonomy?  
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The aim of this study is to understand the reasons and kinds of practiced autonomy which 
enables them to produce and practice housing code. 
 
II.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The investigation of the body of literature relating to kampung settlements in Indonesia, 
particularly in Jakarta, indicates that the kampung settlements have been granted autonomy 
since Dutch Colonial Era. The objective does not originate from a humanitarian perspective, 
but the financial incapability of the ruling government to provide affordable housing for the 
kampung residents. The granted autonomy allowed the kampung residents to arrange their own 
settlement according to their social and economic condition. 
However, the prior studies of kampung autonomy provides insufficient explanation, in 
particularly in Kampung Cikini, on how the granted autonomy was exercised to arrange the 
settlement. All of the prior studies emphasized the historical background of the kampung 
autonomy with the archival research method, but left insufficient explanation on what kinds of 
practical examples resulted from the autonomy. Furthermore, there is a lack of investigation 
on the intersection of the city policies development, which enables the kampung settlements to 
survive in the city center. Therefore, this part of the study aims to understand how the granted 
autonomy is practiced since Independence (Old Order Regime) Era, to ensure the Kampung 
Cikini remains to survive in the city center.  
The investigation of the ‘code’ in the research location cannot be separated from the evolving 
history of Kampung Cikini. In order reach the aim, this research requires 2 (two) tasks: 1) 
Historical investigation of Kampung Cikini; and 2) Historical Self-Help Management of 
Kampung Cikini.  
The first task demands archival research method by investigating the body of literature relating 
to the development of Kampung Cikini since the Dutch Colonial Era. It is essential to 
understand the history of Kampung Cikini in Jakarta. This is because it provides an 
understanding of the development of kampung settlements in the city center, in particular 
Kampung Cikini, and the reception of the granted autonomy since Dutch Colonial Era.  
In order to accomplish the second task, this research comprises of two stages. The first stage 
was data collection through participatory mapping of the historical development of Kampung 
Cikini. The evolving development of Kampung Cikini since the Dutch Colonial Era was not 
documented accurately by the residents and city government. Therefore, the participatory 
mapping of Kampung Cikini was conducted with 20 (twenty) respondents, consisting of: Head 
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of Community Association (CA), Vice of Head of CA, 13 Heads of Neighborhood Associations 
(NAs) and 5 (five) senior residents who have lived more than 30 years in Kampung Cikini.  
The participatory mapping of the settlement was dependent on the memory of the respondents, 
which was dating back to the 1940s until present times. 
During the mapping process, the respondents shared information regarding the following 
topics: 1) the boundary of Kampung Cikini from the 1940s to present day; 2) reasons for the 
dynamic development of Kampung Cikini; and 3) the management of Kampung Cikini as an 
exercise of the granted autonomy. 
Additionally, interviews to Head of Pegangsaan Sub-District and City Housing Agency were 
conducted to understand the historical city policy relating to kampung settlements in Jakarta, 
in particular Kampung Cikini. The information from both respondents are essential to 
understanding: 1) the policy of government to improve the kampung settlements in Jakarta; 
and 2) how the kampung residents practice the autonomy to adapt with the development of city 
policy and for ensuring their survival in the city center. 
The investigation of housing policy in Indonesia was also conducted, to understand how the 
granted autonomy is able to find a way for adaptation along with the city development. 
Furthermore, this investigation also identifies critical housing policy in Indonesia which 
compromises the granted autonomy of kampung settlement.  
The second method was conducted to compile the information from Kampung Cikini residents, 
who voluntarily participated as respondents through a series of participatory mapping 
exercises. The series of group discussions were conducted to provide confirmation on the topics 
raised. Individual discussions were also performed to clarify specific information, and to 
conduct triangulation method to reduce bias.  
The process was conducted in three stages. The first stage consisted of a focus group discussion 
with all participants, and to draw a historical map that was overlaid on a 2007 map acquired 
from city administration. In the discussion, 20 senior residents as respondents, shared 
information based on their memories and their ancestors’ information to articulate the condition 
during the Dutch Colonial and Independence Era. The second stage was conducted to verify 
the information according to the existing physical condition. While the final stage was focus 
group discussion with the same respondents to verify the preliminary analysis result. The 
discussion enriched the analysis result in terms of the history of land development, territorial 
division and the rise of the generated code from the self-help management. 
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II.3  HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF KAMPUNG CIKINI 
II.3.1 Development of Kampung Cikini from Dutch Colonial Era to Present Times 
In the end of 18th century, the Dutch Colonial government developed the Weltervreden area in 
order to accommodate a new settlement for Batavia’s citizens due to rapid population growth. 
This city expansion induced more people to build in the southern side of the settlement, to 
Gondangdia and Menteng.  
 
Figure II.2: The development of Kampung Cikini from 1897-1945 
Source: Mao (2013) with additional illustration from the Author. 
 
Since 1887, Bataviasche Oossterpoorweg Maathappij (BOS), the Dutch train company, also 
developed train transportation systems to connect the whole city. They built train stations, 
railways and steel bridges to pass over the Ciliwung River to accommodate horse tram in 1869, 
steam tram in 1881 and electric tram in 1899. Location of Kampung Cikini at that time, 
consisted of housing for the workers of National Railways Company. 
This system was to not only accommodate the transportation needs of citizens, but also to 
accelerate the distribution of trading commodities from Jatinegara to the Fish Market Harbour. 
The system comprised of 5 (five) major lanes and the Menteng-Kramat-Jakarta Kota track 
passed through Kampung Cikini. As shown in Figure II.2, the main boulevard of the Kampung 
Cikini was one of the railway tracks of train transportation system. 
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Menteng area was derived from the name of prominent colonial official in the beginning of 
19th century, Van Muntinghe, who was the first land owner of this area (Abeyasekere, 1987). 
In order to prevent uncontrollable city expansion, the government bought the land in Menteng 
area (approximately 10 km2) from 1908 until 1927.  
Menteng settlement was assigned for the elite class of Dutch and high-status Indonesian 
citizens. It was designed by P.A.J. Mooijen and modified by F.J. Kubatz, and implemented 
garden city concept from 1910 until the 1930s. It was also designated to separate the elite class 
from the poor and people belonging to the lower societal status (Surjomihardjo, 1977).  
After losing the war against Japan, the Dutch citizens left Jakarta and abandoned their 
properties. It provided an opportunity for Jakarta’s elite society to occupy the abandoned 
colonial houses in the Menteng sub-district. Unfortunately, the separation of elite estates and 
the poor settlement in Menteng was erased during the Japanese occupation of the 1940s. The 
poor were permitted and ordered to plant crops for war’s logistics, without considering land 
ownership and already built self-help housing, including in Kampung Cikini (Sedyawati, 
1987). Since then, migrants from Cirebon, Bogor, Pekalongan, Bandung, Banyumas and other 
regions had relocated to Jakarta in order to participate (Kementerian Penerangan Republik 
Indonesia, 1952).  
This policy grew kampong settlements in the early Independence Era (1945-1965) along the 
Ciliwung River (Lubis, 2008) and created social and environmental problems (Purwanto, 
2008). The monumental projects in this era accelerated urbanization and created housing 
problems due to rapid population growth (Suparlan, 1984).  
Although the famous Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin tried to solve this problem by creating a 
20-year master plan from 1965-1985, the urbanization was already irrepressible. The kampung 
settlements had spread out from Tanjung Priok, Senen, Salemba, Gambir, Kebon Kacang, 
Pedurenan, Raden Saleh, Karanganyar, Tanah Sereal, Kramat, Gunung Sahari, Tanah Abang, 
Krekot Bunder, Pasar Baru, Kampung Cideng, Rawa Galur, along the railways and Ciliwung 
River (Suparlan, 1984).  
In the 1960s, President Soekarno closed down the tram service because it was not feasible to 
accommodate the overflowing city population. The railways were not disassembled but 
overlaid with asphalt to produce pedestrian and vehicular street. This was also done to decrease 
the government’s expenditure (Suparlan, 1984).  
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II.3.2 Autonomy of Kampung Cikini 
The historical development of kampung Cikini has indicated the granted autonomy from the 
Dutch Colonial government. The land given in the 1940s established the legality of Kampung 
Cikini in Dutch Colonial Era, not as the illegally occupied. The massive occupation of other 
parts of the settlement was also allowed by the Japanese government during 1942-1945.  
After Independence in 1945, the kampung autonomy from the Dutch Colonial Era and Japanese 
Occupation Era to the Independence Era, both in the Old Order Regime (1945-1965) and the 
New Order Regime (1966-1998), had been sustained. The persistence of kampung autonomy 
was due to the incapability of government to provide affordable housing for the fast-growing 
numbers of kampung residents. Kampung settlements in Jakarta provide affordable shelters for 
the citizens. They emerged as a response to the city’s modern development, since the quantity 
of housing for the workers cannot be accommodated by government housing programs.  
It corroborates the argument by prominent scholars such as Roy (2005, 2009), who urged the 
slum (kampung) settlements as the housing solution rather than problem. However, in the case 
of Jakarta, kampung settlements were granted autonomy by the government since Dutch 
Colonial Era as the housing solution. 
 
II.3.3 Self-Help Land Development of Kampung Cikini 
In Kampung Cikini, the first kampung residents were given the land through a formal letter 
from the colonial government as the token of appreciation for their service to the NTC. During 
the Independence Era and the euphoria of liberation from the foreign occupation, the first 
migration occurred and the undocumented land transactions begun. The current land owners, 
who had the formal letter of ownership, rented and sold some of their parcels to the migrants 
without any records or documents. Poor resources, ranging from the national budget to the 
officials to enforce the enacted BAL, became the main factor of the unrecorded land 
transactions. As a result, the original Kampung Cikini densified with the proliferation of land 
division.  
The significant modern development in Jakarta provided many job opportunities and required 
participation of the cheap labors from migrants. This symbiotic relationship between the lustful 
government to modernize the capital and the impoverished population from all over the 
archipelago, ignited the rapid pace of urbanization. Cheap labor could be found in the existing 
kampung settlements, even making their own kampung settlements as their housing solution. 
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In the 1960s, as the pace of modern developments continued, the second migration inundated 
Kampung Cikini. According to prominent leaders, Kampung Cikini had been squatted since 
the Independence Era and the usurpation was more considerable after the railways overlaying 
project of the 1960s. Most of them were the traders in the Cikini Market, which was built in 
1962 to serve the basic needs of the Menteng elite society.  
The densified original Kampung Cikini was overwhelmed with additional migrants, the 
majority of which were construction workers for various city developments. The expansion of 
Kampung Cikini became the possible solution, by organizing the piling of construction waste 
along the Ciliwung River. The occupation of the ex-railways along the west side of the 
kampung also became a solution to shelter the influx of migrants, by piling up the construction 
waste from development sites in the city. 
The piling process was possible due to their experience in construction projects and the well-
established connections with the project owners. The dense and strong soil allowed them to 
construct their housing. The food traders in Cikini Market and construction sites were also 
allowed to reside in the expanded Kampung Cikini. As the population kept growing, the 
expanded area formed their own CA, which is now known as CA 7 and 8. CA 7 was located in 
the west side of Ciliwung River, while CA 8 resided above the river.  
In the late 1970s, as part of KIP, CA 8 gradually evicted residents to reduce the flood hazard 
in the city by maintaining the river body. By the end of 1980s, CA 8 had been completely 
eradicated and only CA 7 remains until now in the expanded area. In other CAs, the 
development tends to refer to the existing house structure through land division from the larger 
land parcels. Whereas in CA 7 and 8, the residents planned and built the houses and subsequent 
infrastructure from the vacant land according to their experiences of working in the modern 
development construction projects. The land parcels were divided equally to the usurped 
residents, and the original drainage channels were constructed along the periphery of the 
houses. This condition explained the distinctive construction skill of CA 7 from others, and 
their ability to formulate their own UBSR, which will be explained in Chapter 5. 
 
II.4 SELF-HELP MANAGEMENT IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
II.4.1 Formation of Community Association (CA) and Neighborhood Association (NA) 
In the middle of 1970s, the State enacted the Village Government Law (VGL) 5/ 1974 as the 
juridical basis of the formation of Community (CA) and Neighborhood Associations (NA). 
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This regulation imitated the neighborhood system used during Japanese Occupation, to help 
facilitate the State’s control over the citizens, including kampung residents.  
In the New Order Era (1966-1998), CA and NA were regulated by Ministry of Interior Decree 
7/1983, as the policy instrument from Village Government Law 5/1974. This regulation was 
revised by Regional Government Law 22/ 1999, which was followed by the Presidential Decree 
49/2001 and Ministry of Interior Decree 4/1999 to regulate and standardize the formation 
guidelines that encompassed elections, rights and obligations, tenure time, requirements for 
Head of NA and CA, mutual agreement procedures, and assets of a village.  
This decree emphasized the obligation of the Head of NA and CA to disseminate the central 
government programs, as a form of controlling the numbers and activities of populations, 
including in kampung settlements. The identity and family card became the tools to control the 
number of population, which also helped to legitimize resident’s citizenship, including 
kampung residents.  
The formation of NA and CA were based on mutual agreement by the residents. The elected 
Head and Vice of Head of NA and CA were submitted to the sub-district for receiving the letter 
of acknowledgment from the government. However, the Head of NA and its apparatus are 
excluded from the city government, and do not receive any salary for their services. According 
to Head of CA 1 and all Head of NAs in Kampung Cikini, the position is considered as the 
form of dedication to improve the living conditions of the kampung residents.  
During his tenure, the Head of NA and CA establishes the unwritten rules of the settlement, 
which comprises of rights and obligations of kampung residents to maintain social harmony 
and enact hazard prevention. It was encouraged by the government during the New Order era 
to preserve the spirit of mutual self-help in the management of their own affairs. Therefore, the 
formation of CA and NA is a form of legitimization of the autonomy for all settlements, 
including kampung settlement, which is legalized by various government regulations. 
The first consideration of territorial division was based on the origin of the residents. According 
to information shared by local leaders in several NAs, the native landowners and local leaders 
initiated the differentiation of territory between the original and the expansion of Kampung 
Cikini. The first was occupied by the natives and migrants, who rented or bought the land from 
the existing land owners. While the second was inhabited by the migrants, who created the 
expansion area with piles of construction waste from the surrounding modern city 
development.  
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Basically, the division of NA was based on the equal access from the overlaid railway and 
market, to ensure fair access of circulation among residents. Furthermore, alleys between each 
of NA were used as the distinctive territorial boundaries.  
The distinction facilitated efficient and effective self-organization. Furthermore, it was also 
designated to set clear boundaries of the area that should be evicted. In other words, the native 
local leaders were intended to sacrifice the migrants in the expanded area to save their lands 
and houses, whenever the eviction occurred. However, as the population continued to grow, 
the native family members and relatives were forced to live in the expanded area, due to a lack 
of space in the original part of Kampung Cikini. Consequently, the classification became vague 
and the clear distinction between the native and the migrant’s territory slowly diminished.  
The formation of the NA and CA indicates the merging of kampung’s self-help management 
with the city administration. The Head of CA 1 became the connection between the kampung 
residents and the city administration, which is represented by the Head of the Pegangsaan sub-
district. As the connector, the Head of CA 1 holds a pivotal role in disseminating the aspirations 
of the kampung residents to city administration, particularly in terms of the projects required 
to improve their living conditions. Reciprocally, the Head of CA 1 also became the 
disseminator of the city administration programs and orders, which were communicated by 
Head of the Pegangsaan sub-district.  
This mutual relationship enables kampung residents to obtain recognition from the city 
administration and helps to solidify their existence in their settlement. The distribution of 
Identity and Family cards, as the tools of city administration to identify the number and identity 
of population, became essential tools for the kampung residents to earn recognition from 
meeting their daily needs such as: enrolling their children in the nearest schools, obtaining job 
opportunities in the formal sector, acquiring electricity from the National Electricity Company 
(NEC), and exercising their political rights in general elections. This mutual relationship also 
helps to sustain the autonomy of self-help management of the kampung settlement, and is a 
possible answer to the insufficient resources and incapacity of city administration to deal with 
the massive number of kampung residents.  
 
II.4.2 Self-Help Management of Market in the Overlaid Railway 
In this part of time, the overlaid railway by the NTC has increased the circulation flow to the 
heart of Kampung Cikini. This overlaid railway shortened the distance for pedestrians from 
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Cikini Station to the surrounding commercial area and General Hospital. Consequently, a small 
market emerged along both sides of the overlaid railways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure II.6: The Map (top) and Pictures (bottom) of the market in Kampung Cikini 
 
The market consisted of HBE from the houses along the overlaid railway and the ambulant 
traders, who came from Cikini Station. At first, CA 1 did not collect a fee from the traders, but 
as the market grew rapidly CA 1 started a fee collection system. However, the fee collection 
system ignited conflict between CA 1 and the NAs along the overlaid railway.  
Each of the Heads of NAs claimed their entitlement to collect fees from the traders, who sold 
their commodities in the periphery of their territories. The fees were designated to fund the 
self-help infrastructure improvement and welfare of each NA.  
However, Head of CA 1 also claimed their entitlement to collect the fee, as the ambulant traders 
also sold their commodities in the overlaid railway. Over the time, some of the ambulant traders 
rented space in the houses along the overlaid railway, and should pay the fee to the Head of 
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CA 1. The collected fees by CA 1 were planned to pay the collecting garbage fees to the city 
agency and security which was coordinated by Head of CA 1. 
At the end of the 1970s – according to the Head and Vice of CA 1 and confirmed by several 
longtime traders in the market – CA 1 held a meeting that was attended by Head of NAs and 
their representative of traders in the overlaid railway area. The result was the traders, who were 
the residents of CA 1, would pay the fee to the each of NAs. While the traders, who came from 
the outside of CA 1, should pay the fee to the Head of CA 1.  
Although all the parties pledged to comply this agreement, it only lasted for a decade. The 
influx of ambulant traders was not recorded properly and the overlapping of fee collection by 
Head of NAs with the cooperation with a corrupted security team, had decreased the income 
of CA1. Consequently, CA 1 could not perform their duties appropriately, such as paying the 
garbage collection fees to the city agency. The accumulation of uncollected garbage became 
one of the triggers of distrust between CA 1 and the Head of NAs. As the tension escalated, the 
Head of NAs began to take over collecting the fees from all the traders who sold their 
commodity in the periphery of their territory and share in certain percentages to CA 1.  
This modified system allowed CA 1 to pay the garbage collection fees to city agency, while 
each of the Heads of NAs kept the authority of their territories. However, the tension left 
personal grudges between CA 1 officials and Heads of NAs. As such, most of officials of CA 
1 and each NAs were reluctant to disclose detailed information relating to the overlaid railway 
market.  
 
II.4.3 Establishment of Pegangsaan Sub-District Board 
The Governmental Organization of Jakarta Law 34/1999 mandated the formation of the Sub-
District Board, which was followed by City Regulation 5/2000 on Sub-District Board (SDB) 
and Governor Decree 3/2001 on the Procedure of Electing the Sub-District Board’s members. 
In the City Regulation 5/2000, SDB is an institution for consultation and communication 
between the city apparatus and the representatives of sub-district residents on matters relating 
to the community’s issues and the implementation of government policies.  
SDB consists of elected representatives chosen by the residents and are proposed to the Head 
of Sub-District for inauguration. The representatives are obligated to voice the aspirations and 
consult on the issues of the residents to the Head of Sub-District, but are also responsible for 
disseminating and implementing the government policies in the community.  
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According to the City Regulation 5/2000, the number of members of SDB is the same as the 
numbers of CA in the Sub-District. In the case of the Pegangsaan Sub-District, there are 8 
members of SDB, as there are 8 CAs within the Sub-District. The representative of Kampung 
Cikini, who also became one of respondents, admitted that SDB is very efficient in 
comprehensively discussing the issues in the CA, as they cannot be solved in the particular CA. 
Issues include things such as criminal activities, contagious diseases and others. The intense 
communication with other representatives helps to develop a mutual cooperation to overcome 
the problems of the community. Furthermore, the representatives can easily propose the 
appropriate programs to the city government for solving the problems encountered by the 
community. 
Nevertheless, the Head of Pegangsaan Sub-District encourages the self-help community 
program (including in Kampung Cikini) with mutual assistance from mobilization of labor, 
funding and planning, in order to help solve the second issue by providing and renovating 
neighborhood infrastructure. In other words, the Head of Sub-District, on behalf of the city 
government, gives the autonomy to the residents to address infrastructure problems, due to a 
lack of resources.  
The SDB also becomes a site of opportunity to obtain infrastructure assistance from the city 
government. The discussion and negotiation with the authority in Pegangsaan Sub-District 
enables the representative of Kampung Cikini to acknowledge, propose and obtain the available 
intervention programs for the kampung. Therefore, the representation of Kampung Cikini in 
the SDB holds a pivotal role in obtaining the relevant improvement programs and negotiating 
the autonomy of Kampung Cikini in self-help housing and infrastructure provision.  
 
II.4.4 Mutual Relationship with the Modernized Surrounding Area 
The aforementioned history demonstrates the shifting of Jakarta development, from 
accommodating the kampung settlements to modern city development. In the 1980s, the 
widening of Cikini Raya street in the west side of Kampung Cikini was intended to solidify the 
Menteng district as one of prominent business districts in the DKI Jakarta province, along with 
the development of Central Business Districts. This development has sacrificed the NA 1 and 
2 which were turned into high-rise commercial buildings. 
Furthermore, NA 8, 9, 10 were also included in the eviction in order to build social facilities 
such as Bung Karno University, government buildings and the expansion of General Hospital. 
The constant flooding in the rainy seasons in this decade, enforced the city government to 
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demolish the houses along the riverside and build a new river inspection road. However, this 
road stopped in the overlaid railway bridge due to a lack of resources to demolish the built 
houses along the Ciliwung River. This significant partial eviction changed the territorial 
division and strengthened the community’s solidarity. Several residents, who were reluctant to 
move out from Kampung Cikini, had to rent, buy and even build in the extension area of NA 
14 behind the high-rise buildings. 
Although several NAs have changed into the commercial and social facilities, they are still 
included in territory of CA 1. It entitles the Head of CA 1 to fabricate new relationships with 
the new owners and users of the building. The owners and users of new buildings were 
obligated to obtain letter recommendations for all the purposes relating to the buildings from 
the Head of CA 1, ranging from building permits for renovation or expansion to all social 
welfare such as crime reports to insurance companies and the police station.  
This obligation becomes an irresistible opportunity for the Head of CA 1 to allocate 
unemployed residents to low-rank job opportunities in the surrounding new buildings, ranging 
from building security, parking officers, office boys, cleaning service workers, drivers, to 
negotiated space for street vendors and expansion of housing area in NA 14. After the 
establishment of the Sub-District Board, where the residents of Kampung Cikini have their 
representation, the distribution of unemployed residents to the surrounding commercial 
facilities becomes more streamlined.  
The consented appropriate of labor enables kampung residents to obtain regular and occasional 
donations from the surrounding facilities for various ceremonies. This mutual relationship 
grows to also include access to additional clean water and electricity, the mobilization of 
construction waste from renovations, and improvement and expansion of buildings. This waste 
was utilized for the self-help housing and infrastructure improvement in Kampung Cikini.  
In order to solve the garbage collection issues, CA 1 has been successful in creating and 
maintaining cooperation with the Cikini Market. Shared usage of a garbage tank occurs in 
exchange for a small contribution to a shared fee that is delivered to the market administration, 
as they cannot afford to pay the whole fee established by the city agency.  
For the owners and users, this mutual relationship benefits them for administration problems, 
provision of cheap labor, vending space for their low-rank workers, and security assistance 
from kampung residents. During the political turmoil and monetary crisis in 1997-1998, the 
kampung residents helped the owners and users of the surrounding buildings protect 
themselves from the riots and subsequent plundering in various ways. 
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The mutual benefits with the surrounding modernized neighbors provide job opportunities, 
which still generates migration from outside the settlement. As a result, the expansion of NA 7 
along the river inspection road has occurred. In order to prevent eviction in the future, the Head 
of CA 1 and NA 7 established a rule for the houses in the new area to not usurped the river 
body and instead place their houses along the boundary wall of the modern buildings1. This 
rule still provides sufficient space, approximately 700-1,000 mm, for circulation on the river 
inspection road.  
This description illustrates how the self-help management of kampung settlements has been 
exercised in order to manage the internal population and structure of settlement and collaborate 
with city administration. It establishes the fact that self-help management of kampung 
settlement does not only regulate internally, but has also been able to adapt and capitalize on 
the variation of external conditions to ensure their living can be sustained in kampung 
settlement.  
 
II.5 AUTONOMY ANONYMOUS AS THE RESULT OF FRAGMENTED 
POLICIES 
Since the Dutch Colonial era, kampung embodies spatial segregation of the lower class in 
contrast to those living in larger, better-built houses that line the streets. Due to the absence of 
government intervention, the residents have had to develop their own self-help management. 
However, kampung residents do not only contribute to the modernization that has occurred 
since the Dutch Colonial period to the present time. Residents also help to create opportunities 
for themselves, which is the reason the kampung will always exist as favorable employment 
opportunities close to the city center will always be a characteristic2.  
Therefore, kampung settlements are a product of development where modern economic activity 
gains maximum profits and benefits from the existence of kampung residents. As the 
population grew rapidly, the government enacted Village Government Law 5/ 1974, to register 
the population. This allows the kampung residents to obtain ID and family cards. It also poses 
several commonly overlooked consequences, such as: acknowledgment of the identity of 
kampung and its residents, access to infrastructure and government intervention programs, and 
the ability of residents to exercise their political rights.  
 
                                                             
1  It becomes the milestone of making the UBSR in NA 7, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
2  The economy activities in Kampung Cikini will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter II: The Autonomy of Kampung Settlement in Jakarta and Cikini 
Autonomy Anonymous and the Code of Kampung Settlement: The Case of Cikini, Jakarta 
 
 
II-30 
 
 
 
 
F
ig
ur
e 
II
-9
: A
ut
on
om
y 
A
no
ny
m
ou
s 
as
 t
he
 R
es
ul
t 
of
 t
he
 F
ra
gm
en
te
d 
P
ol
ic
ie
s 
 
Chapter II: The Autonomy of Kampung Settlement in Jakarta and Cikini 
Autonomy Anonymous and the Code of Kampung Settlement: The Case of Cikini, Jakarta 
 
 
II-31 
 
As the population growth kept escalating, the government enacted Ministry of Interior Decree 
7/1983, which allows the kampung residents to voice their aspirations and propose intervention 
programs. In order to decrease the numbers of proposals, the city government established the 
Sub-District Board as a communication forum, where the representative of each Community 
Association (CA) can collaborate and negotiate with other surrounding CAs to solve their 
problems.  
The representation of Kampung Cikini on the SDB acknowledges that the city plan relates to 
the settlement, but also helps residents obtain intervention programs3 from the city government 
and the surrounding commercial facilities. Therefore, it is clear that the Head of Sub-District, 
on behalf of city government, solidifies the autonomy for the residents in the improvement of 
their own settlement, including for those residing in Kampung Cikini.  
However, the development of housing policy in Indonesia has shifted from the encouragement 
of self-help housing to the housing provision by government and the private sector. The 
enactment of Building Law 28/2002 and Spatial Order Law 26/2007 tends to rigidly order the 
building process and function, including housing. Conformity with the established land use 
becomes one of the pivotal mandatory requirements to build. In Kampung Cikini, the projected 
land use according to City Government Regulation 1/2014 is to diminish the houses of 
kampung residents and replace them with high-density commercial, social facilities, and an 
expansion of the General Hospital. This regulation poses eviction threats to the settlement, 
which challenges the acknowledgment of autonomy of the kampung residents. It shows that in 
the context of the kampung settlements, including Kampung Cikini, fragmented policies exist. 
These fragmented policies become the cause of the autonomy anonymous, the unacknowledged 
autonomy of kampung residents to deliver self-help housing provision. This indicates that the 
autonomy anonymous still enables kampung residents to produce and practice their own 
housing code. The following three chapters will explain the housing code in Kampung Cikini. 
 
                                                             
3  This part will be discussed in Chapter 3, as the intervention program from government has correlation with 
the code of Land Tenure Security. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CODE OF LAND TENURE SECURITY IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
 
III.1 LAND TENURE SECURITY IN KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT 
III.1.1 Definition of Land Tenure  
The aforementioned main problem in Turner’s self-help housing concept and the housing 
programs delivered in Indonesia is the land tenure security. UN-Habitat (2007) defined tenure 
security as the right of all individuals and groups to effective protection from the State against 
forced evictions, which is complex and encompasses the dichotomies of formality or 
informality, legality or illegality, and modern or customary law. It is regarded as a major 
contributor to poverty alleviation and advancing sustainable livelihoods. Meanwhile, Payne 
(2001) defined land tenure as the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of 
relationships among people concerning land or its product. It usually involves a complex set of 
rules, or bundle of rights, associated with the use of that land (UN-Habitat, 2004). However, 
Payne (2005) exhorted that land tenure needs to be understood separately from property rights, 
which refer to a recognized interest in land or property vested in an individual or group. 
Governments have become increasingly aware that concerted action is required in the 
promotion of secure tenure, replacing arbitrary forced evictions with negotiated resettlement 
(Farvacque & McAuslan, 1992). 
 
III.1.2 Failure of Land Titling in Poverty Alleviation 
In the last two decades, land tenure provision through land formalization programs has been 
seen as the ultimate solution to this problem. In his prominent book, de Soto (2000) claimed 
that the poor in developing countries own dead capital, which cannot be used to create wealth. 
He argued that these possessions, including houses on land without title, are not adequately 
recorded and turned into capital. The formalization of property rights will serve security of 
tenure (van Gelder, 2007) and provide capital for home improvement (Mooya & Cloete, 2007). 
Nonetheless, this concept has irrefutable shortcomings because it demands fundamental 
changes of the legal system (Berner, 2000). The link between legal titles and access to credit 
have failed to materialize (Calderon, 2004; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007; Lemanski, 2010; 
Pamuk, 2000; Van Gelder, 2009), as any borrower must have a secure income before it is 
possible to leverage credit from a banking system, which is almost impossible for many slum 
residents who work in informal sectors (Bromley, 2008). Few financial institutions will accept 
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it the insecure income as collateral for loans, and slum residents often pay substantially higher 
costs for services than higher income residents in the formal tenure categories (Payne, 1997). 
The potential beneficiaries are unable to afford any form of legal tenure requiring payment 
(Fourie, 1999; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008). In some cases, titles cannot stipulate security of 
tenure, because the regulatory taxation will hamper residents’ financial capacity (Baharoglu, 
2002: 4). Land titling has also been said to potentially disrupt community life and established 
social networks (Bromley, 2008; Payne, 1997; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2003).  
A study in Bogota (Colombia) by Gilbert (2002) established the insignificance of formal 
finance after formal titling, as the slum residents were reluctant to utilize titles to access credit. 
Research by Home and Lim (2004) in Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia proved that 
landholders are more likely to pass plots on to family than sell them on the free market, and 
observed a widespread aversion to the use of land as collateral in all three countries.  
While based on his study in Kenya, Musembi (2007) criticized the neglected customary land 
tenure arrangements and land markets in the absence of formal title, along with the rise of 
insecurity through land speculation and pressure to change traditional customary tenure 
arrangements. The use of land for loans is not popular among poor people in the developing 
world, since they do not need the significant sums of money that require collateral (Payne, 
2001).  
Land titling does not only increase the market value of land (Durand-Lasserve & Payne, 2006: 
7) but also rent and tax prices, which makes landed properties more inaccessible to the poor  
(Payne 2001). Rapid appreciation of property values sparks speculative activities by profit-
motivated land investors (Payne et al., 2007) – making the land is impossible to access by poor 
people (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002) and undermining the customary land tenure 
systems which historically made land easily available to the poor (Durand-Lasserve & Payne, 
2006). These studies have illustrated the fallacious promise of de Soto’s thesis, which is 
incompatible with the socio-economic conditions of slum residents. 
 
III.1.3 Obstacles of Land Titling 
Land titling encounters many tremendous obstacles – such as time and administrative costs 
(Payne et al., 2007) – that mean it cannot respond effectively, because migration tends to be 
more rapid than the process of regularization (Durand-Lasserve, 2006).  
The private household that buys unregistered land and wants to have it registered must reckon 
with additional expenses (about 25 % of the sale price) if the land is bought from an informal 
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sub-divider. The costs of registration, alongside the lengthy (6-12 months) and complicated 
process is the main reason why the landowners hesitate to register their land despite the 
advantages for them. They cannot use their land without registration as collateral, and in the 
case of land acquisition by the government, they would only receive little compensation. 
Until the present day, most residents rely on the contract of sale or simple receipt as the only 
proof of land ownership. Unfortunately, those proofs are not sufficient to give the land buyer 
the right of land ownership (Widjaja & Widjaja, 2003: 27). In order to obtain the right, the 
owner must register the land to the government as suggested in Agrarian Act 5/1960 and 
Government Regulation 24/1997 about Land Registration. This is important to avoid land 
ownership disputes, which obstruct the city development process (Thalib, 1985). 
The regulation suggests the land owner may register his or her land with minimum 20 years’ 
possession also supported by reliable and undisputed proofs. Therefore, it also facilitates the 
registration of customary land in the absence of formal documentation of ownership (Lubis & 
Lubis, 2010: 144). Unfortunately, the applicant must meet more requirements based on 
Agrarian State Ministerial Decree 9/1999 and Government Regulation 16/2004 Article 13 such 
as land use planning, tax payment receipt, land status and building permit (Harsono, 2003). 
 
III.1.4 Prevalence of Subjective over Objective Tenure Security 
The concept of tenure security has both objective and subjective security (Deininger, 2003). 
The former concept is easier to determine by assessing the laws and regulations related to land 
issues (van Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007). The latter concept meanwhile refers to the formal 
interest and rights people have in land holdings in the form of leasehold or freehold tenure and 
through arrangements under customary law (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Payne, 2002). 
Therefore, land tenure security can be achieved without necessarily acquiring land title 
registration if the land rights of people are recognized by the society, duration of the property 
rights are confirmed (Abdulai 2006), boundaries are clearly demarcated and land rights are 
defined (van Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007). Indeed, in many case studies, de facto tenure has 
provided enough security of land rights and potential housing improvements that legal titles 
become obsolete (Varley 2002).  
This program also has been exploited by political elite to harvest votes from the 
underprivileged (Varley, 1999). Turner (1967, 1969, 1972) adds that planning an invasion in 
some cases involves the support of political groups who in turn need squatters to vote for them. 
Ray (1969: 33) agrees with this view, and argues that contact with at least one of the political 
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parties which share governing power in a city is an essential principle for successful invasion. 
In several African countries, land invasions or seizures are often initiated and carried out 
directly by government politicians and their cliques (Mitullah, 1992). Van der Linden (1982) 
in his study of squatter settlements in Karachi (Pakistan) proved that protection against eviction 
is guaranteed by squatter leaders, who can obtain protection from politicians or key persons in 
the government administration. This is rather different from the case of Phnom Penh 
(Cambodia) where squatter landlords are themselves government military or police 
commanders (Khemro, 2000). 
A study by Gilbert (1994) has shown that squatter settlements improve when people have 
security of tenure, when governments provide some of the basic services, and when the 
majority of squatters reside in an area for a lengthy period of time. 
These studies illustrate that the prevalence of subjective over objective tenure security goes 
beyond the community recognition – as Abdulai (2002) asserted – but also reflects the dualistic 
attitude of government towards the existence of slum residents. Slum residents have been 
condemned as non-existent residents in the city because of their illegal occupation of land, but 
several benefits and supports to the interests of the city’s elite. This attitude also has been the 
source of the cumbersome slum improvement program in city planning development. 
 
III.1.5 Land Policy in Indonesia 
A. The Sustenance of Dualism Principle 
The Dutch Colonial government enacted The Agrarian Law of 1870, which is based 
on the principle of dualism. The Agrarian Law differentiated in its regulations 
between non-Indonesians and foreigners on the one hand, and Indonesians on the 
other. For non-Indonesians and Western Europeans, a civil law system prevailed in 
which lands were surveyed, registered, and titled based on Western civil law 
procedures. For Indonesians, custom or customary law was followed and holdings 
were not surveyed, registered, or titled. 
From Independence in 1945 until the enactment of the BAL in 1960, the regulations 
of the Agrarian Law and the dual system was maintained for the time being. During 
the Independence era, land was cadastral surveyed and registered, but it was 
estimated that not even 5 % of the entire country was registered under Western law 
procedures. Customary law was applied for Indonesians, and accordingly their land 
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plots were neither surveyed, registered nor titled. As a rule, there were also no 
written documents, and thus a lack of evidence to prove land ownership. 
The Indonesia government crafted Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) in 1960 to eliminate 
the dual system of land law of the colonial past by introducing an entirely new 
system of unique Indonesian character. It guarantees the application of local 
customary law and norms unless it conflicts with national and state interests, for 
which the duality of the previous system was retained in a more ambiguous form. 
Based on this matter, many district and sub-district agencies issue their own land 
certificate and taxation procedures and formalities, clearly benefiting from the 
uncertainty and lack of public knowledge of national land law. 
 
B. Types of Rights of Land 
In reality, the categories owed more to Dutch and Western models than to 
customary rights. The chief forms of registrable interest in land available under the 
BAL include the following: 
1. The right of ownership: 
The right of ownership is the strongest right to land. The right of ownership is 
not limited in terms of time. The land can be sold, mortgaged or inherited by the 
legal heirs. The right of ownership is subject to registration and the land owner 
receives a legal document as evidence of his rights. As well, the right of 
ownership can be acquired in various different ways: a) conversion of customary 
rights; b) conversion of state lands which have been granted by the Government; 
and c) conversion of property, agrarian property which were valid before the 
BAL came into effect. 
Only Indonesian nationals are able to receive the right of ownership. As a rule, 
the right of ownership is awarded to individuals, however in exceptional cases 
under certain preconditions, certain corporate bodies (state banks, cooperative 
agricultural associations, religious and social institutions) can be awarded the 
right of ownership. Foreigners are excluded from this right. 
a)  Individual ownership 
Those with the right of ownership have complete rights of disposal over their 
land. Under the right of ownership, they can – without the agreement of a 
third party – sell, bequeath, transfer and lease the land. Generally, it is not 
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absolutely necessary for the plot of land to be registered. The disposal rights 
of individuals can, however, be restricted. This concerns, for example, the 
rights of utilization.  
Various transfer rights (inheritance, sale, rent) can likewise be restricted. The 
BAL in Article 17 has set an upper limit to land ownership and in Article 9 
restricts the rights of non-Indonesian citizens, who are only allowed to 
acquire particular land titles. In Article 10, regulations exist for avoiding 
absentee landlords. 
In Article 18, the State retains the right to acquire land owned under any type 
of land right for utilization in the public interest. Article 6 emphasizes the 
social function of all rights to land. This means that state or the general 
interest have priority over personal interests. 
b)  State ownership 
In Indonesia, all areas of land classified as forest are under State ownership. 
This includes the Protection Forests already mentioned above (watershed 
areas, amongst others) and Recreation Forests. Land under the land titles hak 
guna usaha and hak pakai are also under State ownership. Thus all 
plantations under these land titles are the property of the State. The following 
differentiation exists with regard to the organizational form of the 
plantations:  
i) State plantations company; and  
ii) Privately organized companies with limited propriety, which are the 
property of the Government for reasons of capital contributions; and  
iii) Private plantations, whereby the percentage of foreign plantations is low. 
The State dispenses rights to private persons and corporations for using 
State land. Concessions for the operation of production forests for 20 years 
are dispensed in this way. 
c)  Communal ownership 
There exist various forms of communal ownership in Indonesia. The 
authorizations and restrictions regarding disposal of property can vary greatly 
between the various legal jurisdictions. The territorially delineated legal 
system differentiates between three forms of communal land ownership:  
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i) Communal ownership of the village which is regularly rented out to 
procure funds for routine or development costs;  
ii) Communal ownership of the desa1, to which individuals have temporary 
or inherited individual use rights and must fulfill certain obligations 
connected to these rights; and  
iii) Communal ownership of the desa, which is in the possession of village 
officials in lieu of salary. 
d)  Wakaf 
There are two kinds of so-called wakaf2, which are a residential area for a 
mosque and an additional arable field to provide for the maintenance of the 
mosque and its personnel, as inalienable property for the benefit of 
descendants. 
2. The right of building  
This type of right gives the holder the right to build on land owned by someone 
else. This right is limited timewise and can be obtained for state land (by decree) 
as well as for private land (by contract). It is awarded for not longer than 30 
years with the possibility of extending for another 20 years. There are maximum 
area limitations. So far there are no implementation regulations for registration. 
The right of building can be bequeathed, sold, used as a credit security, 
exchanged or presented as a gift. 
3. The right of use  
This type of right gives the holder the right to use a particular piece of land. This 
can be State or private land. In practice, this right is scarcely made use of for 
privately owned land since other titles, such as the right of lease, or right of land 
pledging, play a greater part here. Hak pakai is basically limited timewise. This 
type of right can in principle be transferred when no other regulations apply. 
Resident foreigners and foreign corporations with representatives in Indonesia 
can be awarded the right of use. It is useful for private land that does not get 
registered because of the lack of implementing regulations. 
                                                             
1  Desa means ‘Village’ in Indonesian language. 
2  According to Peter, et. al (2012) wakaf is a charitable endowment under Islamic law, which involves donating 
a building, plot of land or other assets without intention of reclaiming the assets. The word is derived from 
Sunni jurisprudence, waqf, or wakf (Arabic: ﻒﻗو, pronounced [ˈwɑqf]; plural Arabic: فﺎﻗوأ, awqāf; Turkish: 
vakıf). The meaning of Wakf according to Hassan (in Nahar & Yaacob, 2011), is “the detention of a specific 
thing in the ownership and the devoting of its profit or products in charity of the poor or other good objects". 
In Indonesia context, this land right is derived from religion law, as most of the population is Muslim. 
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4. The right of lease  
There is a differentiation here between right of lease for buildings and right of 
lease for agricultural land. In the first case, a building can be erected on someone 
else’s land for a specific but not fixed time by paying a monthly lease. This is a 
case of a personal right. The right of lease is created between landowner and 
lessee with a contract. In the case of the right of lease for agricultural land, land 
must be used for agricultural purposes, and the lease can be paid in either cash 
or kind. 
5. The right of exploitation  
The right of exploitation is the right to State land, and the right to use the land 
for agricultural (including plantations), fishery and breeding purposes. The right 
of exploitation is limited timewise. It can, for example, be granted for an oil 
palm plantation for up to 35 years, with the possibility of extending for another 
25 years. So, de facto, the right of exploitation on state lands can be awarded for 
up to 50 or 60 years.  
Some of the regulations of the right of exploitation have their origins in the 
‘erfpacht rights3’, which were valid before the BAL came into effect. The right 
of exploitation can be acquired by Indonesian individuals and corporations 
established under Indonesian Law and domiciled in Indonesia. There is no 
maximum area of land which can be awarded under the right of exploitation. It 
must be registered at the Land Registry Office, and can be bequeathed and 
likewise be transferred to other parties (sale, exchange or gift) with the 
permission of the BPN. The right of exploitation also allows land to be used as 
a security for a debt. 
6. The right of opening up land  
The right of opening up land is awarded by the Government to Indonesian 
citizens for clearing land, and using the cleared land for a maximum of three 
cultivation periods. It can later be changed into the right to use, the right of 
exploitation or the right of ownership. 
7. The right of collecting forest products  
This right is awarded to Indonesian citizens by the Government on customary 
land in order to be able to use wood and other non-wood products. 
                                                             
3  The term erfpacht is derived from Dutch language. 
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8. The right of land pledged  
The right of land pledged is a way for the landowner to receive money without 
having to sell the land. The right holder transfers the right of use to another 
person who in return pays money to the land owner. The land owner gets his 
land back when he has paid back the loan. This is known as a land pledge. The 
pledge arrangement is only rarely conducted before the village head, and is 
usually unwritten. There is no time limit in which the landowner must to pay 
back the money in order to get back his land. 
9. The right of sharecropping  
The right of sharecropping is restricted to agricultural purposes, which is 
governed by Law 2/1960.  
10. The right of lodging  
The right of lodging is a weak right of use. It allows someone to own a house 
on someone else’s land. The duration of the right is not fixed, and is governed 
by the local customary law.  
11. The right of using water  
The right of using water is a customary-based right which allows access to 
water on another person’s land and/or to divert water across another person’s 
land. 
12. The right of breeding and catching fish 
This is the right to breed fish and to catch fish on another person’s property. 
13. The right of using the airspace  
This is a right, and not a very clear one, for using energy and elements available 
in the atmosphere. 
From all 13 types of land rights, only number 1 and 2 are applicable in the context of urban 
kampung settlement.  
 
III.1.6 General Obstacles of Land Titling Program in Indonesia 
The BAL asserts that customary and religion law are not converted into statutory rights but are 
recognized where still existing – provided that such rights are adjusted to conform to the 
national interest, which is based on national unity. In reality the state owns and dictates the 
development land policy while the local communities are allowed to reside (Dove, 1990). 
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The BAL ensures that all land under colonial law is eligible to be converted to ownership rights 
within a year of the passage of the law, otherwise it would revert to state ownership. A copy of 
all agreements that affect the ownership and possession of the land must be registered at the 
Land Office (Heryani & Grant, 2004). Harsono (2003) identified two types of land registration 
which are: 1) registration of deeds; and 2) registration of title. The former involves the 
registration or recording of documents affecting interests in land; the latter involves the 
registration of title – where a land register should show the actual state of ownership – rather 
than just providing evidence of ownership. 
Because of the onerous requirements, the inhabitants of informal settlements cannot apply for 
the land certificate despite their desire to, and despite occupation for more than 20 years. 
Moreover, the main obstacle of land regulation is the complicated procedure based on Agrarian 
State Ministerial Decree 9/1999, which requires substantial costs and time (Perangin, 1992). 
Land and building tax is automatically applied to the owner, once the land is registered and the 
right of land ownership is certificated (Soerodjo, 2003). 
Although in theory unregistered interests are of the same status as those that are registered, in 
practice the latter are afforded far higher standing. Moreover, the process of registration, as 
described before, requires procedures which are not easy to follow by the residents of urban 
kampung settlements. Only very few landowners complied, which means a large number of 
land parcels in Jakarta and other cities are trapped in bureaucratic uncertainty.  
 
III.1.7 Categories of Land Tenure in Kampung Settlements 
In accordance with the origins and development of kampungs, three categories of land tenure 
are found in these settlements: formal land tenure, semi-formal tenure, and informal tenure4. 
Residents with formal tenure have a property title to their land on the basis of rights 
acknowledged by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which remains the general framework 
for Indonesian land law. At the same time, semi-formal tenure5 is still common in kampungs, 
which is based on customary or religious law. Under BAL, the position of customary law 
                                                             
4  The concept ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ in this literature relates to the literatures in Chapter 1. The former 
corresponds to the tenure security based on land ownership document from government, while the latter 
relates to the land ownership documents which are not issued by government. 
5  According to Harsono (2005), throughout the colonial period, because of legal dualism, residents could apply 
their own traditional customary law in relation to land. In kampungs this customary law soon took form of 
individual, inheritable customary ownership rights. Semi-formal tenure can be formalized through the legal 
conversion of ‘old’ colonial customary ownership rights, whereas informal tenure can be formalized by 
granting ‘new’ rights over state land to its occupants. Indonesian land law does not acknowledge the concept 
of adverse acquisition of title by peaceful occupation of land for a statutory period. 
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changed as part of a unification effort. It does not acknowledge customary ownership rights, 
yet these rights do have a semi-formal status, as they are acknowledged as legitimate claims 
for formalization. Finally, a third category, informal land tenure 6 , is found in kampung 
settlements.  
 
III.1.8 Self-Help Housing without Land Titles 
The assumption is that dwellings in slums are in poor condition primarily because residents 
lack a property title, and are therefore unwilling to invest in their homes (Razzaz, 1993). 
However, people have been found to improve their houses also despite not having legal title 
(Gilbert, 1994). According to Mexico’s experience, Varley (1987) argued that legalization is 
not necessary for improvement, but security of tenure in the absence of formal government 
acknowledgment is important. The subjective security of tenure, which was introduced by 
Payne (2001), is widely accepted as a precondition for households to invest in house 
construction or improvements.  
In Brazilian favelas, de Souza (2001) asserted that the process of housing consolidation 
increases perceptions of security of tenure, as residents invest time, labor, building materials, 
and money when building and improving their houses. Whilst in a case study in Buenos Aires, 
van Gelder (2007) concluded that fear of eviction was more influential on housing 
consolidation. A study in Jakarta by Winayanti and Lang (2002) has indicated that subjective 
tenure security does not always have to be based on property title, thanks to a government 
policy of condoning non-formal tenure and providing public services, in conjunction with a 
high degree of community organization, and support that residents receive from civil society 
groups. They argued that strengthening subjective tenure security resulted in a substantial 
increase in housing improvement.  
In relation to the effects of title on subjective tenure security, Hardjono (1999) argued that slum 
residents feel more secure about their rights to titled land. They affirmed to enjoy greater tenure 
security, as a land certificate recognizes their ownership rights (Smeru, 2002). However, a 
study by Hardjono (1999) did not find a clear relation between titling and improvements to 
land, suggesting that improvement is discouraged by the financial burden of formal status, 
rather than a lack of secure tenure. 
                                                             
6  According to Harsono (2005), informal tenure is usually the result of residents squatting land on which the 
state holds a direct right of avail (state land) or, less often, land on which others have established private 
rights. Informal tenure, therefore, cannot be formalized on grounds of extended occupation of land on which 
others have established private rights. Such private rights may however be forfeited, for instance through 
neglect of the land. In this case, land passes to the state, over which it can again grant ‘new’ ownership rights. 
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Although land tenure security and land title security are related, they are not synonymous 
(Löffler, 1996). The first refers to the feeling of not losing physical possession of the land 
within some future time period, which can in fact exist without documentary evidence. While 
the second refers to the feeling of security with the legal possession of the land, which cannot 
exist without documentary evidence. Legality of tenure may therefore not be a necessary 
precondition for establishing security of tenure, as security depends less on the exact legal 
status (Broegaard, 2005) and more on occupants’ perceptions of the probability of eviction and 
demolition (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Payne, 2002).  
According to the aforementioned literature, subjective tenure security consists of oral 
community recognition and enables the kampung residents to deliver self-help housing. 
However, considering the numbers of evicted kampung settlements in Jakarta, more than oral 
community recognition is required to formulate the code of land tenure security in Kampung 
Cikini and ensure its survival in Central Jakarta. This part of the research poses 2 (two) 
questions: 1) Why does this code of land tenure security emerge in Kampung Cikini; and 2) 
what kinds of practiced code of land tenure security in Kampung Cikini? 
 
III.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
Despite the absence of land titles, the population of urban kampung settlements are still rapidly 
increasing, and residents are building permanent houses. The lack of secure tenure from land 
titling does not discourage the kampung residents from delivering self-help housing 
improvement, which indicates a lack of connection between these two aspects. There are two 
stages relating to the determination of land tenure security in kampung settlement: 
1. Understand the status of land ownership and its background by classifying the type of 
tenure security into Objective Tenure Security and Subjective Tenure Security.  
The first stage will be achieved by understanding the types of documents used by 
respondents to gain tenure security. The land acquisition method will describe the 
relationship between documents and how kampung residents acquire their land. 
2. Identify factors relating to land title that strengthen or weaken Subjective Tenure 
Security and the ability of kampung residents to survive and deliver self-help house 
improvement. 
The second stage can be achieved by identifying the reasons to fear or not fear eviction. 
Providers of kampung interventions projects also are asked to identify additional 
reinforcing factors of Subjective Tenure Security in Kampung Cikini. 
Chapter III: The Code of Land Tenure Security in Kampung Cikini 
Autonomy Anonymous and the Code of Kampung Settlement: The Case of Cikini, Jakarta 
 
 
III-13 
 
 
The issue of land tenure security is very sensitive for the kampung residents, due to the siege 
of eviction threats. In order to deal with the degree of sensitivity, the first group interview was 
conducted in early February 2014. During the session, which was attended by Head of NA 1, 
all Heads of NA and several representatives of community members, the research objective 
was disseminated to obtain the general condition of land tenure in the research location, 
permission for conducting research and agreement to participate from the kampung residents. 
The permission was accompanied by the submission of a formal introductory letter from 
Menteng District to prevent the misuse of data and information about land tenure in the research 
location.  
After submitting the required letter, the research began with remapping the built environment 
in the research location. This was essential, as the latest map was made by the city government 
in 2007 and did not correspond to the actual present condition. Meanwhile, satellite imagery 
from Google Earth could not illustrate the precise location of houses and pathways, as roofs 
covered the narrow alleys, making the boundaries between buildings incomprehensible. The 
remapping process was performed in April-June 2014. This became the working map of the 
entire research. In the following three months, from July-December 2014, the map was verified 
and refined by the location of HBE, public facilities and administrative boundaries. 
Land ownership status is a very sensitive issue, especially in kampung. Respondents were very 
reluctant to share information about land and building ownership, because the settlement has 
been surrounded by eviction threats for almost 40 years. In order to gain primary data, mutual 
trust was built with the local community through several community engagement programs7 
since 2011 in RT 2 and 7 in Cikini Area.  
Snowball sampling was implemented to reach hard-to-reach populations who possess valuable 
information through a chain of nominations and re-nominations (Thompson, 1995). Each 5 
local leaders in RT 2 and 7 were interviewed, where community engagement programs were 
executed in 2011-2013, as the ‘first order zone’8. After sharing the information, these leaders 
                                                             
7  Universitas Indonesia and Chiba Unversity (Japan) performed the community engagement programs with 
participatory design method since 2011-2013, which funded by Directorate Research and Community 
Engagement Universitas Indonesia. Since 2011, we collaborate with the kampong dwellers in Cikini Area to 
rehabilitated and provided public facility to improve their living condition. It relates to the mandatory 
obligation of university, as stated in footnote 10. 
8  Land ownership status is very sensitive issue especially in urban kampong because the settlement has been 
surrounded by eviction threats for almost 40 years. Due to reluctance of respondents, snowball sampling 
method is employed to reach the hidden populations, who possess valuable information through a chain of 
nominations and re-nominations (Thompson, 1995). This sampling technique requires contact and 
interviewed a ‘first order’ zone of the network that will then nominate those that become the ‘second order’ 
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nominated other community members who were considered as reliable respondents for the 
intended research aim. The respondents came from 6 RTs (RT 2, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13) from total 
11 RTs in the research area. In total, 79 landowning respondents were interviewed. All 
respondents were the heads of families, and each of respondent represented one household. The 
interviewed 79 landowners consist of: 5 residents of RT 2, 17 residents of RT 4, 11 residents 
of RT 6, 19 respondents of RT 7, 14 respondents of RT 12 and 13 respondents of RT 13. This 
corresponds to 15% of the 556 households in total across the 6 RTs. 
The compiled data and information from the interview session in July-September 2014 
consisted of: 1) Reason to Reside in the Area; 2) Reside Time; 3) Type of Tenure Security; 4) 
Type of Land Ownership; 5) Alternative Evidence of Landownership; 6) Landownership 
Obtainment Methods; 7) The Obstacle of Land Registration; and 8) Factors Strengthening 
Subjective Tenure Security. 
The results were classified based on generated coding, and tabularized to understand 
quantitative aspects of topics and the relationship between them in each stage. The qualitative 
information will help explain quantitative aspects of the results obtained. The preliminary 
findings covered the general condition of land tenure of HBE owners, the obstacles of the land 
registration and the strengthening factors of land tenure security in kampung settlement, in 
accordance with the first research task. This process was performed in October-November 2014 
to reach preliminary findings. 
The second group interview was conducted in the early December 2014 to verify the result to 
the respondents. This session was essential to confirm validity and reduce bias with 
participatory or collaborative modes with the respondents, as encouraged by several scholars 
(Campbell, 1955; Diesing, 1971; Sieber, 1973). However, this session also brought additional 
information to enrich and refine the preliminary findings.  
This research has been discussed several times in several ways. The preliminary findings of 
land tenure security and its implication to self-help house improvement in Kampung Cikini 
settlement with wider respondents has been discussed in CPIJ Conference in Hanoi (Vietnam) 
and the final result has been accepted in URPR Journal in 2015. 
 
 
 
                                                             
zone and so on in a chain method that will reveal a complete network component. Local leaders were regarded 
as the ‘first order zone’ and they nominated the community members, as ‘second order zone’, who are 
considered as reliable respondents. 
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III.3 TYPES OF TENURE SECURITY IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
According to Indonesia’s Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) Girik and Right to Build (RTB) Letter 
once had legitimacy as evidence of land ownership, based on Dutch Colonial and Early 
Independence Era Law. The inheritance letter has its root to Religious Law, which is 
acknowledged as evidence of land ownership. These letters have lost their legitimacy after the 
National Land Agency issued Government Regulation 24/1997, which obligates the owners of 
those letters to register them in acquiring the acknowledged land ownership and recognition 
from the government. Due to a lack of regulation knowledge along with time and financial 
costs, the owners are reluctant to follow the procedure. Therefore, the expired Girik, RTB 
Letters and Inheritance Letters cannot be considered as legitimate evidence of land ownership 
from the government’s perspective. 
 
Table III.1: Type of Tenure Security and Documents in Kampung Cikini 
 
Type of Tenure Security 
Number   of 
Respondents 
(persons/ %) 
Type of Documents 
Number   of 
Respondents 
(persons/ %) 
A) 
Objective Tenure 
Security (OTS) 
2 (2.53%) A1) Right of Ownership 2 (2.53%) 
B) 
Subjective Tenure 
Security (STS) 
74 (93.67%) 
B1) Inherited Right to Build 8 (10.13%) 
B2) Girik Letter 11 (13.92%) 
B3) Contract of Sale 4 (5.06%) 
B4) Receipt of Land Transaction 9 (11.39%) 
B5) Inheritance Letter 42 (53.16%) 
C) Decline to Answer 3 (3.80%)     3 (3.80%) 
Total number of Respondents (persons) 79  
 
In the case study area, only 2 of 79 respondents (2.53%) have registered their land under Basic 
Agrarian Law to receive Right of Ownership, thus holding Objective Tenure Security. Most of 
respondents (93.67%) hold Subjective Tenure Security, claiming their land ownership by 
possessing: Inherited Right to Build (B1) (10.13%), Girik letter (B2) (13.92%), Contract of 
Sale (B3) (5.60%), Receipt of Land Transaction (B4) (11.39%) and Inheritance Letter (B5) 
(53.16%), as shown in Table III-1.  
 
III.3.1 Reasons to Obtain Right of Ownership under Basic Agrarian Law 
There were 2 out of 79 respondents who hold Objective Tenure Security in the case study area. 
They shared similar reasons to obtain Right of Ownership; these reasons differ from those 
identified in previous studies.  
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One respondent has been a resident of NA 2 for more than 40 years, and her family obtained 
the certificate in the 1990s by participating in a conversion program administered by the 
National Land Agency. As her family already held a Right of Ownership under the Dutch 
Colonial Administration (Eigendom) before the program, she did not experience significant 
obstacles – although it took 5 years to complete the whole process. However, her motivation 
to participate in the program was not to obtain the certificate to secure her tenure and enable 
her to improve her house, as expected from previous research. The motivation, instead, was to 
make the inheritance process easier. She admitted to residing in the family’s land, and all her 
relatives demand their inheritance rights to be distributed. These inheritance rights continue to 
mount, along with the increase in land value, especially as certified land. This reason indicates 
that the family has obtained Right of Ownership, under Basic Agrarian Law, in order to acquire 
profitable compensation by selling the land and divide the proceeds among all family members 
under the customary law or the religion law. 
The other respondent, residing in NA 4, also stated a similar reason to obtain Right of 
Ownership. In her case, just after purchasing the land almost 10 years ago, she registered the 
land, receiving the land certificate 2 years later. She explained by obtaining land certificate the 
land price was expected to increase 3-4 times higher in the case study area. This higher land 
price gives her and her family a sense of security, as if ever they are evicted in the future to 
execute spatial planning, the higher compensation would enable them to relocate to a decent 
house in another location. 
In both cases, respondents who hold Objective Tenure Security have obtained the Right of 
Ownership primarily for economic reasons, rather than for their secured tenure. 
 
III.3.2 Evidences of Land Ownership for Subjective Tenure Security 
As is shown in Table III.1, the majority of the land tenure security in Kampung Cikini is 
Subjective Tenure Security, applying to 74 out of 79 respondents. Among them, 42 respondents 
(53.16%) claimed an Inheritance Letter (B5) is their evidence of land ownership. This 
Inheritance Letter is issued according to the religious law or customary law when their parents 
divided the land they possess into pieces for their children. Consequently, the children, as 
inheritors, perceive the letter as a form of land certificate that can replace the land certificate 
issued by National Land Agency; they then believe they do not need to register the land. 
The inheritance from the parents can be sometimes transferred through an Inherited Right to 
Build (B1) or Girik Letter (B2). For the parents who once worked for Railway Company during 
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the late Dutch Colonial and the early Independence Era, they were allowed to use the lands 
along the former railway line to build their houses and/or plant crops as sign of appreciation 
for their services after the government decided to overlay the railways in the mid-1950s. The 
owners of this Inherited Right to Build (B1) are required to renew the license and register the 
land under Basic Agrarian Law and Government Regulation No. 24/1997, as in most cases the 
license has already expired. However, the respondents in this study have not registered their 
land yet, and continue use the expired Inherited Right to Build as the evidence of the land 
ownership. Likewise, those respondents who claimed Girik Letter (B2) as their proof of 
ownership continue to use expired letters. Although Inherited Rights to Build (B1) and Girik 
Letters (B2) were legally issued by the government, these residents cannot be regarded as 
formal landowner because they fail to meet the requirements, despite possessing acknowledged 
documents. 
 
Table III.2: Types of Document for Subjective Tenure Security and Obtainment Methods 
Types of Document for 
Subjective Tenure Security 
Obtainment Methods 
Number  of 
Respondents 
 
 
Occupy Relative's Land Inheritance Purchase (n) (%) 
 
 
 
B1) Inherited Right to Build 5 3 0 8 (10.81%)  
B2) Girik Letter 0 10 1 11 (14.86%)  
B3) Contract of Sale 0 0 4 4 (5.41%)  
B4) Receipt of Land Transaction 5 0 4 9 (12.16%)  
B5)  Inheritance Letter 0 42 0 42 (56.76%)  
Total (n) 10 55 9 74 100.00%  
 
Contract of Sale (B3) and Receipt of Land Transaction (B4), which are regarded as evidence 
of transaction among the community members, are also claimed as the legitimate evidence of 
land ownership. Therefore, the owners of those documents do not believe they need to register 
the land to National Land Agency. Furthermore, the methods used to obtain this evidence 
illustrates a more complex land ownership scenario in the case study area, as shown in Table 
III-2. 
Additional types of documents such as Contracts of Sale, Receipts of Transaction, and even 
expired RTB and Girik Letters were utilized as concrete tokens of transfer and evidence of land 
ownership. The awareness of the importance of ownership documents increases with an 
increasing of the number land ownership disputes in the settlement. The heads of NA and CA 
have been invoking the transfer of the available land ownership documents from previous to 
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new owners as a symbol of the transfer of land ownership. They use expired, once-
acknowledged land ownership documents as evidence of land transactions, and regard the 
documents as the evidence of land ownership. Two respondents admitted holding expired RTB 
and Girik Letters as the symbol of land ownership from the transaction.  
Naturally, many of the landowners with Inherited Rights to Build (B1), Girik Letters (B2) and 
Inheritance Letters (B5) have obtained the documents through inheritance. All respondents 
with Contracts of Sale (B3) and 4 out of 9 landowners with Receipts of Land Transaction (B4) 
have done so by purchasing the land. Yet, there is 1 respondent who has purchased a Girik 
Letter (B2), using it as evidence of land ownership through land transaction. In this case, the 
Girik Letter (B2) acts as replacement of Contract of Sale (B3) and Receipt of Land Transaction 
(B4).  
There are 10 respondents who claimed their land ownership by Inherited Rights to Build (B1) 
and Receipts of Land Transaction (B4) actually owned by their relatives. In these cases, they 
are entitled to occupy the land of relatives living elsewhere, and are promised to become the 
landowners when their relatives pass away. In other words, the Inherited Right to Build (B1) 
or Receipt of Land Transaction (B4) will be inherited by them in the future. A similar condition 
is also experienced by the land owners who live in their parent’s house. Half of this respondent 
group depends on the community recognition of their land ownership while the other half still 
possess expired Girik Letters from purchasing the land a long time ago.  
Looking into the types of document for Subjective Tenure Security, it is found that respondents 
each have their own reason (and they believe good reason) to claim their land ownership based 
on different documents, such as Inherited Rights to Build (B1), Girik Letters (B2), Contracts 
of Sale (B3), Receipts of Sale (B4) or Inheritance Letters (B5), either inherited from their 
parents or purchased. In addition, some inherit the land by occupying their relative’s land. 
These different forms of evidence of land ownership – obtained through different means – 
makes Subjective Tenure Security more complicated, though it is the majority in the case study 
area. 
 
III.3.3  Obstacles of Land Registration 
Despite the fact that most of the respondents (73.41%) have lived there for more than 20 years 
and the Government Regulation 24/1997 allow land occupiers to register their lands if they 
occupy the land for more than 20 years, the majority of the land ownership remains Subjective 
Tenure Security rather than Objective Tenure Security. 
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Table III.3: Obstacles of Land Registration 
The Obstacle of Land Registration 
Reside Time in Cikini Area 
 
 
0-10 
yrs. 
10-20 
yrs. 
20-30 
yrs. 
30-40 
yrs. 
> 40 
yrs. 
Total (n/ %) 
 
 
 
Inadequate Administration Knowledge  11 4 2 5 2 24 (35.29%)  
Expensive 10 3 2 3 2 20 (29.41%)  
Time Consuming 4 0 0 2 3 9 (13.24%)  
Avoid Land Tax 5 0 1 1 0 7 (10.29%)  
Mismatch with Spatial Planning 2 0 1 0 3 6 (8.82%)  
Belongs to Family 1 0 1 0 0 2 (2.94%)  
         
Total (n) 33 7 7 11 10 68*)  
Total (%) 48.53% 10.29% 10.29% 16.18% 14.71% 100.00%  
*)  2 respondents who already own formal land certificates and 9 respondents who live in their relative’s lands 
are excluded from total 79 respondents, as shown in Table-1. The latter group claims they do not know the 
reasons why their relatives do not register their lands. Therefore the number of respondents in Table-4 
decreases to 68 respondents. 
 
In other words, residents do not register their lands (though it is expected to do so), because of 
several obstacles as depicted in Table III.3. The major obstacle for land registration is residents’ 
inadequate knowledge of land administration. In fact, the procedure of formal land registration 
is too complicated due to the number of the relevant government regulations they are required 
to comprehensively understand. However, even if they (even partially) understand the 
regulations, the expensive registration cost becomes an inevitable obstacle (affecting 20 of 68 
respondents). The registration cost is decided based on the official land value, according to 
Government Regulation 13/2010, which leads to increased costs under increasing land values. 
Indeed, the official land price of this kampung is approximately US$250-500/m2, beyond most 
residents’ financial capacity, even if their lands are small. 
In addition, 7 of 68 respondents (10.29%) realized the obligation to pay land tax as an inevitable 
consequence of land registration. After spending so much for land registration, paying annual 
land tax would not be preferable for them. 
Another obstacle worth highlighting comes from the land ownership. There are 2 respondents 
(2.94%) answered that because their lands belong to their family, they would be compelled to 
deliberate with other family members in order to register the lands. Land registration has been 
discouraged in this case study area mainly due to residents’ inadequate knowledge and the 
expensive costs of both registration and the following tax. Furthermore, land registration is 
thought to be time-consuming, which further discourages registration. 
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III.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND TENURE SECURITY AND HOUSING 
CONDITION  
Intuitively, those who rely on Subjective Tenure Security should fear eviction and be reluctant 
to improve their houses. However, the data regarding the relationship between land tenure 
security and housing condition in Kampung Cikini confirmed similar findings from prior 
studies that this is not the case.  
Although most of the respondents hold only Subjective Tenure Security, 60 out of all the 79 
respondents (75.95%) build their houses as permanent structures. Indeed, 56 of 74 respondents 
(75.68%) under Subjective Tenure Security (from B1 to B5) have permanent houses. 
Conversely, there is 1 respondent under Objective Tenure Security (A1) who has a semi-
permanent house. Therefore, type of tenure security does significantly correlate to housing 
conditions in the case study area.  
 
Table III.4: Land Ownership and Structural Condition of Houses 
Types of Document 
Permanent1) Semi-Permanent2) Total 
(n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%) 
A1) Right of Ownership 1 (1.67%) 1 (5.26%) 2 (2.53%) 
B1) Inherited Right to Build 4 (6.67%) 4 (21.05%) 8 (10.13%) 
B2) Girik Letter 10 (16.67%) 1 (5.26%) 11 (13.92%) 
B3) Contract of Sale 3 (5.00%) 1 (5.26%) 4 (5.06%) 
B4) Receipt of Land Transaction 7 (11.67%) 2 (10.53%) 9 (11.39%) 
B5) Inheritance Letter 32 (53.33%) 10 (52.63%) 42 (53.16%) 
C) Decline to Answer 3 (5.00%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (3.80%) 
Total 60 (75.95%) 19 (24.05%) 79 
1)  The definition of permanent structure house regards to the degree of movability. The permanent structure is 
defined as non-movable because it is intended to stay permanent in a location and the materials cannot be 
detached after the construction has finished. 
2)  The definition of semi-permanent structure refers to the ability some parts of structure to be attached, 
transported and construct elsewhere. 
 
Furthermore, the land status in Kampung Cikini, according to the National Land Agency, is 
unregistered, which challenges National Railway Company’s claim as landowner. As the 
presumed landowner, the National Railway Company could not claim their ownership as they 
had insufficient data of land boundaries.  
The strengthening factor of subjective tenure security in interventions to improve kampung, as 
shown in Table III.6. After KIP 9  was terminated in the 1980s, interventions to improve 
                                                             
9  KIP stands for ‘Kampung Improvement Program’, which is funded by World Bank in the 1980s, to improve 
the condition of physical features of kampung settlement, such as: street, alley, drainage channels. 
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kampung delivery were made by various parties, such as: government, political party, private 
companies and university10. These projects were delivered with a lack of integration by various 
donors according to personal interests, unlike the original KIP.  
 
Table III.5: Factors Strengthening Subjective Tenure Security  
Reside 
Time 
Strengthening Factors of Subjective Tenure Security 
Total Support from Political 
Party & Mass 
Organizations 
Intervention to Improve 
Kampung 
Expensive Cost of 
Land  
(n) (%) 
0-10 yrs. 0 3 4 7 (12.28%) 
10-20 yrs. 1 6 1 8 (14.04%) 
20-30 yrs. 4 1 2 7 (12.28%) 
30-40 yrs. 1 2 7 10 (17.54%) 
> 40 yrs. 3 6 16 25 (43.86%) 
Total 
(n/ %) 
9 18 30 57 
15.79% 31.58% 52.63% 100.00% 
 
Table III.6 illustrates that 68 of the 83 interventions to improve kampung since the 1980s have 
been provided by government, including top-down programs from central governments such 
as Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community 
Empowerment) from the national government and Program Pemberdayaan Masyarakat 
Kelurahan (Village Program for Community Empowerment) from city government. 
These programs were formulated and delivered by central governments to reduce the number 
of slum settlements, and the growing rate of poverty. Although reluctant to acknowledge the 
existence of kampung residents, the city government must comply with the mandatory central 
government’s top-down programs and translate them into various projects. This condition was 
comprehended by slum residents as legitimization of their existence from government, which 
induces greater the Subjective Tenure Security. Furthermore, the representation of Kampung 
Cikini in Sub-District Board (SDB) represents active lobbying to obtain further intervention 
programs in the Pegangsaan Sub-District. It relates to the prior explanation in Chapter II, which 
describes the pivotal role of the representation of SDB in obtaining the programs. 
Support from political parties11, as well as many mass organizations, is a contributing factor 
towards strengthened Subjective Tenure Security. Mass organizations regard interventions to 
                                                             
10  According to National Education System Law 20/2003, every university in Indonesia has three mandatory 
obligations, such as: 1) teaching; 2) research; and 3) community engagement program. All of interventions 
in kampung settlement were delivered by university to meet the obligations, especially research and 
community engagement program. 
11  One of the overlooked consequences from obtaining ID cards is that kampung residents can exercise their 
political rights. Therefore, they can participate in general elections, enroll in political parties and negotiate 
with political parties for representation of their interests. 
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improve kampung as efficient persuasion to enroll new members from kampung settlement. 
Meanwhile, political parties compete to generate votes from kampung residents by improving 
the public infrastructure, such as communal bathrooms, drainage, neighborhood streets and 
house improvements, all of which were delivered in pre-election periods. According to the 
Head of CA 1, some political members came to the neighborhood and offered interventions to 
improve kampung, in order to obtain votes from kampung residents. The projects encompassed 
communal bathrooms, neighborhood streets and even house improvements, as shown in Table 
III.6.  
 
Table III.6: Providers of Intervention to Improve Kampung Cikini 
 
The Provider (n) (%) 
Name of 
Intervention 
(n) Object of Improvement (n)  
        
Anonymous1) 5 6.02% Anonymous1) 5 Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 5 
 
 
Government 
68 81.93% 
Anonymous1) 17 
Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 7 
 
 
Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 10 
 
 
   
MHT/ KIP 3 Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 
3 
 
    
PNPM Mandiri 18 
Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 8 
 
 
Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 
8 
 
 
  
House Improvement 2 
 
 
PPMK 30 
Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 5 
 
 
Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 25 
 
 
  
Political Party 
and Mass 
Organizations 
7 8.43% Anonymous1) 7 
Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 1 
 
 
Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 3 
 
 
House Improvement 3 
 
 
Private 
Company 
1 1.20% 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Program (CSR) 
1 Neighborhood’s Street Improvement 1 
 
 
University 2 2.41% Anonymous1) 2 Communal Bathroom/ Drainage 2 
 
 
Total (n) 83        
1) Due to many fragmented additional kampung improvement nowadays, kampung residents have difficulty 
identifying the provider and the name of programs. Many of them were not recorded appropriately in any level 
of government bodies. Therefore we use the term anonymous, referring to unknown providers and name of 
projects. 
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Although kampung residents recognized the projects as a political bribe in exchange for their 
votes, they exploit these mutual relationships to generate support from mass organizations and 
political parties to challenge the government’s eviction plan. According to the Head of CA 1 
& several Heads of RTs, this support encourages their Subjective Tenure Security and has 
proven a means of survival against ongoing eviction plans. 
 
III.5 THE CODE OF LAND TENURE SECURITY IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
However, according to the current regulations, residents’ land tenure security is being 
constantly threatened. In order to preserve their tenure security, the kampung residents slowly 
fabricate their code of land tenure security. At the beginning, the tenure security was obtained 
formally from the Dutch colonial era with a Girik letter. This condition changed rapidly in 
Independence era, where unrecorded land transactions flourished in the first wave of 
urbanization. These land transactions escalated in the second wave of urbanization. As the 
result, land tenure security was fabricated with the acknowledgment of land ownership by 
community.  
Under Basic Agrarian Law 5/ 1960 and the relevant regulations and programs, the government 
expects increasing numbers of land registration. In this sense, the residents in Cikini Area have 
advantageous conditions, such as the strategic location in the center of the capital, access to 
city infrastructure and high land value. Moreover, most of them have resided more than 20 
years, making them eligible to register their land formally through the National Land Agency. 
However, as supported by the previous studies, less than 3% out of the respondents have 
Objective Tenure Security in Kampung Cikini.  
This minority has registered their land to obtain Rights of Ownership in order to earn higher 
profit from selling their land. On the other hand, the low number of land registrations is an 
inevitable result of the existence of various (and sometimes expired) documents, such as 
Inherited Rights to Build, Girik Letters, Contracts of Sale, Receipts of Land Transaction and 
Inheritance Letters, which are considered as the evidence of land ownership by residents, 
theoretically qualifying as Subjective Tenure Security.  
There are several obstacles that contribute to discouraging land registration, such as: 1) One 
major obstacle is inadequate knowledge about land administration, because the land 
registration is very complicated; and 2) The financial burden also discourages kampung 
residents from registering their land, because the cost of land registration and the ongoing 
annual land tax are both very expensive, especially in the center of the capital. 
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Figure III.1 illustrates the historical development of Subjective Tenure Security and its ‘code’ 
to ensure living sustainability in Kampung Cikini. In this figure, the fragmented policies also 
play a pivotal role of the inability of kampung residents to obtain Objective Tenure Security. 
According to BAL, most respondents are eligible candidates to obtain the land title. 
Unfortunately, the prerequisite requirements in Government Regulation 24/1997 occludes the 
good will of government to legalize the land ownership. The enacted city spatial plan has 
diminished eligibility of settlements, as the land use of Kampung Cikini is not designated for 
residential but for mixed mix-use commercial development. This inconformity denies the 
opportunity of residents to obtain letter recommendations for land registration from the local 
government offices. 
Oral community recognition has become reliable evidence of land tenure security, as many 
scholars have explained. This source heavily depends on the memory of witnessing parties to 
the land transaction, such as Head of CA, NA and the surrounding neighbors, which increases 
the risk of land ownership disputes in the future. The transfer of existing once-acknowledged 
documents, such as Right to Build and Girik Letter then becomes a revised procedure of land 
ownership transfer to accompany the agreed amount of compensation. This procedure has been 
refined with the additional transactional documents such as contracts of sale and receipts of 
land transaction, including signatures of the involved parties and witnesses. This procedure 
depicts the ongoing refinement of the self-organizing system of the land ownership in 
Kampung Cikini, to ensure their perceived tenure security. 
Despite the absence of Objective Tenure Security, the residents still perform self-help housing 
improvements by building permanent houses. Furthermore, Subjective Tenure Security is 
strengthened by the following additional factors, such as: 1) The strategic location propels the 
land price, which would require the government to provide significant compensation for 
eviction; 2) Various interventions to improve kampung; and 3) Political parties and other 
organizations/groups derive support from kampung residents.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CODE OF HOME BASED ENTERPRISES AND SELF-HELP 
HOUSE IMPROVEMENT IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
 
IV.1 HOUSE FOR PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION ACTIVITIES 
IV.1.1 The Function of the House for Kampung Residents 
In the past, several strategies have been employed by governments in developing countries to 
eradicate slum settlements in urban areas, including eviction, sites-and-services, and the 
upgrading of slum settlements. Despite these efforts, most strategies have failed. These projects 
have failed because the poor could not afford the provided housing units, which led to their 
displacement from designated houses. Furthermore, the projects could not be replicated in other 
areas, as the cost recovery proved impossible to achieve (Aldrich & Sandhu, 1995). This ignites 
competition for housing between the low and middle-income groups and becomes a major 
factor contributing to the housing crisis. McInnes (1995) suggested that supplying housing with 
specific requirements for each income group will prevent such competition. 
Ahrentzen (1997) argues that the myth of the privatized home is belied by the fact that the 
house has always been and continues to accommodate reproduction and production activities, 
especially for the poor. However, there is little attention in housing studies that focus on houses 
as places where reproductive activities take place along with the operation of productive 
activities.  
Whereas Laquian (1993) argued that for the people who live in slum settlements, the house is 
not just for home-life, but it is a place of production, marketing, entertainment, and financial 
institutions. The productive function of the house for slum residents such as the production 
and/or sale of goods and services (Tipple, 2005b) helps to produce income-generating activities 
(Moser, 1998).  
 
IV.1.2 Definition of Home-Based Enterprise 
HBEs have been defined as any business activity engaged in selling products or services into 
the market that is operated by a self-employed person, with or without employees (Mason, 
2008: 10), that uses residential property as a base of their operation (Lawanson & Olanrewaju, 
2012).  
Home-Based Enterprise (HBE) has been widely introduced since the 1980s as part of informal 
activities sector (Strassmann, 1985; Gilbert, 1988). Terms such as home-based work, home-
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based income generation, and homeworking, also share the characteristics of HBE (Felstead & 
Jewson, 2000). Ligthelm (2005) has concluded that poverty and unemployment are the main 
factors that lead to the formation of the informal sector.  
However, this argument has cultivated numerous challenges, based on studies in South Africa 
(Napier & Mothwa, 2001), Kenya and Ghana (Chu, et. Al., 2007). In these studies they 
established that the decision to start HBEs is to achieve better results that formal sector can 
offer to them and not because they had no other alternative (Naudé & Havenga in Dana & 
Anderson, 2007). Studies in Ghana (Sinai, 1998; Afrane, 2000), Egypt (El-Sheikh, 2001), 
Zambia (Kellett et. al., 2000), South Africa (Ligthelm, 2005), Bangladesh (Ghafur, 2000, 2002; 
Mahmud, 2003), India (Bose, 2000), Colombia (Gilbert, 1988), Peru (Strassman, 1987), 
Bolivia, South Africa and Indonesia (Tipple, 2005b) have acknowledged HBEs as an important 
part of informal sector activities.  
HBEs are diverse in terms of time, labor consumption, financial, spatial and technical demands 
(Gilbert, 1988). However, common organizational characteristics exist. Many enterprises are 
operated from morning until night, at least partially within the house or on the land plot, and 
their financial affairs are mixed with private financial matters (Afrane, 2000). It proves the 
operation of the production activities is socially, financially and spatially integrated into the 
lives of the households (Strassman, 1987; Kellett & Tipple, 2000; Smith & Narotzky, 2005).  
HBEs are important for generating employment, especially for household members otherwise 
not involved in paid labor (Tipple, 2005b). Most of the employees in HBEs do not receive 
payment for their work and reciprocal arrangements govern the exchange between food, pocket 
money, housing and training, in return for labor (Tipple, 2005b; Ligthelm, 2005).  
 
IV.1.3 Positive Implications of HBEs 
Ghafur (2000) explained the positive outcomes of HBEs such as an increase in household 
income, home improvements, and even an increase in contribution to GDP. The mixture of 
reproduction and production activities in the house enables the poor to improve the housing 
conditions to better accommodate the activity (Kellett & Tipple, 2000). Furthermore, HBEs 
also contribute a multiplier effect to local economies by providing basic services that better 
suit the preferences and needs of the community (Gough, 2010), reduce transport costs by 
offering those goods and services within the settlement (Tipple, 2005a), and develop and 
strengthen community cohesion and liveliness in the neighborhood (Gordon et al., 2006). These 
relationships, which involve two or more persons and have a certain degree of stability, form 
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networks. The significance of this network is also emphasized in research undertaken by Lyons 
and Snoxell (2004) in Nairobi (Kenya), which suggested that the tough working environment 
and fierce competition in the informal sector necessitates strong social ties among the actors.  
Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) have encouraged a paradigm shift towards urban housing strategies 
that provide more than shelter but also community development and economic improvement. 
Majale (2003) added that the house improvement projects also need to build human capital 
through skills upgrading, strengthen community-based groups, facilitate access to credit, and 
help review regulatory frameworks. UN-Habitat (2001) has advocated the need for design and 
planning solutions to integrate living and working functions in order to improve income, 
housing quality, and employment generation in low-income settlements.  
In their discussion on the re-urbanization of informal settlements in Manaus (Brazil),  
Magalhaes and Rojas (2005) argued that an integrated approach incorporating physical 
infrastructure, upgraded environmental conditions, regularization of the legal position of these 
settlements (to enhance social inclusion), and evolving new housing designs, was often more 
successful .  
Besides contributing to the economy, HBEs are also environment-friendly, as they save time 
and money by eliminating home-to-work commuting, thus reducing traffic jams, pressure on 
public transport, and air pollution (Yapi-Diahou, 1995; Jie, 1997). Consequently, government 
intervention is crucial in assisting these small-scale enterprises by providing land, 
infrastructure, relaxing tax and registration regulations, and eliminating the threat of demolition.  
Therefore, providing spaces for HBEs is essential for promoting the sustainability of public 
housing programs as well as improving the socio-economic well-being of residents. Despite 
the important role played by HBEs in slum settlements, the responses of government and its 
agencies to the activities of the informal enterprises are very ambiguous. This tends to 
encourage socio-economically expedient and active repression in pursuit of a good city image 
(Onyebueke, 2001). As such, urban planners and architects must seek new and innovative ways 
of integrating or reintegrating these two complementary functions, for improving the image of 
the house, neighborhood, and city (Onyebueke, 2001). 
 
IV.1.4 Negative Implications of HBEs 
However, HBEs were also regarded to have negative effects such as: pollution, waste, and fire 
hazards. Privacy and crowding both for the household and the neighborhood were also 
identified as negative effects (Ogunbunmi, 2005). For example, in Turkey the use of space for 
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home-based work restricts the area within the house, and polluted air in the dwelling causes 
poor environmental conditions for residents (Kümbetoğlu, 1992). A study by Sinai (1998) in 
Kumasi (Ghana) proved that the households that utilize their housing for income-generation 
sacrifice the potential expense of improved housing quality, so that they can afford to occupy 
more rooms. 
Harper (1992) cited the reluctance of the policy makers and planners to accommodate HBEs 
was due to themselves not being the major purchasers of goods and services from informal 
enterprises. This lack of attachment has diminished the understanding of HBEs, resulting in 
attitudes that view them as a nuisance and obstacle to modernization, rather than a source of 
services (Van Empel, 2008). According to Strassmann (1987), governments are against HBEs 
because of land use theories, bias against private economic gain, and an attitude that they 
consider these enterprises to be “unproductive sweatshops with no future”. Perera and Amin 
(1996) report that HBEs are also considered an environmental hazard and are not supported by 
urban planners who argue they can be a danger to the public, especially those that are carried 
out along roads and sidewalks. These studies demonstrate a lack of insightful understanding of 
the reasons surrounding the lack of incidence of HBE in the central area. Therefore, this study 
attempts to confirm the results of previous studies by selecting a research location in the central 
area, which is Central Jakarta. 
 
IV.1.5 HBE and Questioning Its Promise of Self-Help House Improvement 
According to Newberry (2006) – who conducted an extensive study of kampung settlements in 
Yogyakarta – the economic world of the kampung is a dense and interconnected one. Residents 
are engaged in innumerable exchanges, whether within and between households or based on 
kinship and proximity. These exchanges include money, services, gifts, and even children, as 
the participating laborers. Beyond these exchange relationships, kampung settlements emerge 
as the site of significant production activities through small industries. It is clear that the 
kampung settlement is a mixed-use area, a place to live and work (Benjamin et al., 1985; Patton 
& Leksono, 1988). 
Relating to land tenure security, a study by Setiawan (2001) in Indonesia provided the insight 
that land tenure security has increased the willingness of the households to develop HBEs. In 
Bangladesh, Ghafur (2000) found that land tenure security significantly impact the HBE 
operation, but the study of Sinai (1998) found otherwise. Thorough research of the situation in 
Yogyakarta (Indonesia) by Marsoyo (2012), and African and South Asian countries by Kellett 
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(2000) and Tipple (2005) have demonstrated similar findings with Sinai (1998). These vague 
findings from different locations and times require further exploration through an investigation 
of the relationship between HBE and land tenure security in Kampung Cikini, in order to 
establish a clearer relationship between these two mechanisms.  
In serious financial recessions, HBEs become important safety nets for household livelihoods 
(Yasmeen, 2001). Additionally, the activities of HBE in the kampung can absorb significant 
portions of the urban workforce without having to leave the neighborhood. Furthermore, 
Yasmeen’s study also found that the majority (77%) of HBE incomes and the majority of total 
of household incomes (87%) are greater than the Regional Minimum Wage. HBE activities as 
urban livelihoods are not only to enable poor households to survive but also to improve their 
life and get out of poverty. Previous studies in the two Indonesian cities of Yogyakarta 
(Marsoyo, 2012) and Surabaya (Tipple, 2005) have demonstrated that households with home-
based enterprises tend to have larger incomes than non-home-based enterprise incomes. This 
finding gives credence to the notion that home-based enterprises contribute to household 
poverty reduction (Gough et. al., 2003).  
Empirical studies in Sudan (Ibrahim, 2002), Kenya (Muraya, 2006), South Africa (Tyrell, 
2008), Ghana (Gough, 2010), Indonesia (Marsoyo, 2012; Marsoyo & Widiyanto, 2013), and 
Nigeria (Lawanson, 2012) have documented the role of HBEs in improving slum residents’ 
financial capacity, which consequently leads to self-help house improvement (Tipple & Ameen, 
1999). Sarin (in Strassmann, 1987) and Gough and Kellett (2001) observed in two Colombian 
cities that self-help housing improvement depends heavily on the household's ability to sustain 
and improve its income.  
Although kampung residents have a code of land tenure security and operate HBE, the 
incremental self-help housing improvement remains thwarted, considering most of the physical 
attributes of slum settlement, including housing, is still in poor condition. Therefore, there must 
be impediments to enable the kampung residents who operate HBE to deliver self-help housing 
improvement. Therefore, the research questions are: 1) why does the code of HBE in Kampung 
Cikini emerge?; and 2) what kinds of practiced code of HBE and self-help house improvement 
exist in Kampung Cikini? 
 
IV.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
Desk study consisted of reviews of the latest and essential theories of HBEs in mid-June 2015. 
This was undertaken in tandem with reviews on the land tenure security issue. After 
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formulating the research framework, the first group interview was conducted at the level of 
Community Association to disseminate the research objective, obtain permission for the 
research, and comprehend the general condition of the HBE in the research location. After 
receiving permission and the general information of the HBE, several community members 
volunteered to guide the mapping of HBE owners and the types of commodity. HBE mapping 
was executed from the first to the third week of July 2015. This was done to ensure that the 
actual number and location of HBE was documented. During the process, all HBE owners were 
asked for their consent to participate in the research.  
After receiving consent from respondents, the survey was delivered in August-September 2015. 
It consisted of interviews and observations to obtain data and information relating to: 1) the 
role of HBE for the owners; 2) the occupation on head of household; 3) the amount of financial 
capital; 4) types of commodity; 5) the authorized parties; 6) reasons of permission for HBE 
operation; and 7) the implication and impediments of HBE to self-help house improvement. 
Data and information on house size was obtained by measuring the house and visual 
documentation, such as video and photographs. 
The result was classified based on the generated coding and tabularized to understand the 
quantitative aspects of topics and the relationship between them in each stage. The qualitative 
information will explain the quantitative aspects of the obtained result. The findings covered 
an variety of areas: from the general condition of HBE, the positive and negative contributions 
of HBE, to the neighborhood and the existing code of the HBE operation in kampung 
settlement. These findings were used for answering the first aim. Implications and impediments 
of HBE to self-help house improvement addressed the second aim. This process was performed 
in October-November 2015 in order to reach the preliminary findings. 
The second group interview was conducted in the early December 2015 to verify the results 
with the respondents. This session was essential to obtain validity and reduce bias. Participatory 
or collaborative modes of communication with the respondents were undertaken, as 
encouraged by several scholars (Campbell, 1955; Diesing, 1971; Sieber, 1973). However, this 
session also brought additional information which has been used to enrich and refine the 
preliminary findings. 
For peer examination, as one of the methods to increase the degree of validity, the implication 
of HBE to self-help house improvement has been discussed Professor Akiko Okabe and 
Norihisa Shima in University of Tokyo and Toyo University (Japan), Professor Triatno Yudho 
Harjoko in Universitas Indonesia (Indonesia), Johan Silas (Surabaya Institute of Technology) 
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and Budi Prayitno (Gadjah Mada University). The result of the reviews were elaborated to 
paper which is under-review for Habitat International Journal. 
 
IV.3 GENERAL CONDITION OF HBE IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
IV.3.1 Role of HBE as Income Source 
When the head of households holds an occupation that provides steady and sufficient monthly 
income, the HBE is designated to earn additional income. The additional income is necessary 
to provide financial security for households encountering the uncertainty associated with living 
in the city and a deprived neighborhood. Conversely, HBE becomes the primary source of 
monthly income when the head of household cannot provide sufficient and stable monthly 
income. HBE also becomes the only primary income for households whose head of the family 
has passed away. Nevertheless, acquisition of a sufficient and stable monthly income by the 
head of the household is not the only determinant factor of the HBE’s role in the household. 
 
Table IV.1: Role of HBE for Households According to Head of Household’s Occupation 
Head of Household’s 
Occupation 
Certainty of 
Monthly Income  
Primary 
Income 
Additional 
Income 
Total  
(n) (n) 
Civil Servant 
Certain Monthly 
Income 
- 1 1  (1.85%) 
16  (29.63%) Private Employee - 9 9  (16.67%) 
Retiree*) 1 5 6  (11.11%) 
Self-Employed Uncertain Monthly 
Income 
8 11 19  (35.19%) 
21  (38.89%) 
Daily Labor - 2 2  (3.70%) 
Unemployed None of Monthly 
Income 
5 1 6  (11.11%) 
17  (31.48%) 
Passed Away 11 - 11  (20.37%) 
Total 
(n) 25 29 
54 
(%) 46.30% 53.70% 
*) The retiree, especially former civil servant still earns monthly pension fee based on the latest rank. 
 
This condition is illustrated in Table IV.1. When the head of household does not have 
occupation (unemployed and passed away), the role of HBE for households becomes the 
primary income source to support their livelihoods. Whereas the HBE becomes the additional 
income source when the head of household manages to obtain an occupation that earns monthly 
income.  
However, despite the fact that most of the respondents do not have a certain monthly income 
(70.37%), the number of respondents who regard HBE as primary income source (46.30%) is 
slightly lower than those who regard HBE as an additional income source (53.70%). In the 
uncertain monthly income group, most of the HBE emerged as an additional rather than 
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primary income source. During times of hardship, the head of household manages to save 
money despite fluctuations in monthly income. As a result, HBE becomes the supporting 
monthly income source for the household in these scenarios. From the constant help from their 
working children, most of the respondents of this group still manage to obtain sufficient 
monthly income outside the HBE operation.  
Although the retiree group could be classified as the occupation with a certain monthly income, 
there is only one respondent who claimed the HBE as the primary income. The amount of 
monthly pension fee is insufficient to meet their daily needs, which compels this respondent to 
operate HBE as their primary income source. Whereas there are 5 retiree respondents that 
claimed HBE as their additional income source. These respondents admitted all their monthly 
basic needs were financed by all their children, as they have succeeded in obtaining sufficient 
monthly income from formal jobs in the city. In this case, HBE acts as means of social 
interaction with neighbor. The financial profit or loss from the operation of HBE becomes the 
least concern for them or the supporting children.  
A similar scenario also emerges for a respondent that has an unemployed head of household, 
who admitted that HBE is not their primary income source. The successful children act as the 
donor for all the monthly basic needs for their parents, and HBE becomes their means for social 
interaction with neighbors.  
These findings demonstrate that there is insignificant correlation between the certain monthly 
incomes with the role of HBE as the primary income source. The occupation and the generated 
monthly income of the head of household should be demystified as the only factor to predict 
the role of HBE for household, as it is only one of the mobilized assets. The lack of occupation 
and certain monthly income of the head of household does not automatically place HBE as the 
primary income source to meet their immediate needs, as the other family members may be 
actively involved in ensuring the maintenance of their livelihood.  
As a result, the additional role of HBE as the means of social interaction with neighbors cannot 
be overlooked. The financial support from other family members guarantees the fulfillment of 
basic needs and as such, the role of HBE shifts from generating income to promoting social 
interaction.  
Furthermore, it also reveals a sector of kampung residents who are engaged in the formal sector 
and earn sufficient, regular monthly income to meet their monthly needs and support their 
parents with financing their HBE operation.  
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IV.3.2 Source of Capital for HBE 
Most of the respondents (85.19%) accumulated savings from various sources of income from 
various occupations in order to start the HBE, as shown in Table IV.2. Their relatives are also 
struggling to survive to live in the city and financial dispute with other parties, such as 
neighbors, is the last thing they need if the HBE fails in the future.  
Several respondents (7.41%) claimed that Koperasi (Indonesian self-help micro-finance 
institution) was their source of start-up capital. This institution is located in their household 
member’s formal working place. Respondents become members of the institution to procure a 
small loan for starting up the HBE. Despite commonly exercised mutual assistance and the 
conviviality that exists among the neighbors, money-lending activities for HBE operations are 
rarely practiced. 
Table IV.2: The Source of Financial Capital 
The 
Amount of 
Capital*) 
Source of Capital 
Total (n) Household 
Assets 
Extended 
Family's Loan 
Relative's 
Loan**) 
Koperasi's 
Loan***) 
< US$ 10 2 - - - 2  (3.70%) 
US$ 10-20 6 1 - - 7  (12.96%) 
US$ 20-30 9 - - - 9  (16.67%) 
US$ 30-50 10 - 1 1 12  (22.22%) 
> US$ 50 19 1 1 3 24  (44.44%) 
Total 
46 2 2 4 
54 
85.19% 3.70% 3.70% 7.41% 
*)    US$ 1 = Rp. 12,000.00 
**)  In this case, relative includes neighbors, friends outside family and neighborhood. 
***)  Koperasi is Indonesian terminology for a non-profit institution which circulates its members monthly due for 
the basic needs provision, including microfinance facility with micro interest for its members. 
 
This indicates that the capital for HBE operation is primarily sourced from the mobilization of 
personal and family assets, in order to avoid conflict with others. It also rejects the prediction 
of de Soto (2000), who discussed the possibility of using land as collateral to obtain additional 
start-up capital for HBE and support the HBE operation. 
 
IV.3.3 Implication of Financial Capital to the Types of Commodity 
Although the types of commodity have been studied, identified and classified in the extensive 
body of literature, the preference rarely enters the discussion. The types of commodity implies 
the kind of practiced spatial strategies. This places great importance on the preference of 
commodity, as it one of the contributing factors to determining a spatial strategy. 
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As shown in Table IV.3, affordable capital is a formidable determinant of selecting the types 
of commodity. Most of respondents (44.4%) provide financial capital of more than US$ 50 to 
operate HBE.  
 
Table IV.3: The Implication of Amount of Financial Capital to the Type of Commodity 
The Amount of 
Financial 
Capital *) 
Types of Commodity 
Total (n/%) Raw 
Foods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Processed 
Foods 
Rental 
Room 
Service 
Provider 
< US$ 10 - - 2 - - 2 (3.70%) 
US$ 10-20 - - 7 - - 7 (12.96%) 
US$ 20-30 - 2 7 - - 9 (16.67%) 
US$ 30-50 - 4 8 - - 12 (22.22%) 
> US$ 50 4 5 10 1 4 24 (44.44%) 
Total 
4 11 34 1 4 
54 
7.41% 20.37% 62.96% 1.85% 7.41% 
*) The range was coined by the respondents during interviews (US$ 1=Rp. 12,000.00). 
 
Nonetheless, processed food becomes the most preferable options for HBE, as it can be 
operated within a wide range of a household’s financial availability, from less than US$ 10 to 
more than US$ 50. This flexibility is attained because it can be integrated into household’s 
expenditure for domestic needs. The owner can prepare foods for household’s members and 
consumers simultaneously. In very rare occasions, the consumers are allowed to propose a 
menu that suits the financial capital and skills of the owner, and even provide the ingredients 
to produce specific foods for a lesser price based on mutual agreement. Consumer goods also 
becomes a popular type of commodity because of similar reasons. The number and variety of 
commodities fluctuate, depending on monthly profit earnings.  
Raw foods however cannot attain similar results because the operators are prescribed to 
purchase from the traditional market or distributors in a large amount, which requires a large 
amount of capital. Service providers also require significant capital as they need specific tools 
such as sewing machines, stone grinders, etc., which is more than US$ 50. Tools maintenance 
demands additional expenditure, and upgrading is required to expand the scope of services and 
numbers of consumers. Rental rooms also demand higher financial capital for separating the 
living space for the household members from the renters, and also to meet the renters’ 
expectations for a certain level of quality and additional bathrooms. Therefore, the available 
financial capacity becomes the formidable determinant of selecting the types of commodity, 
which will also impact the practiced spatial strategies of the operating HBE. 
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IV.3.4 Various Preferences of the Types of Commodity 
Personal and household assets, as confirmed in Table IV.4, are the sources of capital for HBE. 
The assets cannot be regarded only as financial assets (22.22%) but also personal skills 
(20.37%). According to respondents, as the number of operating HBEs grows over time, 
avoiding conflict because of competition is essential (20.37%). This preference demonstrates 
that when selecting the types of commodity wider interests are considered, rather than just the 
household’s capacity and interest.  
 
Table IV.4: The Various Preference of Types of Commodity 
The Preference of 
Types of 
Commodity 
Types of Commodity 
Total (n/%) Raw 
Foods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Processed 
Foods 
Rental 
Rooms 
Service 
Provider 
Affordable Capital 2 1 8 - 1 12 (22.22%) 
Suits Personal Skills - 1 9 - 1 11 (20.37%) 
Space Availability - 3 4 1 1 9 (16.67%) 
Less competition 1 3 7 - - 11 (20.37%) 
Community's Needs 1 3 4 - 1 9 (16.67%) 
Social Interaction - - 2 - - 2 (3.70%) 
TOTAL 
4 11 34 1 4 
54 
7.41% 20.37% 62.96% 1.85% 7.41% 
 
The space availability (16.67%) becomes one of the inevitable preferences. Due to the lack of 
space inside the house and insufficient money to rent space outside the house and neighborhood, 
there are only two options of location of HBE which are: inside the house or in its surroundings. 
The first option must be delivered carefully because it impacts on the domestic space, and the 
second must be performed carefully because it may compromise the neighbors’ interests. 
Therefore, the types of commodity is determined by the space availability, the capacity of the 
household’s assets, and social interest. As the future consumers, community needs (16.67%), 
must also be taken into account to determine what kind of commodity to sell. The selected 
commodity should intend to gain profit but also avoid the conflict with the neighbors.  
The preference of types of commodity does not only originate from the owner, but also from 
the surrounding neighbors. It does not originate directly from the neighbors’ immediate needs 
but is more emphasized on creating social interaction space with the presence of HBE (3.70%). 
Processed food becomes a suitable option to create social interaction space, as this type of 
commodity enables HBE to act as a common dining space for the neighbors. This confirms the 
role of HBE, not only as a means of generating income but also stimulating social interaction.  
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IV.3.5 Implications of House Size to the Types of Commodity 
Small house size does not become a constraint for residents to operate HBE, as illustrated in 
Table V.5. The findings show that most of the processed food vendors live in very small houses 
(0-21 and 21-36 m2). Similar conditions also occur with the consumer goods traders, because 
this commodity only requires small space inside or outside the house for display and storage 
space.  
 
Table IV.5: Type of Commodity According to House Size 
House 
Size*) 
Types of Commodity 
Total (n) Raw 
Foods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Processed 
Foods 
Rental 
Rooms 
Service 
Provider 
0-21 m2 1 2 14 - 1 18 (33.33%) 
22-36 m2 - 4 12 - 1 17 (31.48%) 
37-45 m2 2 1 2 - - 5 (9.26%) 
46-60 m2 1 3 2 - - 6 (11.11%) 
> 60 m2 - 1 4 1 2 8 (14.81%) 
Total 
4 11 34 1 4 
54 
7.41% 20.37% 62.96% 1.85% 7.41% 
*) The classification is based on standard house size by Government of Indonesia in various regulations of 
Ministry of Public Works. 
 
Most of raw foods vendors are located in houses of moderate size (37-60 m2), however one 
respondent trades in a small sized house (0-21 m2). The latter managed to trade raw foods in a 
small sized house because of the limited type of raw food for sale, while the former sell various 
kind of raw foods. Similar findings are also obtained in the service providers, which indicates 
that house size and types of commodity is based on the scale of commodity for sale. While 
rental rooms as a commodity requires large sized houses (> 60 m2) in order to provide privacy 
to homeowners and the renters, something that cannot to be accommodated in small sized 
houses.  
Therefore, the implication of house size to the type of commodity is insignificant in general, 
due to several reasons. First, it depends on the flexibility of spatial arrangement which enables 
the integration of domestic and economy activity simultaneously. Second, it relies on the scale 
of the business, which relates to the spatial consumption of the commodities and/ or the 
operating tools. Finally, only rental rooms require a spacious house for separating the living 
space of household members and renters to ensure privacy. 
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IV.3.6 Self-Governance of HBE in Kampung Cikini 
A.  The Acceptance of Neighbors 
This research corroborates the findings of previous studies on the implications of HBE 
on neighborhood members. From 200 respondents of non-HBE owners, 171 
respondents (85.50%) supported the presence of HBEs in the neighborhood because of 
the positive impacts, as depicted in Table IV.6. Nonetheless, 17 respondents (8.50%) 
are reluctant to consent to the presence of HBEs due to their negative contributions to 
environmental degradation in the neighborhood. While there are 12 respondents 
(6.00%) who claimed neutral because they thought HBEs concurrently benefit the 
neighborhood through positive impacts, and negatively contribute to environmental 
degradation within the community. 
 
Table IV.6: The Acceptance to HBE Operation Based on Its Contributions to Neighborhood 
The Acceptance to HBE Operation The Contribution of HBE Total (n/%) 
Yes 
Meet Community's Needs 51 (29.82%) 
Provide Job Opportunities 51 (29.82%) 
Create Interaction Space 32 (18.71%) 
Short Distance to Purchase 25 (14.62%) 
Allow Pay in Installments 12 (7.02%) 
Sub Total 171 (85.50%) 
No 
Abundant Waste 10 (58.82%) 
Circulation Blockage 6 (35.29%) 
Noise Disturbance 1 (5.88%) 
Sub Total 17 (8.50%) 
Neutral*) Sub Total 12 (6.00%) 
Total 200 
*)  The answers of the respondents in the neutral respondent group are various combinations between the 
positive and negative contribution which corresponds to accept and refuse respondent groups. 
 
   
Figure IV.1: The positive implications of HBE to the neighborhood 
 
The respondents asserted that HBEs in the neighborhood sell various commodities that 
fit their everyday needs. Respondents confirmed that the HBE’s owners are also willing 
to serve them for basic daily needs in case of an emergency, although it is beyond their 
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standard operational time. It is regarded as one of the possible answers to reduce 
unemployment and poverty, which may reduce crime activities in their neighborhood. 
Purchasing commodities from HBE’s owners is also considered as helping neighbors 
to increase their monthly income. Simultaneously, it creates interaction space, where 
they can meet other neighbors, circulate information about their neighborhood, and 
deliver domestic activities.  
The specific type of processed food, in several cases, are determined by consumers’ 
requests. The consumer, who primarily consist of neighbors, sometimes ask the 
processed foods providers to deliver different foods for variety, which increases the 
provider’s cooking skills and enriches options for consumers. It indicates that HBE 
serves the need of the surrounding consumers, not only as place of commercial activity 
but sometimes as a communal kitchen, where the operators serve the requested product 
which is different from the regularly offered menu. 
 
   
Figure IV.2: The negative implications of HBE to the neighborhood, ranging from abundant 
waste (left), circulation blockage (center) and noise disturbance (right) 
 
The presence of HBEs across the neighborhood enables the respondents to access their 
daily needs within walking distance. Especially in times of emergency, the nearest 
HBEs are available to provide suitable commodities without wasting extra time and 
effort. HBEs also facilitate neighbors to purchase their daily needs by allowing them to 
pay in installments. This facility benefits neighbors especially the retiree and senior 
citizens who do not have jobs with regular monthly income.  
Regardless various positive sides of the HBE’s presence in the neighborhood, it ignites 
several environment problems that affect neighbors, as depicted in Figure IV.3. These 
problems have encouraged 17 of 200 respondents (8.50%) to refuse the presence of 
HBEs in the neighborhood. Abundant waste that is produced by HBEs is the dominant 
factor in their refusal (58.82%). It fills the drainage channels and alleys, attracts insects, 
disperses unpleasant odors, and is also the main cause of flooding in the neighborhood 
during the rainy season. Circulation blockage in the alleys also becomes the disturbing 
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problem by neighbors (35.29%). Motorcycle riders and pedestrians find it is very 
difficult to circulate, especially in the morning when residents are heading to their 
workplaces. Additionally, noise disturbance (5.88%) is an inconvenient condition for 
neighbors, especially at night when they are resting.  
Despite all negative implications that are shared by HBEs, 12 of 200 respondents 
(6.00%) – the neutral respondents – allow HBEs to operate because of various benefits 
they acquire from the presence of HBEs. Hence, most of the respondents welcome the 
presence of HBE in their neighborhood. 
 
B.   Permission from the Neighborhood for Operating HBE 
Although the HBE owners have persisted with self-help by gathering capital and 
performing spatial adaptation after deliberation with household members to select the 
affirmed spatial strategy, they still require permission from the neighbors to operate 
HBEs. As many of 23 of the 54 HBE owners (42.59%) were required to obtain 
permission because of several issues that required consent, such as the usage of public 
space (69.57%), sale competition (17.39%), and scale of business (13.04%).  
The permission to operate HBE in Kampung Cikini was based on oral agreement, and 
acts as a token of acceptance by the neighborhood to the HBE operation. There are two 
parties who informally authorize to issue the oral agreement, they are: the Head of CA 
and the neighbors. Table-5 explicates the authorized parties and the division of 
consented issues.  
Neighbors are entitled to confer permission for the HBE operation in regards to two 
issues, which are: the usage of public space and sale competition. The first issue is 
concerned with the maximum usage of public space for economic activity, which is 
determined through deliberation among neighbors. The surrounding neighbors 
understand the need for HBE owners to use a small part of the alley for economic 
activity because of the lack of interior space. They are also aware that it provides a 
certain degree of convenience for the households, but the expansion must not induce 
public inconvenience through circulation blockage.  
The Head of CA has an authority to issue a permit for the type of commodity that has 
the potential to generate large numbers of consumers from outside the neighborhood in 
an indefinite time of operation. Besides the possibility of disturbance to the surrounding 
neighbors, this scale of business is stopped as it may compromise the safety and security 
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of the neighborhood due to the influx of unrecognized consumers from outside the 
neighborhood. In this case, game center and computer rental providers are the kinds of 
commercial activities that require permission from the Head of CA because they 
operate almost all day and night, and generate loud noise and consumers from outside 
the neighborhood. The type of commodity becomes essential in HBE operation. It is 
not only determined by the owner’s startup capital, including money and house size, 
but also determine by the permission from the Head of NA or fellow HBE owners in 
the surrounding area.  
The permission has objective to the preserve the business sustenance of every HBE 
owner in the neighborhood. The proliferation of HBE with a similar type of commodity 
will spark fierce competition and unrest among neighbors. Selecting a complementary 
varietal of a similar type of commodity becomes the usual mutual decision in order to 
obtain a permit from the neighbors. This finding demonstrates that the HBE operation 
is an inevitable adjustment between individual capacity and the surrounding context.  
According to the respondents in this location, the maintenance of well-preserved social 
harmony in the midst of economic competition can be delivered through sincere 
relationships among the HBE owners and the surrounding residents. The new HBE 
owner should communicate their intended types of commodity and their reasons for 
selection to the existing HBE owners and surrounding residents.  
This communication is essential to fabricating possible cooperation with existing HBE 
owners and mutual benefit for the residents in the surrounding area. It also enables the 
existing HBE owners and residents in the surrounding area to make social and spatial 
adjustments in order to adapt to the new and emerging HBE activity. The first relates 
to the possible new social activity within the existing economy, and domestic activities 
in the surrounding. While the latter corresponds to the permitted space and time 
allocated for the economic activities of the new HBE owners to avoid the possible 
disturbances in the future.  
The reason plays a pivotal role in ensuring that the sincere objective of performing HBE 
is communicated to the existing HBE owners and the residents in the neighborhood. 
The objective, according to the respondents, determines the possibility of making 
mutual cooperation in the future.  
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Figure IV.3: Examples of Kitchen for Production and Reproduction Activities on the Public 
Space in NA 6 (top) and NA 13 (bottom) 
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Figure IV.4: Examples of Shifting of Space for Production and Reproduction Activities on 
the House in NA 5 (top) and NA 13 (bottom) 
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Figure IV.5: Examples of The Usage of Public Space for Production Activity in NA 13 & 15 
(top) and NA 14 (bottom) 
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Table IV.7: Reasons for Permission According to the Authorized Parties 
The 
Authorized 
Parties 
Reasons for Permission 
Total  
(n/%) The Usage of 
Public Space 
Sale 
Competition 
Neighborhood 
Security 
Head of CA - (0.00%) - (0.00%) 3 (100.00%) 3 (13.04%) 
Neighbors 16 (100.00%) 4 (100.00%) - (0.00%) 20 (86.96%) 
Total 16 (69.57%) 4 (17.39%) 3 (13.04%) 23 
 
If the objective is to only earn profit individually without any concern for the 
surrounding area, then the existing HBE owners in the neighborhood tend to be 
reluctant in issuing permission, because it may impede mutual cooperation in the future. 
Although HBE was performed by mobilizing individual assets of the households, such as 
financial capacity and house size, the community has an important role in deciding some 
operational aspects, including: the types of commodity (to maintain market competitiveness), 
the usage of public space, and neighborhood security. Therefore, HBE is more than an 
individual production and reproduction activity but also a social one, where there may be 
decisive involvement from the community. 
 
IV.4 SELF-HELP HOUSE IMPROVEMENT AS INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES WITH 
COMMUNAL INVOLVEMENT 
IV.4.1 The Implication of HBE Operation to Self-Help House Improvement 
Despite the promising contribution to monthly income from HBE operation, it does not 
effectuate house improvement. As shown in Table IV.8, the number of households, who 
operate HBE and opt to improve their house is lower (48.15%) than who choose to decline 
(51.85%). Most of the HBE owners who improve their house are also the landowners (92.31%), 
while most of the respondents who decline house improvement are land tenants (53.57%). This 
finding signifies the relationship between land ownership of HBE owners with house 
improvement, where land owners tend to improve their houses rather than land tenants.  
The level of improvement depends on the monthly income from HBE operation. Higher 
earning monthly income provides more options for HBE owners to improve their houses. 
Households with the lowest monthly income (3.85%) from HBE operation have limited options 
in house improvement such as: repainting the house, façade or interior, repairing roof or floor 
tiles, and fixing windows or door frames. 
As shown in Table IV.8, the possibility of various options for house improvement increases 
along with the increase of monthly income. Vertical expansion, which demands high-cost 
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expenditure, becomes one of the plausible options for house improvement when the monthly 
income from HBE operation has reached US$ 30-50. Therefore, the amount of monthly income 
becomes a considerable determinant of house improvement types. 
 
Table IV.8: Self-Help House Improvement According to Land Ownership 
Land Owners 
Self-Help House Improvement  
Total (n) 
Yes (n) No (n) 
Owned Individually 24 (92.31%) 11 (39.29%) 35 (64.81%) 
Owned by Parents 2 (7.69%) 2 (7.14%) 4 (7.41%) 
Rent 0 (0.00%) 15 (53.57%) 15 (27.78%) 
Total 
26 28 
54 
48.15% 51.85% 
 
HBE operation contributes to the increase of self-help house improvement. Table IV.8 
illustrates that 26 of 54 respondents delivered self-help house improvement because of their 
increase in monthly income due to HBE operation. All respondents are also land owners, who 
claimed the ownership that is unacknowledged by the government. While all the land renters 
are reluctant to deliver self-help house improvement. This indicates that the sense of land 
ownership plays a vital role in the execution of self-help house improvement. 
There are three types of self-help house improvement, which are: house finishing, interior 
partition, and vertical expansion. The first type refers to improving the quality of the 
appearance of building components, such as building paint, interior ceiling, floors and roof 
tiles. The second type covers the additional walls and openings inside the house to expand the 
number of rooms. Whereas the third type encompasses the additional number of floors and 
house size in the vertical plane, considering the limited land size and additional stories is the 
only possible increase of house size. 
Table IV.9 depicts that the first type of house improvement is the most affordable and the third 
type requires high-cost due to additional structure and construction being required. For HBE 
owners who earn monthly revenue less than US$ 20, house finishing is the only option in their 
self-help house improvement. As the monthly revenue increases, the other types of self-help 
house improvement become affordable for HBE owners.  
The reasons of self-help house improvement are also varied. Based on in-depth interviews with 
respondents who have delivered self-help house improvements, there are three key motivating 
factors, which are: 1) privacy; 2) increase volume trading; and 3) prestige.  
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The first reason is based on their psychological needs and solving the crowding issue that 
household members encounter. Privacy provision becomes a dominant reason (69.23%) for 
self-help house improvement. The collision of domestic and economic space in the limited size 
of the house has diminished the privacy afforded to the household members. It proves that HBE 
risks one of the basic psychological needs of household members and the increase of monthly 
income has enabled them to recapture that lost sense of privacy.  
 
Table IV.9: Types of House Improvements According to Monthly Income from HBE  
Monthly 
Revenue*) 
Types of House 
Improvement**) 
Reasons for House Improvements 
Total (n) 
Privacy 
Increase 
Costumers 
Prestige 
< US$ 20 
House Finishing - 1 - 1 (100.00%) 
Interior Partition - - - - (0.00%) 
Vertical Expansion - - - - (0.00%) 
(n) - 1 - 1 (3.85%) 
US$ 20-
30 
House Finishing - - - - (0.00%) 
Interior Partition 1 - - 1 (50.00%) 
Vertical Expansion 1 - - 1 (50.00%) 
(n) 2 - - 2 (7.69%) 
US$ 30-
50 
House Finishing - - - - (0.00%) 
Interior Partition - - - - (0.00%) 
Vertical Expansion 3 - - 3 (100.00%) 
(n) 3 - - 3 (11.54%) 
US$ 50-
100 
House Finishing - - 1 1 (20.00%) 
Interior Partition 1 - - 1 (20.00%) 
Vertical Expansion 3 - - 3 (60.00%) 
(n) 4 - 1 5 (19.23%) 
> 
US$ 100 
House Finishing - 1 1 2 (13.33%) 
Interior Partition - 1 - 1 (6.67%) 
Vertical Expansion 9 3 - 12 (80.00%) 
(n) 9 5 1 15 (57.69%) 
Total 
(n) 18 6 2 
26 
(%) 69.23% 23.08% 7.69% 
*)  The range of Monthly Income from HBE category is made by respondents during the in-depth interview; 
**) The Type of House Improvement category is based on the classification by all respondents, where house finishing 
corresponds to minor improvement, interior partitioning equals to medium improvement and vertical expansion is 
regarded as a major improvement. 
 
The second corresponds to the economic interest, where house improvement will create a better 
image of the HBE thus attract more customers. Self-help house improvement also benefits the 
HBE owners to increase their volume trading and monthly revenue (23.08%). The improved 
of the house attracts more customers and provides better space for economic activities, such as 
additional rental rooms, and the spatial expansion of commodity production and storage. The 
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earned monthly revenue is mobilized for capital accumulation by HBE owners to expand their 
business. Therefore, the self-help house improvement is not only designated to improve the 
domestic activities of household members but also to increase economic activities and monthly 
income. 
The third motivating factor refers to the social needs, where the improved house emancipates 
the social status of HBE owners in the family and neighborhood. Self-help house improvement 
also elevates the social status of kampung residents according to some respondents (7.69%). 
All of the respondents, who confirmed the increase of social status, delivered the first type of 
self-help house improvement.  
The betterment of house finishing, such as house facade and other building components, 
represent the betterment of the household’s quality and elevates their social status. The 
betterment encompasses the decent spatial movement of domestic and economic activities for 
household members, but also an increase in their social status. This increase of social status 
helps improve residents’ sense of dignity as human beings in the family and among neighbors 
in Kampung Cikini.  
 
IV.4.2  The Impediment Factors of Self-Help House Improvement  
Table IV.10 depicts the refusal of landowners to make house improvement, which is mainly 
because of lack money, lack of space and lack of knowledge. While most of the land renters 
decline to perform house improvement because of lack of ownership.  
Most of the landowners (32.14%), who refuse to improve their houses, consider the monthly 
income from HBE to be insufficient in meeting the construction cost, especially for those who 
regard HBE as the primary means of income generation. According to this respondent group, 
they prefer to allocate the generated income to primary needs, such as: children’s education 
fees, communication fees, and gasoline for motorcycles. The last item is a useful asset in 
becoming a part-time motorcycle driver in order to generate more income. The explanation 
describes how house improvement becomes the least priority of household’s expenditure.  
For the respondents in the lack of knowledge category, where space availability and financial 
capacity are not the issue, the ability to compose and execute self-help improvement for 
overcoming their substantial spatial problems becomes their main concern. While the 
respondents in the lack of space category, the spatial intervention in their limited size house 
will impact tremendously on their well-established, interwoven domestic, economic and social 
activities. Due to the lack of financial capacity to purchase or rent a house, lack of rental houses 
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or houses for sale in the surrounding neighborhood, moving to another location will jeopardize 
the sustainability of HBE operation, including the domestic and social life they have created 
throughout the years. 
 
Table IV.10: Usage of Monthly Revenue and the Impediment Factors of Self-Help House 
Improvements 
Land 
Owner
ship 
The Usage of 
Monthly 
Revenue  
The Impediment Factors of Self-Help House 
Improvement 
Total (n) 
Lack of 
Money 
Lack 
 of Knowledge 
Lack of 
Space 
Lack  
of ownership 
Owned 
Least Priority 8 2 1 - 11 (100.00%) 
Buy Elsewhere - - - - - (0.00%) 
(n) 8 2 1 - 11 (39.29%) 
Owned 
by 
Parents 
Least Priority - 1 1  2 (100.00%) 
Buy Elsewhere - - -  - (0.00%) 
(n) - 1 1  2 (7.14%) 
Rent 
Least Priority 1 - 1 - 2 (13.33%) 
Buy Elsewhere - - - 13 13 (86.67%) 
(n) 1 - 1 13 15 (53.57%) 
Total 
(n) 9 3 3 13 
28 
(%) 32.14% 10.71% 10.71% 46.43% 
 
Buying a house in another place becomes a plausible option for HBE owners, especially land 
renters. The lack of ownership has diminished their willingness to deliver self-help housing 
improvement. While the landowners veered their intent to deliver self-help house improvement 
due to their limited capability in overcoming impediments.  
 
IV.5  THE CODE OF HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
IV.5.1 Mixed-Function of the House with Communal Involvement  
Although they are known for their of spirit mutual assistance, kampung residents tend to 
mobilize their own resources as the financial capital for HBE. Personal savings become the 
most popular sources of capital along with other financial resources that can be mobilized by 
household members. Accumulated capital, such as financial means and existing house size, are 
the undisputed resources to start HBE. These resources determine the type of commodity the 
HBE owners will pursue as they impact the domestic and economic activities of the household 
members. Despite its sense of individualism, the mobilization of personal assets aims to 
preserve social cohesion among residents by avoiding the possibility of generating conflict over 
economic activities.  
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This research established the HBE as one of the plausible solutions for increasing monthly 
income, through the creation of job opportunities that offer various benefits for the surrounding 
neighborhood. Despite irrefutable contributions to the neighborhood of many benefits, HBE 
also amplifies environmental degradation, especially the production of abundant waste due to 
a lack of a proper waste disposal system. In order to increase the positive benefits and minimize 
the negative downsides, deliberation among surrounding neighbors, the fellow HBE owners 
and the Head of the Neighborhood Association are essential for determining the type of spatial 
strategy. The spatial strategy of HBE cannot be reduced only to house size but must also 
consider the amount of financial capital, types of commodity, and the neighborhood-scale 
socio-economic activities. The latter is essential to achieve social harmony in the neighborhood. 
HBE cannot be disregarded from overall socio-economic activities in the neighborhood 
because it contributes both benefits and disadvantages to the surrounding area. These factors 
do not relate to one another in a linear causal-effect mode, but dynamically interchange 
according to the process of negotiations between HBE owners and other stakeholders in the 
community.  
 
IV.5.2 The Implication and Impediments of HBE to Self-Help House Improvement 
Despite the lack of the acknowledged land ownership by government, all respondents affirm 
HBE as source of income. It indicates the respondents’ subjective tenure security prevails, 
where households’ perceived rights to own and use their houses generate primary or additional 
income, regardless the government’s acknowledgment, as De Souza (1999) and van Gelder 
(2007) stated.  
This research corroborates the findings which corroborated the lack of land ownership with the 
performance of HBE by kampung households. The role of government acknowledgment of 
land ownership becomes obsolete to perform HBEs, as suggested by Turner (1972) and de Soto 
(2000) in their prominent works. Therefore, this finding affirms that there is insufficient 
evidence of land tenure security which is issued by the government to HBE operations.  
Many experts, such as Tipple and Ameen (1999) and Kellett (2000), are convinced that HBE 
will significantly contribute to self-help house improvement. This argument was built upon the 
economic perspective, where the increase in income from HBE operation will enable the owner 
to deliver self-help improvement. This argument is not completely false, as this research finds 
nearly half of total respondents performed self-help house improvement. The amount of 
monthly income determines the variety of options for the type of self-help house improvement.  
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However, this research discovers that more than half of respondents still decline self-help house 
improvement despite the income generation occurring. There are three reasons for this rejection 
from land owners and those who live in their parent’s houses, these being: 1) lack of money; 
2) lack of knowledge; and 3) lack of space.  
Firstly, HBEs do not guarantee an adequate amount of monthly revenue to deliver self-help 
housing improvement. The amount is generally only sufficient to fulfill daily basic needs. In 
the second reason, is that self-help house improvement requires specialized knowledge such as 
design, to solve most of resulting spatial problems within a relatively small budget and without 
disturbing their HBEs operations. The last reason, lack of space, highlights that the construction 
process will compromise their HBEs operation, as renting the house during the construction 
process is their unfavorable option due to increasing monthly expenditure and the possibility 
of a decline in revenue from HBE in the new location. Although many experts have celebrated 
their wondrous ability to adapt to every changing of condition and situation, compromising the 
well-established domestic, economic and social web of activities should definitely be avoided 
as it depletes residents’ available assets to survive. In this sense, the production activities are 
prioritized more than the reproduction activities in the house. Due to these reasons, self-help 
house improvement becomes the least of priorities. 
All land renters decline to perform house improvement because of their lack of ownership. This 
research exposits the possibility of initiative for self-help house improvement coming from 
land renters, which contradicts with the aforementioned common argument. Unfortunately, the 
land owners disregard the land renter’s sense of ownership, and they seek to gain a higher profit 
by eliminating the house improvement cost. 
In the case of Kampung Cikini, the generative factor of self-help house improvement is not 
only the economy, but also tenure security and social relationships with the neighbors. Thence, 
self-help improvement is not a linear economic matter, but encompasses the entire individual 
and communal activities within the kampung settlement.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE CODE OF UNWRITTEN BUILDING SHARED RULES IN  
KAMPUNG CIKINI 
 
V.1 THE CITY BUILDING CODE AND ITS IMPEDIMENTS FOR KAMPUNG 
RESIDENTS 
V.1.1 Enactment of the Building Code in Housing and Settlement 
The objectives of regulations relates to ensuring safety and health for the citizens. According 
to the Harvard Graduate School of Design (1989), standards are developed as an embodiment 
of laws, customs or institutional objectives. Many of the building standards used today have 
their origins in building, health and sanitation codes formulated by most European and 
American countries in the late 19th Century.  
The rationale for the enactment of various regulations is to safeguard, conserve, disburse and 
regulate the use of land in the overall public interest (Agbola, 1998). As observed by 
Mabogunje et al (1978), these regulations fall into the realms of space-use density control, 
health sanitation laws, community facilities, and services provision standards. Since housing 
constitutes the most important land use element in city planning, it is mandatory that housing 
standards should be firmly entrenched in the building regulations of most countries. The State 
and experts use a set of universal social, environmental, public health and safety criteria to 
evaluate community needs. They develop and enforce zoning ordinances, review guidelines 
and standardize the physical aspects of the community (Ben-Joseph & Szold, 2005). This 
rationale is adopted in developing countries, including Indonesia. 
Complying with these requirements imposes significant costs and is usually complex and time-
consuming. In a study of nine cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, researchers found that 
most cities had planning and building standards that were unsuited to the poor (Devas, 2001). 
The official minimum plot size in many developing countries is considerably higher than what 
is regularly found in slum settlements, which costs more than what many households can 
afford. Those adversely affected by such unrealistic standards are the urban poor and low-
income households, who are excluded from the city planning scheme, and live in slums as the 
unplanned and unserviced settlements (Kironde, 2006). 
According to the social, economic and cultural heritage of most developing countries, building 
standards have become the agent of regulatory authorities. However, unlike the process of 
evolution of standards in response to observed failures in the developed nations, the legalized 
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building standards adopted in most developing countries were imported from the developed 
nations without contextual modification which fit with the socio-cultural and economic 
circumstances. Based on their studies in six South American cities, Mayo & Gross (1987) 
argued the adoption of housing solutions from developed countries failed in developing 
countries because they relied on heavily subsidized blocks of public housing flats with high 
standards of construction and infrastructure, zoning and building code regulations.  
This classic study shares similar findings in Kampung Cikini. The established building code 
has systematically excluded the kampung residents from complying due to administrative 
documents and financial capacity. Therefore, Fitcher et. al. (1972) proposed that properly 
designed performance standards for the physical, economic and social components of housing 
would revolutionize the role and impact of housing standards generally. 
 
V.1.2 Unwritten Building Shared Rules in Kampung Settlement 
Based on its extensive history since the Dutch colonial era, kampung is a site of self-help 
management (Maharika 2010). The spirit of neighborliness, cooperation and willingness to 
help (Shukor Rahman, 1996) are the emergent forms of social collaboration in kampung 
(Simone, 2004; 2010). This aforementioned spirit was extended to community self-help 
management and regulation (Gilbert, 2007; Smith, 2002), in accordance with the social and 
cultural context (Holloway & Hubbard, 2001). This relates to not only the investment of sweat 
equity by owners in their homes, but also the processes of owner design and management 
(Harris, 2003). It is ongoing process with perpetual organization and creativity from the 
occupant-builders, which emphasizes the physical form of the buildings often at the expense 
of users (Kellett, 2008). The works are carried out in accordance with rules and procedures that 
are potentially as specific and necessary as those that have governed official, formal city-
making (Brillembourg & Klumpner in Hernandez, et. al., 2010).  
In developing their built environment, the community relates to fellow actors through unwritten 
building shared-rules (UBSR) that are based on local knowledge (Garau & Sclar, 2005). They 
contain things such as: skill and muscle-power, the capability for using available materials and 
tools, the ability to organize enterprises and local institutions, and the capacity to co-operate 
(Turner, 1976). However, if UBSR becomes the guidelines for self-help housing, then the 
houses should share similar characteristics, which currently does not occur. Therefore, there 
must be a distinctive code of UBSR which operates in Kampung Cikini. The following research 
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questions are: 1) Why does this distinctive code of UBSR occur in Kampung Cikini; and 2) 
What kinds of code of UBSR exist in Kampung Cikini?  
 
V.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
Rapoport (1969) stated that a slum settlement grows spontaneously as a direct response to 
immediate needs of a community. Slum settlement develops over time and is controlled by a 
set of local-specific practices that have were based on local knowledge, existing practices, 
material availability (Glassie, 2000), and a desire to reduce construction costs by using recycled 
and used materials (Garau & Sclar, 2005). This system is governed by a self-help organization 
among community members (Turner, 1976). The organization exists without professional 
expert involvement (Cuff, 1991), and emerged as a direct response to the government’s 
inability to provide satisfactory services (Meagher, 2012).  
In developing their built environment, the community relates to fellow actors through a 
consensual agreement, which was coined by Garau and Sclar (2005) as the unwritten building 
shared-rules (UBSR). It is a reflection of local knowledge as a means of constant struggle for 
survival (Roy, 2011). In several countries, many prominent scholars such as Simone (2011, 
2013), McFarlane (2008, 2009, 2011), and Silver (2013) have observed the capacity and the 
establishment of self-help mechanisms created by slum residents in order to build their 
settlement. This self-help system is very flexible because of its ability to adapt to the dynamic 
fluctuations of encountered situations. Although these publications have emerged as important 
references to understand the complexity of the self-help building process in slum settlements, 
there was insufficient elucidation of the micro-scale mechanisms, which were required in order 
to attain a profound understanding of the UBSR within specific settlements. While abundant 
research studied the physical, specifically the transformation of houses and open space in 
kampung settlements, there is insufficient explanation on the mechanisms of the community-
based self-help system (Funo, et. al., 2002; Rolalisasi, et. al., 2012, 2013).  
Oliver (2006: 408) reminded that it is required for an architect to engage in improvement 
programs in this kind of settlement, as an architect fails to design responsibly when he or she 
ignores UBSR. This posits the importance of having a thorough comprehension of the UBSR, 
which is rarely publicized. Yet, it is difficult to identify the pattern of built form in its 
appearance. If the UBSR are generally complied with by the community members, then most 
of the buildings in kampung settlement will share regularity, as opposed to a chaotically built 
form. The apparent chaotic built form suggests the existence of a certain mechanism in UBSR 
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compliance by community members. Therefore, it is important to investigate the practice of 
UBSR in the urban kampung settlement when looking at self-help house improvement.  
The investigation involves three stages in order to understand the production, dissemination, 
and implementation of UBSR in self-help house improvement. These three stages include: 
1. Understanding the role of UBSR and its content for self-help house improvement in 
kampung settlement; 
The first stage can be reached by revealing the history on the production of UBSR, 
which consists of: main objectives, aspects, detail regulations, detail objectives of each 
regulations, and penalties.  
2. Identify the dissemination method of UBSR for self-help house improvement in 
kampung settlement; 
The second stage will be accomplished by identifying the dissemination method by 
kampung residents, and examining their level of awareness for implementing the UBSR 
in self-help house improvement. 
3. Investigate the implementation of UBSR for self-help house improvement in kampung 
settlement.  
The third stage can be attained by investigating the extent of compliance by kampung 
residents when implementing UBSR, the negotiated process, and items of UBSR during 
the process of self-help house improvement. 
 
The information relating to the main objectives, aspects, detail regulations, detail objectives of 
each regulations and penalties, were obtained from the local residents who had experience in 
formulating and enforcing the UBSR since its first enactment. It consisted of the Head of CA 
1, Head of NA 7, two experienced local builders, and five senior residents who had experience 
in building their own and other neighbor’s houses. The data and information were collected 
through multi-stage interviews, ranging from group interviews to individual interviews with 
each of the participants. This strategy was necessary to obtain information from each stage of 
interview and verify every detail of information with respondents separately and systematically. 
Due to the absence of a written document, UBSR must be restructured, according to the verified 
information from the interview. This restructured UBSR became the guidance to examine the 
degree of compliance to UBSR by kampung residents in delivering their self-help house 
improvement. 
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The first group interview was conducted in mid-January 2013 at the Community Association 
level. The interview found that only NA 7 had established UBSR as the local building 
regulation 1 . This result became the justification for the selected research area. UBSR 
implementation is investigated in the design and construction process of a community facility, 
parallel with the project. This process was used to identify the existence of UBSR and the 
procedures undertaken to ensure its enforcement over a period of 9 months, since April 2013-
November 2013. During this time, a series of individual interview were also conducted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V.1: The Location of NA 7 in Kampung Cikini 
 
The following part of the method was conducted 2 years later, as the preliminary findings 
received valuable reviews during a 2014 conference in Bogor (West Java). A presentation was 
undertaken as a form of peer examination, and to stimulate discussion, reviews and comments 
by several nonparticipants in the field that were still familiar with the research subject. This 
was performed to help reach validity, as suggested by Yin (2003). One of the reviews suggested 
that the study expanded the sample of self-help house improvement participants in the 
                                                             
1  It was initiated by the community project in NA 7, which was held by Universitas Indonesia and Chiba 
University in 2013. During the community meeting, consent was obtained. The team also found that NA 7 
was the only neighborhood area in Kampung Cikini which has UBSR. While others may also have something 
similar, there is nothing that has been established specifically. 
NA 7 
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neighborhood in order to establish a sufficient number of respondents. This suggestion was 
intended to understand the degree of enforcement of the enacted UBSR by kampung residents. 
As the result, in mid-January 2015, the extended stage was delivered. 
The second group interview was delivered in mid-January 2015 with similar participants. The 
aim was to obtain permission from the residents to participate in this extended research, and 
also to confirm the latest condition of UBSR. After permission was received and confirmation 
of the remaining content of UBSR performed, the extended research started in mid February-
April 2015. It consisted of semi-structured interviews to provide a systematic order but still 
allow freedom in conversation. This method was selected because the interview is a dynamic, 
meaning-making technique, where the actual circumstance of the construction of meaning is 
important, as stated by (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). 
Information regarding the level of awareness and the compliance of UBSR in the built houses, 
was obtained by interviewing 50 respondents, who were selected randomly. Random sampling 
was used as the consent to participate in the research had been obtained, there was a lack of 
information availability when the owners rented the houses, and the availability of residents 
during door-to-door interview sessions. Based on the self-restructured guidance, the built 
houses of 50 respondents were examined to understand the extent of compliance with the 
enacted UBSR.  
Simultaneously, questions were asked of the respondents that specifically related to the 
awareness and the method of disseminating the UBSR, and the existence and source of the 
house building permit. For those who failed to comply, reasons for negotiating and the 
negotiation process were also investigated during the door-to-door interview.  
The result was classified based on the generated coding and tabularized to understand 
quantitative aspects of topics and the relationship between them in each stages. The qualitative 
information will explain the quantitative aspects of the obtained result. 
The result was presented and discussed in the third group meeting, which was delivered in mid-
May 2015 to verify the results with the respondents. Peer examination, was used to increase 
the validity of the data obtained. The preliminary findings in UBSR were presented in the 5th 
Megacities Conference in Bogor (Indonesia) and discussed with Professor Stephen Cairns 
(ETH Zurich). His valuable insights were elaborated on in a paper, which was under-reviewed 
in International Journal of Architectural Research.  
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V.3 THE FAILURE OF CODE OF HOUSING IN KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT 
V.3.1 Building Regulation in Indonesia 
In order to ensure the safety of the building users, the Government of Indonesia has enacted 
Building Law 28/2002. The Government Regulation 36/2005 was issued as an explanation of 
Building Law 28/2002. It explained the stages of the building process, such as: 1) procurement, 
which includes the standard building experts in design and construction; 2) general criteria of 
architecture, structure and building utilities design; 3) building construction; 4) maintenance; 
and 5) penalties for any kinds of infringements. 
Several more detailed national regulations were enacted by Ministry of Public Works as 
guidelines for ensuring the accomplishment of the objective of Building Law 28/2002. Each of 
the MPWR are equipped with detailed codes of standards that are issued by the National 
Standard Agency (NSA). The codes comprises of the standard building structure safety and 
required infrastructure networks of housing complexes. The first, which refers to building 
structure safety, relates to the earthquake and fire hazards with the mitigation systems. While 
the second corresponds to the road, water, electricity, and garbage disposal network system.  
The detail design of the house or housing complex belongs to the domain of the city 
government, because it relates to the specificity of the land use policy in each city. The 
established Floor Area Ratio (FAR), building heights, the building setback to the road, river 
and sea, are regulated in the enacted city government regulations. The City Government of 
Jakarta has enacted several regulations, such as: 1) City Regulation (CR) 7/2010 on Building; 
2) Governor Regulation (GR) 129/2012 on Procedure of Building Permit’s Obtainment; 3) CR 
3/2012 on Retribution of Building Permit CR, and 4) CR 1/2014 on City Plan. City government 
also annually establishes the Unit Construction Price for calculation of the construction cost. 
A study by Musyafa (2013) in Indonesia has proven that there is gap, approximately 40% of 
the construction cost, between the prescribed standard and the practiced construction of the 
cost. This study highlights the difference of the prescribed standard and the practiced labor 
price. It indicates that the labor price plays a pivotal role in determining the overall construction 
cost. This study also emphasized that land cost, including the initial provision and the building 
permit process, takes up more than half of the overall construction cost, which is significant to 
the overall cost of house building.  
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*)  NSI corresponds to National Standard of Indonesia, which is established by National Standard Agency. 
**)  It voluntary for house owners to comply with this document, but mandatory for house/ building which is built 
by using state/ city expenditure budget. 
 
Figure V.2: The Hierarchical Building House Regulations in Jakarta 
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12. NSI on Standard Modular Design for 
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15. NSI on Energy Conservation of Air 
Conditioning; 
16. NSI on Design Guidelines of 
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17. NSI on Energy Conservation of 
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building compliance repeats if there is any change in design 
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However, the study excludes the architect’s service fee for providing the construction 
documents, despite this being a prerequisite in obtaining a building permit. According to the 
Indonesian Institute of Architects (IIA), the minimum fee of architect’s service for house 
projects has reached US$ 150/ m2. The obligation to use the architect’s service, as enforced by 
various government regulations on the national and city levels, has increased the construction 
cost of houses, especially for the kampung residents. Although ensuring the safety of the 
building users is the regulations noble intention, it impedes the kampung residents to comply 
due to the unaffordable price. As a result, the enacted regulations have systematically excluded 
the kampung residents from obtaining a building permit and complying with the enacted 
regulations. 
In CR 1/2014 on Jakarta City Plan, the development of Menteng district’s future goes to 
vertical development, which surely diminish of the kampung settlement. In Article 74, the 
Vertical Rent and Owned Housing will be developed to replace the existing low-rise housing. 
 
V.3.2 Constraints of Code Compliance for Kampung Resident 
A. The Building Permit in Jakarta 
The procedure of obtaining a building permit in Jakarta has been regulated by 
Governor Regulation (GR) 129/2012 on Procedure of Building Permit’s 
Obtainment. This regulation has established three stages, which are: application 
submission, retributions, and issue the building permit.  
In the first stage, the applicant must fill the application form and submit several 
documents to the district office such as: 
1. A copy of identity card of the applicant; 
2. A copy of taxpayer identity card of the applicant; 
3. A copy of land certificate from NLA legalized by public notary; 
4. A copy of the latest payment receipt of land and building tax; 
5. Five copies that demonstrate the project’s conformity with land use in the house 
location according to the city plan; 
6. Five copies of the architectural design of the house; 
7. Four copies of the construction design of the house; 
8. Four copies of the structural analysis of the house. 
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After the district office has assessed and approved the submitted application, the 
applicant proceeds to the second stage for paying retribution to the tax office. The 
amount of payment is stipulated in City Regulation (CR) 3/2012 on Retribution of 
Building Permit, which establishes the formula: Building Size x Unit Retribution 
Price x Index. The first refers to the house size, while the second corresponds to the 
established unit retribution price for houses. The third is derived from a complex 
assessment that considers fire hazard risk, permanency, earthquake risk, density, 
height and ownership. The submission of the receipt of retribution payment is 
required to proceed the final stage. 
In the final stage, the district office issues a building permit on paper and creates a 
board to be put on display at the construction site. The length of issue time is twenty 
days after the applicant submits the receipt of retribution payment to the district 
office.  
B. The Compliance Constraint for Kampung Residents 
The respondents were aware of the obligation to apply for building permits to the 
Menteng district office. However, they are reluctant due to their inability to meet 
the requirements outlined in GR 129/2012. 
The first difficulty arises when trying to obtain the taxpayer identity. Most of the 
respondents, who work in the informal sector, cannot obtain taxpayer identity for 
several reasons, such as: 1) the low-income is exempt from paying tax; 2) the 
fluctuated monthly income from unsteady jobs cannot obtain taxpayer identity.  
The second difficulty is in obtaining the land certificate from the NLA and legalized 
by the public notary. As previously mentioned in Chapter IV, none of the 
respondents can obtain the land certificate from NLA. Therefore, they are instantly 
not an eligible candidate to obtain the building permit.  
Thirdly, procuring the latest payment receipt of land and building tax is another 
difficulty. Although some of the respondents admitted to paying the land and 
building tax, there is no evidence of the payment, which excludes them from being 
seen as a land and building tax payer.  
Fourth, the conformity of land use in the house location according to the city plan. 
In the city plan, the kampung location is projected to be commercial and social 
facilities without residential area. Therefore, the non-compliance excludes the 
opportunity of kampung residents to obtain the building permit.  
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Fifth, the required construction documents. In order to provide construction 
documents, hiring architect and civil engineer are mandatory, which is unaffordable 
for the respondents.  
The second stage presents even more financial restraints. Even if the respondents 
are able to comply with the requirements of the first stage, it is doubtful that their 
financial capacity could meet the requirements of building permit retribution.  
 
Generally, seven of the eight requirements in the first stage cannot be complied with by the 
respondents, due to administrative and financial constraints. Additionally, the second stage 
presents a significant financial hurdle, which definitely guarantees the exclusion of the 
kampung residents to receiving a building permit. Due to their ineligibility, the activities of 
self-help housing improvement in Kampung Cikini are not well-documented or supervised. As 
such, they are delivered differently from the established housing regulation stipulated by the 
MPWH. Therefore, residents encounter problems in the process, not only economic problems 
due to the regulation being unaffordable, but also policy issues, which excludes them from 
being able to actually comply with the regulations. 
 
V.4 UBSR IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
V.4.1 History of UBSR 
All respondents, who have resided for more than 30 years in the study area, asserted that the 
inability of comply with regulations compels the community to self-regulate their own 
settlement. It was necessary to have a set of accepted regulations that could be a reliable 
reference when creating a harmoniously built environment among kampung residents. As 
prominent figures of the community, three of them recalled that since the 1980s they had tried 
to arrange and compose UBSR.  
Although the community members do not have formal education in construction engineering, 
some of them are local builders, who have experience in building houses and infrastructure. 
One community member was even appointed as an infrastructure and building expert in NA 7 
during the 1960s. He earned construction knowledge from his involvement in government 
construction projects since the 1960s. During his working years as a construction laborer, he 
learned trade skills associated with timber, concrete, and metal constructions, and also became 
familiar with many finishing materials such as plywood, clay bricks, ceramic and many others. 
Since his retirement from construction projects in 1980’s, he has built all of the community 
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sanitation facilities, drainage channels and several houses in the neighborhood, with help from 
other community members. He managed to build those infrastructures within very limited 
budget by utilizing used materials which were collected by the community. 
 
Table V.1: Unwritten Building Shared Rules in Neighborhood Association 7  
 
NO. 
MAIN 
OBJECTIVE 
ASPECTS 
DETAIL 
REGULATION 
DETAIL 
OBJECTIVES 
PENALTIES 
1 
Hazard 
Prevention 
related to 
building 
 
a) 
Fire 
Hazards 
Prevention 
i) 
Electrical 
Safety; 
Minimize short-
circuit 
Paying 
Compensation 
to Fire 
Victims ii) Kitchen Safety Control Gas & Fire 
b) 
Clean 
Water 
Preservation 
Prohibit Individual 
Bathroom within 
11 meters from 
communal 
bathroom 
Evade Pollution to 
Communal Well 
Demolition of 
Individual 
Bathroom 
2 
Social 
Concordance 
Preservation 
related to 
building 
a) 
Cantilever 
Structure to 
Increase 
Interior Size 
i) 
Maximum 
Span less than 
half of street 
width; 
*) 
Preserving 
Privacy each 
Households 
Renovation of 
Cantilever 
Structure 
**) 
Shaded Area 
in the Street 
ii) 
Opening 
Position 
Protecting Security 
and Privacy  
Shifting 
Openings 
b) 
First Floor 
Height 
 
Parallel 
Elevation 3.00 
meters 
Access by 
Shopping Cart from 
Market 
Demolition of 
Cantilever 
Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V.3: Sketch of the formal (left) guidelines based on Government regulation and 
informal (right) guidelines based on research finding. 
 
Preventing hazards and preserving social order are two main objectives of UBSR to maintain 
their ability to live in the city center. The arrangement of shared electricity wires and allocation 
of the kitchen has become the main concern in fire hazard prevention. Due to limited clean 
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water resources in this high-density kampung settlement, individual bathrooms in each house 
are restricted within 11 meters distance from communal well to prevent pollution.  
Cantilevered structures and first-floor heights are the main concerns relating to the preservation 
of social harmony. In order to accommodate activities in the very limited interior space, UBSR 
allows the community to expand the second floor to the street. It shaped most of the houses in 
this settlement using cantilever structure. It also provides shaded space in front of the houses 
that helps generate comfortable social spaces in the street for the community. This decision 
allows various community activities to occur inside this small building. Nonetheless, the length 
of cantilever structure must not exceed half of the street width in order to preserve social 
harmony with the surrounding neighbors.  
Local leaders and builders have claimed that the regulation of cantilevered structure is 
designated to resolve many conflicts among kampung residents. According to UBSR, the 
appropriate length is around 700-900 mm, considering that the most of the streets in the 
settlement are only 2 meters wide. Moreover, most of the cantilever structures in this 
neighborhood were made by second-hand wood blocks which were collected from various 
locations. Therefore, the material strength is compromised and such structures would easily 
collapse if they were built beyond the regulated length. It creates a small gap between 
cantilevered structures to prevent spatial conflict and permits the penetration of natural light to 
illuminate the street during daytime. Furthermore, the minimum first story height is 3.00 meters 
to allow the trading carts to circulate in the alley. Nonetheless, the regulation tolerates different 
measurements, according to the variety of street width and with mutual agreement with the 
surrounding neighbors. 
Community members were allowed to build without a local builder’s involvement. Therefore, 
supervision becomes essential to enforce UBSR. In order to ensure the project referred to 
UBSR, local builders usually supervise periodically or accidentally. This supervision was not 
only delivered by local builders but also the rest of community members. Information on a 
building’s progress was shared during community meetings for further investigation by local 
leaders and builders. Therefore, the implementation of UBSR is effective through the 
participation of community members. 
 
V.4.2 Dissemination of UBSR among Kampung Residents in NA 7 
Lack of written technical guidance, rules, and construction documentation presents several 
constraint for the community members to acknowledge and understand UBSR. According to 
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50 respondents, there are 3 (three) ways to encourage the awareness of UBSR, which are: 
internship, community meeting and neighbor’s talk. 
The internship is affirmed by most respondents as the most efficient way to raise awareness of 
UBSR among community members. The engagement of community members in housing 
improvement and community facility provision, enables the local leaders and builders to 
transfer technical knowledge and UBSR principles to the rest of community. It becomes one 
of the most effective methods to preserve UBSR since those projects were never documented. 
Local builders and community members who are involved in these projects have memories 
about the details and processes, which becomes the only experienced information source for 
improvement projects in the future. 
The information of UBSR is also widespread through neighbor’s talk. The neighbors, who 
participate in neighborhood improvement or the construction of a community facility, share 
their knowledge of UBSR and direct the construction design in order to fulfill the UBSR 
principles. The shared guidance from neighbors is essential to meet the basic principles of 
UBSR, which prevent hazards and conflict among residents.  
 
Table V.2: Awareness and Dissemination of UBSR with its Connection to Design 
Consultation  
 
Awareness and Dissemination of 
UBSR among Community Members 
UBSR Compliance 
Yes No Total 
1. Yes 20 (54.05%)* 17 (49.95%)* 37 (74.00%) 
a. Internship 13 (65.00%)** 12 (70.59%)*** 25 
b. Community Meeting 2 (10.00%)** 2 (11.76%)*** 4 
c. Neighbor's Talk 5 (25.00%)** 3 (17.65%)*** 8 
2. No 0 (0.00%) 13 (100.00%) 13 (26.00%) 
TOTAL 20 (40.00%) 30 (60.00%) 50 
*)  Percentage based on the population who aware of UBSR; 
**) Percentage based on the population who aware of UBSR and comply with UBSR; 
***) Percentage based on the population who aware of UBSR and do not comply with UBSR. 
 
Community members are also aware of the existence of UBSR through information 
disseminated during community meetings. During the meetings, local leaders and builders 
frequently share the latest condition of their neighborhood and propose ideas for improvements. 
Through discussion with community members, local leaders and builders, UBSR and its 
application to solving their spatial problems in the neighborhood is circulated to community 
members. Through these methods, UBSR should be disseminated to all residents in the 
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neighborhood and that may encourage them to comply in order to prevent the undesirable 
hazards in the future. 
This finding confirms the self-organizational ability of the community to utilize the available 
materials and tools based on their craftsmanship skill. UBSR becomes the product of their 
insistence to protect their living quality in an impoverished environment. The community 
members in the research area coined 2 (two) principles of UBSR, which are necessary to 
comply with. First, it is intended to maintain the quality of natural resources such as fire disaster 
prevention and clean water preservation that are needed to survive in this vulnerable 
environment. Second, it is designated to avoid conflict among community members. 
Deliberation is conducted among local leaders, such as the Head of NA 7 and acknowledged 
local builders, drawing on their prior technical experiences and the socio-cultural context of 
the community.  
The existence of UBSR in Kampung Cikini confirms the argument of Turner (1976) and Roy 
(2011) about the capability of kampung residents to organize themselves. Their resolve to 
overcome the possible adversities that arise from living in the vulnerable environment are 
manifested in UBSR. First, the land acquisition case demonstrated the ability of the social 
structure to impose the agency of kampung residents. Fire is one of the most avoided hazards 
in kampung settlement and the social structure, which consists of rules to regulate resources, 
are accepted by the whole kampung residents. The second case is the preservation of the 
community’s clean water source. Due to the small availability of clean water, local leaders and 
builders enacted a rule to prevent the contamination of their common good.  
In the community facility case, where local leaders and builders are actively involved in the 
design and construction process, UBSR was implemented thoroughly. It commonly occurs 
when there is outside party involvement or high-income fellow residents wishing to build a 
house in the neighborhood. As the authority of the neighborhood, the local leaders and builders 
apply the existing UBSR in order to prevent the escalating probability of hazards occurring in 
the future. They apply UBSR based on their local knowledge and skills from the design and 
construction stages, and eventually authorize a building to be built. In the design and 
construction processes of community building, the local leaders and builders were engaged 
actively to realize the design according to their local UBSR. This finding indicates the relation 
between the financial capacities of homeowners with the application of UBSR. In the case of 
the community facility project (that was financed by outside party), the local leaders and 
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builders were convinced the application of UBSR was a feasible method in achieving its main 
objective.  
This local knowledge is preserved through an internship Internship has been affirmed by many 
experts to be the most efficient method in disseminating and preserving the UBSR to the rest 
community members. Learning by doing through the practical application is acknowledged by 
most respondents as a way to understand UBSR. This system also provides knowledge and 
skills transfer from local builders to other community members, which is useful for those who 
wish to build or renovate their houses in the future in accordance with the UBSR. This process 
also occurs in the design and construction of the community building project, where several 
community members participated in helping and learning about building houses. This finding 
corroborates the argument of Garau and Sclar (2005) on the application of local knowledge 
during design and construction process that involves skill, ability to organize self-help, capacity 
to co-operate, muscle-power, and also the capability for using available materials and tools.  
Therefore, the social structure, which consists of rules to manage resources, will be accepted 
and complied by the whole community when it directly supports their survival. The rule to 
manage and preserve the available living resources and maintain social harmony has been 
conserved through various methods: from the apprenticeship, to community meetings and 
neighbor’s discussions. The first is an efficient way to preserve UBSR because it involves 
simultaneously sharing information whilst practicing, which is useful in building and 
supervising the construction process of their own or others’ houses.  
 
V.4.3 Implementation of UBSR on House Building in NA 7 
Although community members have acknowledged the construction skills of the local builders 
in NA 7, not all of them use the service of local builders. There are 4 of 50 respondents (8.00%) 
that used local builders to build or renovate their houses. Most of the respondents collaborated 
with neighbors, hired craftsmen and family members. 
This condition impacts UBSR compliance in the research area. From 37 respondents who 
acknowledge UBSR, only 20 respondents (54.06%) communicated their house building or 
renovation processes to local leaders or builders in order to comply with UBSR. This 
permission only occurred when local leaders were informed and actively involved in the 
construction process. All of the respondents, who used the local builders’ service, were willing 
to utilize his skills because of his well-known reputation. Although the construction price was 
higher than prior expectation, they were assured that the building would be of good quality and 
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that it complied with the UBSR, thus preventing them from hazards and conflict with neighbors 
in the future.  
Despite the well-known reputation of local builders, 16 of 20 respondents (80.00%) refused to 
utilize the local builders’ service to build or renovate their houses. Local builders are reluctant 
to discuss and negotiate with clients, and sometimes disregard clients’ aspirations towards their 
own houses because of their highly praised construction knowledge and experience. Their 
approaches were very rigid when referring to UBSR, which sometimes compromised the 
respondents’ spatial needs. Their decisions also often disregarded the financial capacity of 
respondents, which exacerbated the construction process. Therefore, most of the respondents 
have historically preferred to collaborate with people who may have less construction 
knowledge and skills, but are able accommodate their spatial needs, such as: hired craftsmen 
from outside neighborhood, neighbors, and even family members. Nonetheless, the local 
leaders supervise the work of outside builders to meet UBSR, and also obtain the building 
permit.  
Although they have acknowledged the existence of UBSR at various instances of their time in 
the settlement (such as an internship, community meeting, and neighbor’s discussion), 17 of 
the 37 respondents (45.94%) confirmed that they do not consult with local leaders on the 
construction design of their projects, or comply with the UBSR. These respondents, as shown 
in Table V.3 and 4, claimed to acknowledge UBSR but negotiated to have the requirements not 
compromise their immediate need for space. All respondents claimed that using the local 
builders and complying with all UBSR requirements would burden their households with 
escalated renovation expenditures. Based on their prior knowledge from the internship, 
community meeting and neighbor’s discussion, their house renovation process tends to be 
delivered by family members with the participation of their nearest neighbors in order to avoid 
future conflict. Therefore, these respondents’ house building projects or improvements see that 
meeting their spatial needs within their financial capacity is a higher priority that UBSR 
compliance. As such, this behavior compromises the integrity of the UBSR.  
As for those respondents who do not acknowledge UBSR, none of them undertake a 
consultation process to check their house building or renovation complies with UBSR. All 13 
respondents admitted they did not obtain a building permit from local builders but rather 
neighbors. The construction cost becomes their main consideration to avoid using the service 
of local or outside builders. 
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Table V.3: The Awareness of UBSR, House Builders, UBSR Compliance and Obtain Permit  
 
Aware
ness of 
UBSR 
Total 
The House 
Builders 
UBSR Compliance Obtain Building Permit 
Yes No Leaders Neighbors None 
Yes 37 
Local Builders 4 0 4 0 0 
Outside Builders 16 0 16 0 0 
Family Members 0 8 0 3 5 
Neighbors 0 9 0 9 0 
(n) 74.00%  
20 
(54.06%)* 
17 
(45.94%)* 
20 
(54.06%)* 
12 
(32.43%)* 
5 
(13.51%)* 
No 13 
Local Builders 0 0 0 0 0 
Outside Builders 0 0 0 0 0 
Family Members 0 5 0 1 4 
Neighbors 0 8 0 8 0 
(n) 26.00%   
0 
(0.00%)** 
13 
(100.00%)** 
0 
(0.00%)** 
9 
(69.23%)** 
4 
(30.77%)** 
Total 50 
(n) 20 30 20 21 9 
(%) 40.00% 60.00% 40.00% 42.00% 18.00% 
*)  Percentage based on the population who aware of UBSR; 
**) Percentage based on the population who aware of UBSR and comply to UBSR. 
 
Table V.4: The Negotiated UBSR  
 
Source of 
Building 
Permit 
Total 
(n) 
Negotiated 
UBSR 
Aspects 
Total 
(n) 
Reasons for Negotiating 
UBSR 
Total (n) 
Neighbors 
12 
(70.59%) 
Fire 
Hazard 
Prevention 
1 
(8.33%) 
Ramification for sharing 
electricity 
1 
(8.33%)* 
Clean 
Water 
Prevention 
6 
(50.00%) 
Need of Individual 
Bathroom for senior or 
female occupants 
6 
(50.00%)*  
Cantilever 
Structure 
5 
(41.67%) 
Need for additional interior 
space 
3 
(25.00%)* 
Need for opening in the 
additional structure 
2 
(16.67%)* 
None 5 
(29.41%) 
    
Neighbor's participation in 
construction 
1 
(20.00)** 
  Small improvement and 
impact to neighbors 
2  
(40.00) ** 
    
Understand the UBSR & 
construction knowledge 
2  
(40.00) ** 
Total (n) 17    17 
*)  Percentage based on the population who obtain building permit from neighbors; 
**) Percentage based on the population who do not ask building permit from local leaders or neighbors. 
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The requirements of UBSR forces residents to compromise on their immediate needs, 
considering the expensive construction cost. The height of first floor and the length of 
cantilever structure demand a certain construction cost that they cannot afford. While the size 
may not be suitable for their immediate needs they must acclimatize. Neighbor’s involvement 
in house construction allows them to negotiate to reach a mutual agreement according to the 
respective needs of each party. This is done to prevent conflict among the parties in the future. 
This method was regarded as more efficient than consulting to local or outside builders.  
Clean water preservation is the most negotiated aspects of the UBSR (50.00%), as shown in 
Table V.4, rather than cantilever structure (41.67%) or even fire hazard prevention (8.33%). 
The purpose of constructing individual bathrooms in the interior of the house was to increase 
privacy for female residents or convenience for elderly residents, especially in the middle of 
the night. Nonetheless, the construction of a complete individual bathroom requires the 
installation of an expensive clean water well along with a septic tank to prevent contamination 
of the communal water source. Interior space availability also becomes the inevitable 
consideration. The common solution is the construction of a modest bathroom without clean 
water installation to serve as a space to urinate, while the communal bathroom remains as the 
bathing and defecation space, as the bathroom pipe is connected directly to the existing 
neighborhood greywater drainage. 
    
 
Figure V.4: The Various of UBSR implementation of Cantilever Structure 
 
Figure V.4 illustrates the various implementation of UBSR in a cantilever structure. The 
immediate need to increase interior space results in the construction of a second floor. 
Interestingly, the urge to construct a cantilever structure, as prescribed in UBSR, is not always 
delivered as it depends on the immediate spatial needs and present financial capacity of the 
household. It also relies on the permission of the surrounding neighbors. In some cases, the 
neighbors have refused the construction of cantilevered structures to protect the penetration of 
sunlight to their houses. In some cases, neighbors have offered to share space as a replacement 
for the intended cantilever structure whilst still accommodating the immediate spatial needs. 
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The placement of openings in the second floor is a noteworthy consideration, to preserve the 
privacy of each household. For example as shown in Figure V.4., the household closed the side 
window when the neighbor constructed a second floor to achieve the mutual needs of privacy. 
These descriptions explain the flexibility of UBSR implementation through series of 
negotiations of present immediate needs, financial capacity of households, the existing physical 
house condition, and the needs of surrounding neighbors.  
 
V.4.4 Double-Sided Effect of UBSR 
For the 13 respondents who do not acknowledge UBSR, most of them (61.54%) affirmed that 
the lack of enforcement is a main factor of the lack of UBSR awareness. The variety of physical 
built houses along with the operation of ever-growing negotiations has obscured the  UBSR as 
a fundamental building reference in the neighborhood. Its flexible implementation renders 
UBSR as a vague guideline, as admitted by 4 of 13 respondents (30.77%).  
 
Table V.5: The Relationships of Lack of Awareness of UBSR, House Builders and Provider 
of Building Permit  
 
Lack of 
Awareness 
House Builders 
Provider of Building Permit 
Total 
Local Builders Neighbors None 
Low 
Enforcement 
1. Local Builders 0 0 0 
8 2. Family Members 0 2 2 
3. Neighbors 0 3 1 
(n)   0 (0.00%) 5 (62.50%) 3(35.50%) 61.54% 
Vague  
1. Local Builders 0 0 0 
4 2. Family Members 0 1 0 
3. Neighbors 0 2 1 
(n)   0 (0.00%) 3 (75.00%) 1(25.00%) 30.77% 
Unwritten 
1. Local Builders 0 0 0 
1 2. Family Members 0 1 0 
3. Neighbors 0 0 0 
(n)  0 (0.00%) 1(100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 7.69% 
Total  0 (0.00%) 9 (64.28%) 4(35.72%) 13 
 
As an unwritten product, it lacks clarity, which renders vagueness and thus enforcement 
encounters problems, according to 1 respondent (7.69%). They choose to solve their spatial 
needs and resolve all disputes through discussions and negotiation among neighbors. This 
practice makes UBSR to an obsolete rule in maintaining spatial order for this respondent group. 
Despite its lack of clarity, local leaders admitted the flexibility encourages social interaction 
among community members and allows them to meet their immediate needs whilst respecting 
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the established consensual agreement. If the mutual agreements cannot be reached or conflicts 
occur, then UBSR becomes the reliable reference to neutralize disputes or conflicts.  
The enforcement of UBSR must be flexible because it does not contain rigid punishment for 
every infraction. Although they are appointed as leaders, based on their acknowledgment social 
status and expertise, local leaders consider themselves as ordinary members of the community 
who also rely on others to deal with obstacles in their everyday lives. They do not have 
privileges based on a formal law like a government agency, which discouraged them from 
delivering definitive punishment for each infraction.  
The suitable punishment is declared through deliberation among community members based 
on the context of the infraction. The degree of the infraction, financial capacity, and social 
reputation of the member become inherent considerations before the community establishes 
the punishment. If these considerations were not taken into account, it would spark a more 
acute conflict that will risk their capacity to deal with hazards in the future. It confirms that the 
enforcement is not solely based on technical considerations, but also considers social and 
economic aspects of community members.  
Nonetheless, the findings also illustrate inconsistent UBSR compliance in self-help houses in 
the neighborhood. Most of the respondents (60.00%) declined UBSR compliance due to several 
impediments. The main impediment of UBSR compliance in the research location is its 
application encumbers the financial capacity of the community members, despite its promising 
objective to prevent hazards and future conflict among neighbors. The rigid enforcement by 
local leaders and builders to reach the objective of UBSR instead compromises the individual 
objectives and financial capacity of each community member to deliver house improvement. 
The compromise was stimulated by the difference of time period of the objective. The UBSR 
attempts to prevent the hazards in the future while the self-help improvement occurs to meet 
the immediate needs for space according to the present socio-economic condition of the 
community members. This difference discourages the enforcement of UBSR compliance 
among the community members and places it at a lower priority than other immediate 
considerations during the design and construction process of their self-help house improvement 
activities. The adjustment of UBSR is designated to conform its main objective with needs for 
space and financial capacity of the homeowner, and the needs of surrounding neighbors.  
The involvement of the surrounding neighbors in the design or construction process of self-
help house improvements demonstrates the multi-level participatory planning and design that 
is implemented to overcome the adversities existing within the deprived neighborhood. UBSR 
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was created as building rules at a neighborhood level, and it has been dynamically modified 
amongst smaller groups of neighbors. 
The provision of the individual bathroom for accommodating privacy for female residents and 
convenience of the elderly, additional interior space and complicated ramifications of 
electricity wires have collided with the needs of surrounding neighbors to produce creative 
spatial solutions that correspond to the definitive context. The possibility of thorough spatial 
usage, mutual sharing of space to reduce the number of the cantilever structures, the 
configuration of building openings, and careful ramification of wires for sharing electricity 
represent the existence of multiple socio-spatial UBSR among neighbors. The built house is 
not only a product of individual homeowner’s work, but also the result of collaboration with 
their surrounding neighborhood. The accommodation of comprehensive considerations 
emerging from the household, neighbors and neighborhood levels, makes the whole 
neighborhood an inseparable unit. The house interior has been affected not only by the 
immediate needs of homeowners but also the existing physical condition of the neighborhood 
and needs of surrounding neighbors.  
This flexibility breeds several consequences. It remains unwritten because it is based on 
consensual agreement among neighbors, which made the mechanisms vague. Although UBSR, 
as the social structure in the community, was accepted and approved by the entire community 
members, vague understanding among community members allows diverse interpretations, as 
long as the unwanted results are hindered. The local leaders and builders still tolerate the house 
building or improvement to occur without UBSR compliance as long as its main objective is 
still accomplished.  
This tolerance also exemplifies the low enforcement of UBSR compliance. Its enforcement 
was conducted through discussions among community members to reach a reasonable solution 
for reducing or eliminating unwanted consequences. If they cannot reach any possible solutions 
which may compromise their social harmony as a community, then they will refer to UBSR 
for a solution. If one disputed party still refuses to comply with the UBSR, local leaders and 
builders shall decide to take extreme measures.  
This condition makes community members encounter difficulties in enforcing UBSR in each 
house and as such, it is often disregarded as a reference. Negotiating with neighbors becomes 
essential because most of the respondents are relying on the assistance of their neighbors to 
build or improve their houses to avoid the unwanted hazards. The limited result from the 
application of UBSR by local leaders and builders, breeds various modifications as an 
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alternative to consensual agreement in micro-scale. The various modifications to the UBSR 
becomes the most efficient rule to meet the immediate needs for space whilst minimizing 
possible hazards, as they encompass the consensual agreement beyond building design but also 
the delicate spatial system among neighbors that makes the built houses perform well for the 
homeowners and surrounding neighbors.  
 
 
 
Figure V.5: The Modified UBSR and its Implementation 
 
Eventually, UBSR only becomes the reference to solve disputes when hazards and conflicts 
have already occurred, rather than a proactive, preventive source. However, UBSR must act as 
a preventive rather than curative rule, in order to maintain and improve the living quality of the 
deprived neighborhood.  
However, the ever-growing modification of UBSR indicates the flexibility of self-organizing 
rules to address the encountered context. The immediate needs to increase the house size with 
insufficient amount of resources still enables the kampung residents to meet their needs. The 
involvement of neighbors, in terms of sweat equity through mutual assistance in the 
construction process or advice to minimize the negative impacts to the neighborhood, becomes 
the alternative solution to the unaccommodated conditions. The absence of a building permit 
does not indicate the perfunctory building construction. The involved neighbors assist the 
implementation of UBSR in the construction in various ways, and help to build the house 
accordingly.  
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V.4.5 Implementation of UBSR in Case Studies 
The implementation of UBSR appears in several houses in these case studies. The locations of 
case studies are outside of the agreed distance to the nearest communal well.  
 
 
 
Figure V.6: The Location of Communal Bathrooms and Case Studies in NA 7 
 
Furthermore, these case studies also depict the various methods of implementation of the 
location of kitchen and cantilever structure requirements. These case studies are served to 
provide the reasons behind the implementation of UBSR in each house. 
 
A. Case Study 1 
Although there is opportunity for residents to build a cantilevered structure, not all 
of them utilize it for expanding their house size on their limited land size. The first 
case highlights the size of the alley is less than 1500 mm, which is essentially 
useless for building a cantilever. The house owner agreed to avoid any cantilever 
structure on top of the alley to allow the penetration of sunlight, as the front 
neighbors have already taken up 400 mm with a cantilever structure. Moreover, the 
agreed decision was intended to avoid social disharmony relating to the privacy. It 
  
 
 
Case 
Study 1 
Case Study 2 
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was a concern that the close proximity of the periphery wall between houses may 
ignite privacy intrusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V.7: Plan, Section and Photos of the First Case Study 
 
The first case also depicts code compliance in terms of bathroom provision. The 
house owner was allowed to provide a private individual bathroom because the 
house distance from the communal well is more than 11 meters. The kitchen was 
also built in the interior due to the alley being of insufficient width (less than 700 
mm). Use of the alley may have created circulation blockage for the surrounding 
neighbors. However, the close placement of the kitchen with the bathroom was 
intended for quick fire extinguishment whenever the potential fire hazard occurs in 
the kitchen. 
The house was built incrementally with the help of the local builders. The first stage, 
the completion of the two-story house, was in the late of 1970s. While the second 
stage, a vertical extension to a third story, was in the mid-1990s. This was due to 
their children growing older, demanding more privacy and the household reaching 
the threshold of space for comfortable movement in the interior. The close 
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relationship with the local builders and adequate financial capacity to meet the 
construction cost were the reasons to use the local builders. Furthermore, the result 
served to guarantee social harmony with the surrounding neighbors, as it complied 
with the UBSR in NA 7. 
 
B. Case Study 2 
The house was built in the early of 1980s with the help of neighbors and without 
assistance from the local builders. The house owner explained that the local builders 
were very strict on enforcing UBSR, which was not accommodating to spatial needs 
of the households. However, the assisted neighbors acknowledged the USBR and 
modified it to meet the spatial needs of the house owners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V.8: Plan, Section and Photos of the Second Case Study 
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The house owner still manages to meet the spatial needs and household 
requirements in a one-story house, and thus the owner did not need to build 
vertically. Therefore, the cantilever structure is not required. However, the front 
edge of roofline exceeded the boundary of the land plot, which consumes the alley 
space. The consensual decision was for the roof line to not exceed half of alley 
width, to allow the sunlight penetration, clean air, and equal opportunity for the 
surrounding neighbors to extend the front edge of their roof lines without damaging 
the build front edge of other roof lines.  
This condition cannot be acceptable in standardized housing design as set out by 
the government, but is very common in kampung settlement. According to the 
house owner and the surrounding neighbors, this roof line extension provides 
several advantages. First, it covers the alley and provides shaded area which is 
thermally comfortable for the residents to perform activity outside the house. 
Second, it also covers the alley and some parts of the house from rainfall, which 
decreases the pedestrian’s direct exposure to rain. Third, the house owner and the 
surrounding neighbors do not receive any negative impact from the exceeding roof, 
which therefore makes it tolerable.  
At first, although the house is not within the prohibitive distance to construct an 
individual bathroom, the house owner decided to not construct the individual 
bathroom. This decision was based on several benefits for the house owners. First, 
it saves money on construction, as an individual bathroom inside the house is very 
expensive for the house owner. Second, it also saves interior space for other 
activities, which was needed for the household members.  
However, as the house owner grows old, their mobility to use the communal 
bathroom decreases, especially in the middle of the night. Therefore, the house 
owner decided to construct the individual bathroom in 2002. The permission from 
the surrounding neighbors was required, because it added the piping system to 
existing drainage channel. The neighbors accepted as they recognized the elderly 
condition of the house owner. The construction of the piping system was connected 
directly to the drainage channel underneath the alley with the assistance from the 
surrounding neighbors. 
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V.5  UBSR AS THE CODE IN KAMPUNG CIKINI 
The aim of the application of regulations and standards to low-cost housing is to not only 
improve the housing conditions of the poor (Hanafi, 1991) but also generate the opposite effect 
(Turner, 1972). It is unsuitable for the poorest populations in developing countries due to its 
high production costs (Rodell & Skinner, 1983),  lack of cost-recovery for maintenance 
purposes (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992), and low use value as opposed to self-constructed houses 
(Turner, 1976).  
As the result, the poor cannot afford housing that complies with official planning standards and 
regulations (Fergusson & Navarrete 2003). For Rodríguez & Åstrand (1996), building codes 
and regulations that prescribe high standards can hinder development of self-help housing. 
Turner (1976) stated that the function of a person’s home went beyond meeting building codes 
and physical standards. Unfortunately, in most developing countries the legalized building 
standards were adopted from the developed countries without modification. This results in a 
misfit with the local socio-cultural and economic circumstances. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether the majority of the population can actually meet these standards (Choguill, 1994). 
These warnings occur in Kampung Cikini. The noble intentions of the enactment of the 
building codes actually exclude the kampung residents from being able to comply with the 
code due to the administrative requirements and financial constraints. They cannot meet the 
taxpayer identity and land use in the established city plan requirements. Furthermore, the 
prerequisite documents demand them to use the service from architects, whose fee they cannot 
afford.  
Therefore, it is necessary to follow the argument from Yahya (1982), who asserted that the 
legalized building standards must be technically feasible to achieve a safe and hygienic 
building, but also economically viable in terms of materials, labor and land. He also noted that 
the legalized building standards must be compatible with the use of traditional skills and local 
materials, without compromising the health and safety aspects of the building. Fitcher et. al. 
(1972) and Ramirez et. al. (1992) identified that appropriately designed, realistic performance 
standards that were suitable for the physical, economic and social components of housing 
would revolutionize the role and impact of housing standards generally.  
As the modernization of development sweeps across the globe, the local knowledge in slum 
settlements are associated with the past, and times of underdevelopment and poverty (Gellner, 
1983; Prain, 1992: 52). The use of local knowledge in professional work simply attempts to 
revalue forms of knowledge that professional science has excluded, rather than to devalue 
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scientific knowledge itself (Ostrom, 1996). Non-experts, on the other hand, celebrate 
community-building and organizing through practical experience and common sense, which 
still remains unappreciated by the State and experts (Crawford in Mehrotra, 2005).  
UBSR has the rule to manage the resources, and has emerged as a source of guidance for 
building and improving houses and infrastructure in kampung settlement. Its existence is 
substantial evidence of active self-help organization of community members. Together they 
collaborate to protect themselves against the latent hazards existing in deprived neighborhoods. 
It contains consensual building regulations from the fire hazard prevention, clean water, and 
social harmony perspectives. The preservation of local knowledge and the existence of UBSR 
were delivered through internships, community meetings, and informal neighborly discussions. 
These methods do not only provide community members with information, but also builds the 
knowledge and skills required to comprehend UBSR. 
Despite the fact that UBSR is a product consensual agreement, it still lacks an ability to adapt 
to each household’s condition, especially to those who have limited financial capacity. 
Evidently, UBSR is only applicable for homeowners or outside parties with the adequate 
financial capacity to meet its compliance. The result of self-help house building or 
improvement deals with the immediate spatial needs and depends on the financial capacity of 
the homeowner. Most of the respondents, who have financial shortcomings, attempt to 
negotiate UBSR by achieving its main objective with other feasible ways, in accordance with 
their immediate needs and present financial capacity. Negotiating and working with neighbors 
has become one of the popular methods to negotiate UBSR. As the result, the local leaders and 
builders end up tolerating the finished house building or improvement. 
However, UBSR remains unwritten and this fact creates vagueness and complicates the process 
of compliance and enforcement. It is only effectively implemented when local leaders or 
builders are actively involved in the design and construction process. It also provides 
ambiguity, especially for outside parties such as an architect, around engagement and 
conducting community projects in the neighborhood. Whereas, planners and architects must 
comprehend UBSR to deliver successful slum improvement program, as suggested by Oliver 
(2006).  
This case shows the necessity of combining flexible building regulation to meet the needs for 
space according to the specific context of the homeowner and the surrounding neighbors, with 
regulation at the neighborhood level to avoid hazards and conflict. The negotiations to resolve 
conflict must be comprehended as an effort to refine the UBSR as adaptable building guidelines 
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in the neighborhood. The role of general UBSR is shifting, from being the only building 
regulation in the neighborhood, to general policy and the acknowledgment of the practice of 
micro-scale UBSR in specific areas.  
Therefore, UBSR as a code of building houses in kampung settlement emphasizes regulation 
of the process, rather than the product. This is different to government regulation. It illustrates 
the characters of the ‘Pirate Code’ which are: 1) bottom-up; and 2) adaptable to changes. When 
the residents attempt to make ‘rigid code’, which is UBSR, it is constantly challenged, 
negotiated and developed to meet the main objectives and adaptable to socio-economic 
condition of the residents. UBSR is not a fixed and rigid rule to regulate activities and space of 
community members, but rather an open-ended set of directives that generate the ever changing 
built form in kampung settlement.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
VI.1  KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT AS AUTONOMY ANONYMOUS 
Significant global urbanization results from the monstrous population growth prediction, 
especially in Asia. The proliferation of slum settlements is conceived as the nemesis of modern 
city development, which is promised by accelerating population growth and rapid urbanization. 
This prediction preoccupies the mindset of city governments in Asian developing countries, 
including Indonesia, to eradicate slum settlement and achieve the expected results of city 
development.  
Referring to the scholars of urban development, who regarded the slum settlements as a 
temporary phenomenon that would diminish with economic growth, the State and city 
governments have been working to evict slum settlements and impel economic growth 
simultaneously. According to the experience of Indonesia, slow and steady income per capita 
growth has failed to reduce the number of slum settlements. While in Jakarta’s experience, the 
enactment of the Jabodetabek (The Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Area) concept since the 1970s 
– which was intended to disperse the wave of urbanization to the surrounding regions – has 
only decreased the population growth but not the size of slum settlements significantly, despite 
the promising trend of economic growth. Therefore, slum settlements must be understood 
beyond just being an economic problem. 
As economic growth fails to automatically diminish slum settlements, various programs have 
been launched, including evictions, site-and-services, and upgrading.  Although these programs 
indicated promising results, several essential issues are still yet to be resolved, such as land 
tenure security, the high cost of building code compliance and the use value of the house.  
This research attempts to expand the definition of kampung from its historical perspective. 
Since the Dutch colonial era, kampung settlement was granted autonomy from city 
development. The given autonomy allows the kampung residents to formulate and practice 
their own ‘code’ in arranging the settlement. This ‘code’ includes land tenure security, function 
of the house, and building regulation to arrange their living space and maintain their social 
concordance.  
However, their autonomy is only half-heartedly acknowledged by State and city governments, 
as their land tenure security in kampung settlements is continually challenged. Furthermore, 
modern city development since the Dutch colonial era is impossible to deliver without the 
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presence of kampung settlements, as they function as the housing solution for the cheap labor 
responsible for building and maintaining the modern city. The establishment of Sub-District 
Boards has allowed the kampung residents to voice their aspirations and receive various 
intervention programs for improving their living conditions. It also becomes a form of 
acknowledgment of the kampung residents by city government, thus allowing them to exercise 
their autonomy in constant adaptation with the development of city policies. 
However, it is anonymous, as the autonomy to arrange the settlement by their own code 
remains unacknowledged by government through fragmented policies. It is a bitter fact that the 
failure of modern city planning to achieve its utopian dream, as continuous economic growth, 
separation of reproduction and production activities in the house, and the standardization of 
building regulations have denied the kampung residents from obtaining housing appropriate to 
their conditions. 
 
VI.2 THE CODE IN KAMPUNG SETTLEMENT IN THE CASE OF KAMPUNG 
CIKINI 
VI.2.1 Self-Help Management of Kampung Cikini 
In the Dutch Colonial era, the early kampung residents were the workers of NTC, who obtained 
the Right to Build and Use land from the colonial administration in exchange for their services. 
At the dawn of the Independent Era, the State launched a monumental building and 
infrastructure campaign around the city center, as a form of national identity-making. This 
commenced an alarming pace of urbanization in Jakarta and required massive housing 
solutions for the influx of migrants. Due to its close proximity to the site of developments, 
Kampung Cikini bore the inevitable impacts from the first wave of migration.  
In the 1950’s, the land owners partitioned their lands to be sold or rented to the new migrants. 
At that time, sale and rental transactions were unrecorded, based only on oral agreement and 
the development of community recognition. Partitioning was based on the existing structure 
and organized entirely by the land owners.  
As city development continued under the New Order government, the second wave of 
migration hit Kampung Cikini in the 1960s. Consequently, the existing land densified due to 
the uncontrolled arrival of migrants. It sparked rapid partitioning of existing land and instigated 
the reclamation of land between the river inspection road and Ciliwung River. The land 
reclamation was initiated by the construction workers by piling the construction waste to 
strengthen the soil and increase the soil level from the surrounding developments. The 
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construction workers organized the land partitioning in the expanded area and built the self-
help infrastructure to support the livelihood of the newly arrived migrants. The role as planner, 
builder and organizer of the new settlement in the expanded land solidified their position as 
local leaders, earning their own territory and forming NAs to exercise autonomy.  
This fact corroborates the notion that kampung settlements emerged as the housing solutions 
for modern city development, which the State and city governments failed to deliver. The 
efforts to perform self-help housing solutions and self-organize the settlement should be 
regarded as the support rather than the negative residue of modern city development.  
The newly established NA, as the product of Village Government Law 5/ 1974, also cemented 
the territorial division between the native and migrant people, which at first strived to establish 
the identity of neighborhood. The local leaders in the new expanded land were responsible for 
the organization of the migrants, which reduced the responsibility of the native local leaders. 
However, as the settlement densified throughout the years and some parts of the kampung faced 
eviction in the 1980s, the relative or family members of native residents also resided in the 
expanded land due to land availability. As a result, the firm territorial division between native 
and migrant people in this settlement gradually diminished.  
The sharing of authority and responsibility between Heads of NA and CA was delineated, 
whereby the Head of NA exercised authority over the residents, while the Head of CA claimed 
the authority to the deal with the outside parties and maintain social harmony among NAs. This 
self-governance allows kampung residents to self-organize internally and foster the 
relationship with outside parties for overcoming daily adversities. Externally, Kampung Cikini 
managed to nurture and capitalize on a mutual relationship with the modernized surrounding 
neighborhood to ensure their sustained living in Jakarta. 
The self-help management enables kampung residents to organize and generate their own 
‘code’ in kampung settlement. The birth and evolution of the ‘code’ of kampung is an enduring 
effort to ensure their survival in the modernized city. This ‘code’ consists of a way of living, 
including land tenure security, function of the house by practicing Home-Based Enterprises 
(HBE), and Unwritten Building Shared Rules (UBSR) as the building regulation. 
The first issue, is that all the land transactions were communicated to the Head of NA in order 
to supervise the dynamic population, manage land ownership changes, and prevent conflict 
among residents in the future. In the second issue, the arrangement of proliferating HBEs and 
their implications for self-help house improvement are necessary to increase monthly income, 
encourage social cohesion and maintain social harmony. While the third issue relates to the 
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effort of kampung residents to build and improve their house to meet their spatial needs, but 
still prevent future hazards and maintain social concordance among the residents.  
 
VI.2.2 Code of Land Tenure Security 
Due to the rapid land division and the occurrence of land reclamation for the expanding 
kampung settlement, land tenure security is essential. In the first wave of usurpation, the land 
division and ownership were based on oral agreement among residents and reported to the 
Heads of NA and CA. This condition asserted the original subjective tenure security with oral 
agreement and community recognition, and continued through the second wave of usurpation.  
The position of Heads of NA and CA became the source of information about land ownership. 
Consequently, the service time of Heads of NA and CA is very long, as they seek to overcome 
land ownership disputes among residents or with the outsiders. In order to minimize disputes, 
the code of subjective tenure security evolved from oral agreement and community recognition 
to various land transaction documents, ranging from contracts of sale, receipts of land 
transaction, handover previous land ownership letters (Girik and Right to Build Letter) to 
inheritance letters.  
However, the mismatch with the enacted city spatial plan raises the eviction threats which 
challenge the existence of kampung settlement in the city center, including Kampung Cikini. 
The land registration process provided by the government requires high costs and complex 
procedures, with which kampung residents fail to comply. Although the kampung residents 
have obtained autonomy, ID and family cards, the political right to vote, and the representation 
of Sub-District Board, their land and houses in their current location have been 
unacknowledged by city government regulation. This demonstrates the fragmented policies 
relating to land tenure security for kampung residents.  
As eviction threats escalate in tandem with massive modern development, the relationship with 
external parties is important in order to maintain their residences in their current location. The 
obtained ID and family cards have given the political right to vote, which makes kampung 
residents prospective constituents for political parties. It provides a platform for a flourishing, 
symbiotic relationship between political parties and kampung residents, who want to 
effectively preserve their tenure security.  
As this symbiotic relationship has been effectively preventing the execution of the ongoing 
eviction threats, the city government delivers various projects for improving the physical 
characteristics of the kampung settlement. The improvement of road, drainage channels and 
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communal sanitation facilities have been launched throughout the years. City infrastructure, 
such as electricity, solidifies residents’ assumptions that the city government acknowledges the 
existence of the settlement. Referring to their time in residence within the settlement, kampung 
residents are entitled to register their lands to obtain land tenure security from the NLA, as 
promised in BAL.  
 
VI.2.3 Code of Function of the House Relating to Home-Based Enterprises 
The use value of the kampung residences encompasses the production and reproduction space. 
The first refers to the production of economic activities and the second corresponds to the 
biological welfare of the owners. These spatial relationships are embodied in the proliferation 
of HBE, where some of the houses in Kampung settlement emerge as the combination of 
economic and domestic activities. 
This research demystified several arguments relating to the HBE issue.  
First, HBE becomes the primary income for the kampung residents due to their piteous income. 
In Kampung Cikini, most of the HBE play a role as a source of additional income for social 
activities and savings during times of hardship. The monthly income of a household does not 
come only from the head of household but from many sources, including other household 
members who work in formal and informal employment sectors. HBE transforms space to more 
than just an economic production area but to a social fabrication space, where the economic 
and social interests of owners and the neighborhood are solidified beyond the walls of houses. 
Second, HBE refers to the economy activities of individual households. Although the start-up 
capital and house size plays important role deciding the type of commodity, neighbors also 
emerge as the inevitable determinant to choosing the type of commodity and spatial strategy in 
an HBE. This is because the selection of commodity may impact surrounding HBEs, their 
needs, and their owners. 
In several cases, which involve outside parties, the consent from the Head of CA is a 
prerequisite to prevent abdicable consequences in the future. This authority confirms the 
previous argument, where the Head of NA and neighbors are entitled to self-organize their 
neighborhood, while the Head of NA is responsible with all outsider’s activities within 
kampung settlement. 
Third, self-help housing improvement is an inevitable consequence of HBE and subjective 
tenure security. This argument was built in the spirit of individual economic and social 
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improvement as the source of the household’s capacity to deliver self-help housing 
improvement.  
However, several impediments exist, including lack of space, lack of knowledge and lack of 
money. This proves that self-help housing improvement is more complex than economic and 
tenure security improvement. As the result, the monthly income earnt from HBEs were spent 
to fulfill other needs or buy/improve their houses in other locations. It indicates that the HBE 
and self-help house improvement are not individual activities, but also require mutual social 
agreement with the surrounding neighbors. 
 
VI.2.4 Code of Unwritten Building Shared Rules in Kampung Cikini 
Historically, only NA 7 manages to operate the UBSR in arranging their self-help housing and 
built settlement. The main objectives of UBSR are the prevention of hazards and maintaining 
social harmony. These objectives are manifested from the building envelopes to the interior 
space arrangements. Infringement of the UBSR will earn several degrees of punishment, from 
reprimand for adjustment to the forced demolition of the infringed building component.  
Despite a lack of written documentation, UBSR has been disseminated throughout the 
neighborhood by apprenticeship, community meeting and neighborly communication.  
These dissemination methods have been effective in keeping the houses built according to 
specification. 
However, as the population grows due to migration and birth rate, the demographic profile of 
the residents in NA 7 changes. The various level of monthly income influences the ability to 
comply with UBSR. The UBSR also demonstrates some tolerance and leniency of punishment 
towards those who cannot afford to comply with the standards, as long as consent from the 
surrounding neighbors has been reached. This modified procedure is taken to prevent hazards 
and ensure the preservation of social harmony. As a result, UBSR becomes the point of 
reference for building activities that involve of outside parties, and in situations where  disputes 
among the residents may occur.  
Although physical house and infrastructure improvements are necessary to improving their 
living conditions, the existing ‘code’ must be elaborated to ensure the sustainability of the 
improved houses and infrastructure through the self-organization of kampung residents. The 
use value of the house, as the production and reproduction space with the established ‘code’ in 
kampung settlement, must reclaim its place in the planning and design of the kampung 
improvement projects. Revisiting the standard house design and infrastructure is essential, 
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because it must accommodate the ‘code’ of self-organization to ensure the sustainability of the 
delivered projects.  
 
IV.3 ACKNOWLEDGING THE AUTONOMY AND RESPECTING THE CODE 
According to the findings, the kampung residents manage to create the ‘Pirate Code’ relating 
to the housing provision and improvement. These efforts are the result of administration 
incompatibility and unaffordability, and the spirit to sustain living in the city center. The 
produced and practiced housing codes, which encompass land tenure security, home-based 
enterprises and unwritten building shared rules, demonstrate the limit of the government codes 
to accommodate these residents living in the city. The comparison between the housing code 
of the government and the kampung residents is showed in the following Figure VI.1. 
 
Figure VI.1: The Code of Kampung Settlement in the Case Kampung Cikini 
 
In the conclusion of their book, Durand and Vergne (2013) suggested that the government’s 
housing code is more inclusive than exclusive. This suggestion attempts to merge the housing 
code of the kampung residents to the housing code of the government. 
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Despite good intentions, the suggested inclusiveness will lead to the ‘Pirate codes’ growing, as 
the meaning of inclusive itself poses an exclusion1. The merge with the housing code of the 
government will diminish the main characteristics of the housing code of kampung which are: 
1) a bottom-up approach; and 2) ability to adapt to the ever-changing living conditions of the 
residents.  
 
Figure VI.2: The Connections between Housing Code of Kampung and Government 
 
There are 2 (two) examples to explain these arguments. First, the code of land tenure security. 
When the code is included and formally incorporated into the housing code of the government, 
the residents tend to sell their lands on the market in order to obtain a profitable outcome. This 
condition will either remove them from the city center or move them to another kampung 
settlement. Second, is the case of UBSR. The residents in NA 7 have already formulated UBSR 
                                                             
1  Etymologically, the word inclusive is derived from 15th century Medieval Latin inclusivus, which means “a 
shutting up, confinement”. This word then was absorbed to Modern English, with the meaning ‘An intention 
of policy of including people who might otherwise be excluded or marginalized, as a part or subordinate of 
the whole’. Therefore, inclusiveness will make the housing code of ‘kampung as slum’ subordinate to the 
housing code of government code, and losing its main characteristics, such as a bottom-up approach and the 
ability to adapt to ever-changing living conditions of the residents. 
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as the guidelines for building their houses. However, it is still modified by residents in order to 
achieve the main objective and adapt to the living conditions of the residents. This second case 
demonstrates that the top-down and rigid characteristics of the housing code are not suitable 
for the residents. 
Therefore, instead of an inclusive approach, acknowledgment of the autonomy and respect 
towards the practiced housing code of the ‘kampung as slum’ are more suitable approaches. As 
shown in Figure VI.2, the ‘kampung as slum’ as autonomy anonymous actively produce and 
practice its own housing code, which interweaves with the housing code of government through 
various types of demographic policy. The housing code of ‘kampung as slum’ benefits from 
the fragmented policies and the insufficient capacity of the government to sufficiently provide 
housing. This condition enables the residents to live in city center by practicing the integrated 
housing code, while maintaining social order as the primary rule.  
 
VI.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
VI.4.1 Recommendations from This Research 
Therefore, it is essential to diminish the anonymity of the autonomy with the acknowledgment2 
of the autonomy’s existence, and to respect the existing codes in kampung settlement in order 
to find a suitable approach for house improvement in kampung settlement in the future. This 
research provides several suggestions: 
1. The fragmented policies have created the autonomy anonymous. Therefore, the 
synchronization of policies which cover land tenure, city spatial plan and building 
regulation is essential to regain the autonomy for the kampung residents to arrange the 
settlement according to their living conditions. The synchronized policies must 
accommodate the interest of kampung residents to ensure and improve their living 
quality to live in the city center; 
2. Legitimate population data and the code of land tenure security of kampung residents 
must be gathered to formulate the special land tenure security system for the kampung 
                                                             
2  Etymologically, the term acknowledgement is derived from 15th century Middle English oncnawan, which 
means ‘understand, come to recognize, token of due recognition’. This term is absorbed into Modern English, 
which means ‘Recognize the existence, the truth, the fact, the authority, validity or claims.’ According to the 
Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy (2013), Quinn (2010) and Norval (2008), this term has been used 
interchangeably with recognition. Based on those literatures, the difference between acknowledgment and 
recognition is in the process of dispute. The first term corresponds to the acceptance of the ‘Other’ after long 
and exhausting dispute, while the second refers to the acceptance of the ‘Other’ that emerges as new and 
strange. Therefore, considering the long, exhausting dispute between government and ‘kampung as slum’ 
residents, the word acknowledgment is preferable than recognition. 
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residents. The special system is not equal to citizens in the high and middle-income 
groups, who can afford to pay the land tax price; 
3. The changing paradigm from mono-functional to mix functional house is required to 
accommodate the needs of kampung residents in order to utilize their houses for 
increasing their monthly income. Therefore, the infrastructure of the kampung 
settlement must also support the mixture of production and reproduction activities to 
help minimize the environment impacts; 
4. Self-help housing in kampung settlement cannot be regarded as the outcome of 
individual economic capacity, as communal involvement also plays a pivotal role. 
Therefore, the house improvement program in kampung settlement demands multi-
scalar planning from the individual house to settlement level in order to respect the 
interconnection of the physical structure and the social aspect of the kampung residents; 
5. The adaptable building regulation for kampung residents is critical to enabling the self-
help house improvement. Relating to suggestion number 4, building in kampung 
settlement emphasizes the process of communication with the surrounding neighbors, 
not only the product as the end-result of the building regulation. However, the assisted 
self-help house building and improvement works are also necessary to ensure that 
hazards prevention occurs and social order is maintained; 
6. However, it is essential to maintain the recommendations 2-5 outside of the housing 
code of government, as a manifestation of acknowledging the autonomy and respecting 
the code; 
7. Considering the housing code is an integrated code, the recommendation 2-5 must be 
integrated.  
8. It is important for architects and city planners to develop new design methods and 
techniques to deliver recommendations 3-5 by working with the residents as the 
partners. This egalitarian relationship is essential to improving kampung settlement 
according to the socio-cultural and economic condition of the residents.  
 
VI.4.2 Recommendations for Further Studies 
Yet, this research focuses only one kampung settlement due to its aim to understand 
comprehensively the code of kampung settlement in the city center. Due to limited respondents 
and study area, the research findings cannot be regarded as a general condition in other 
kampungs in Jakarta or other cities. Therefore, more case studies with an expanding number 
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of kampung settlements and respondents are suggested to reduce the bias and reaching 
comprehensive understanding of this essential issue. It would be efficient to formulate an 
effective land titling policy to provide tenure security for kampung residents that is compatible 
with their social, cultural and economic context, especially in the center of big cities.  
Furthermore, relating to suggestions above, there are suggested further studies in the future: 
1. Comprehensive policy studies encompassing the land, city spatial planning, and 
building regulations, to formulate the synchronized policies that accommodate the 
interest of kampung residents living in the city center; 
2. Comprehensive mapping of land tenure security of kampung residents in big cities; 
3. Comprehensive planning and design studies of house and settlement for mix function 
of production and reproduction activities to minimize environment hazards; 
4. Longitudinal studies in various study areas are required to obtain time-series 
documentation of the UBSR and its implementation through generations. The results 
will contribute to formulating the realistic and contextual design interventions. 
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